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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates the figure of the cyborg as conceptualised by Donna Haraway in 
The Cyborg Manifesto (1991). The figure of the cyborg, as a transgressive figure in the late 
twentieth century within socialist feminist discourse, is problematized with regard to its 
efficacy as a creature that challenges the constructed nature of gender and contests the 
boundary between human and machine through its ambiguous nature. Haraway’s notions 
of the cyborg, which she bases partly on cyborg characters from Science Fiction literature, 
deny the ocularcentric traditions that have structured gender and the body. Similarly, 
Haraway does not engage adequately with the figure of the cyborg with regard to situating 
it historically. This thesis unpacks both the visual and the historical aspects that have 
structured the cyborg body. By engaging with these concepts, the cyborg emerges as a 
figure that is identified through visual signifiers of female deviance and pathology. By 
reading female deviance and pathology on the body of the nineteenth-century hysteric, 
similarities can be drawn between the hysteric and the cyborg. Through a reading of 
Alien (1979); Blade Runner (1982); and Star Trek: First Contact (1996) key cyborg texts of 
the late twentieth century, the figure of the cyborg, and its relation to the deviant 
pathologised female can be understood when read against the body of the hysteric and 
how it was visually coded and communicated. 
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Introduction 
 
The figure of the late twentieth-century cyborg emerged in Science Fiction films as a figure 
representative of hybridity; ambivalence; oppositional discourses; the coupling of machine 
and organism; and the multiplicitous nature of late twentieth-century life. In films such as 
Alien (1979); Blade Runner (1982); The Terminator (1984); and Cherry 2000 (1987), the 
incarnations of the cyborg differ greatly, from ‘Ash’ (the villainous on-board doctor in Alien) 
to ‘Cherry’ (the docile, eroticised housewife in Cherry 2000). The many variations in the 
image of the cyborg reflect the numerous ways of being in late twentieth-century life and 
depict the differing views of society and how these views are coupled with the 
technological.  
 The cyborg however is not a recent addition to popular culture or literature. 
Historically, the cyborg has appeared in a variety of ways that mirror the cultural and 
technological context of that particular time. From machine slaves proposed by Aristotle; 
the female golem of the 1500s; the automata of the eighteenth century; to the cyborg of 
the twentieth century – each stage in the history of the development of this figure can be 
used as an ethnography of the society that gave rise to it. These early cyborgs also reflect 
the way in which human beings have responded to technological change. 
 The figure of the late twentieth-century cyborg is constructed by popular myth and 
imagination; fact; and the scientism that inflects Postmodern ways of being. The cyborg 
comes to act as a repository for the anxieties that result from technological and cultural 
change, and has fulfilled this function historically from the time of the female golem. 
Changing socio-cultural landscapes are reflected in the visualisation of the cyborg, and as 
Glenda Shaw-Garlock (2008:2) in Abject Cyborg Woman states, the cyborg body has 
historically been the “embodied site of struggle upon which cultural anxieties are projected 
and worked through”. 
 According to David Mitchell (2003:5) in What is it like to be a Robot? “a cyborg, a 
contraction of Cybernetic Organism, is a hybrid of man (or woman) and machine” and 
Haraway (1991:141) states that the cyborg is “a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine 
and organism”. Donna Haraway in A Cyborg Manifesto (1991) suggests the use of the 
figure of the cyborg as a way for feminists to re-imagine gender and the dualisms that have 
structured it. Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto has been regarded as a seminal text which 
outlines the figure of the cyborg as a political tool.  
 Haraway (1991:157) states that “the cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has 
no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to 
organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher 
unity”. Because of the cyborg's hybrid nature, it is able to sever the constitutive links to 
patriarchal ideology that construct the difference that forms the basis of gender binaries.  
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 As Michelle Chilcoat states in Brain Sex, Cyberpunk Cinema, Feminism, and the 
Dis/Location of Heterosexuality (2004), the cyborg allows us to “imagine a world without 
gender, an alternative, or escape from the dualisms that persist in how we think of our 
bodies and the construction of gender” (Chilcoat 2004:157).  
 The dislocation of normative frameworks that structure gender, the body, and identity 
and problematize the constructed nature of these is enabled by the hybrid body of the 
cyborg. Judith Butler in Bodies That Matter (1993) states that 
 
  The constructed character of sexuality has been invoked to counter the claim that 
sexuality has a natural and normative shape and movement, that is, one which 
approximates the normative phantasm of a compulsory heterosexuality. The efforts to 
denaturalize sexuality and gender have taken as their main enemy those normative 
frameworks of compulsory heterosexuality that operate through the naturalization and 
reification of heterosexist norms (Butler 1993:93). 
 
 As Haraway (1991:181) states, “cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of 
dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves”. The cyborg’s 
hybrid nature that questions the boundaries between human and machine, simultaneously 
questions what it means to be human. Gender, as a key characteristic of the notion of 
‘human’ is then brought into question, and gender binaries are weakened. Haraway re-
imagines the late twentieth century as an era that embraces its technological coupling and 
rejects totalising constructions of the world. She states that 
 
Cyborg imagery can help express two crucial arguments… first, the production of the 
universal, totalizing theory is a major mistake that misses most of reality… second, taking 
responsibility for the social relations of science and technology means refusing an anti-
science metaphysics, a demonology, and so means embracing the skilful task of 
reconstructing the boundaries of daily life, in partial connection with others, in 
communication with all of our parts (Haraway 1991:181). 
 
 The cyborg as a political tool for socialist feminist discourse in the late twentieth 
century then functions as a beacon for Post-Modern life as Haraway conceptualises it. By 
problematizing the boundary between human and machine, and thus male and female, the 
cyborg transgresses totalising narratives and weakens patriarchal ideology. If the post-
gendered cyborg is a useful tool for making our way out of the dualisms with which we 
construct our bodies and thus what it means to be human, then this thesis seeks to closely 
examine the depictions of cyborgs that we are confronted with and the efficacy of such 
depictions.  
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 As Adam Bostic notes, in Automata: Seeing Cyborg through the Eyes of Popular 
Culture, Computer-Generated Imagery, and Contemporary Theory, the main drive of 
Western civilisation is advancement, progress, and technology. Thus, he asks whether the 
image or metaphor of the cyborg is as redemptive or transformative, in a post-gendered 
sense as authors such as Donna Haraway, have claimed (Bostic 1998). Robert Fisher, in 
AI and Cinema: Does Artificial Insanity Rule? suggests that the image of the cyborg that 
the cinema-going public is handed is that of the insane or hysterical machine which is very 
much gendered (Fisher 2001). 
 When critically examining representations of the cyborg in Science Fiction films of the 
last three decades, the discrepancy between the cyborg as conceptualised by Haraway, 
and the representation of the cyborg in popular culture, becomes evident. The visualisation 
of the onscreen cyborg is persistently structured through narratives of the Other and the 
feminine. Paradoxically, the gendered onscreen cyborg simultaneously functions to allay 
fears of the loss of the gendered human body in the Electronic Age.  
 The validity of the cyborg as a creature in a post-gender world is called into question 
when comparing Haraway’s notion of the cyborg and the depiction of the cyborg in Science 
Fiction film. The onscreen cyborg emerges, as Glenda Shaw-Garlock (2006:2) states, as a 
“composite of otherness that gives expression to such anxieties as the unruliness of 
nature, the dehumanization of industrial development, transgressive female sexuality, and 
shifting gender relations”. This thesis questions the validity of the cyborg as an icon of 
Socialist Feminist discourse and problematizes the visual representations of cyborgs in 
Science Fiction films. By situating the cyborg within a larger discourse of patriarchal 
ideologies of the machine, science, and the feminine, and questioning how the image of 
the cyborg has depicted these discourses of control, this thesis aims to assess the validity 
of this figure.  
 An analysis of visual representations of female deviance in the nineteenth century is 
important in order to understand not only the cultural context of the time, but also the role 
that technology played in containing, pathologising, and subsequently neutralising female 
deviance. Visual renderings of female deviance are unpacked in order to ascertain specific 
visual markers related to this deviance. These are then used as a starting point from which 
to critique representations of the cyborg. 
 This schema of visual signifiers of female deviance will then be compared to images of 
the twentieth-century cyborg in popular film in order to facilitate a dual reading of both 
female and technological deviance, and how the understanding of both technology and the 
feminine converge in the depiction of the cyborg. To adequately track the progression of 
female deviance as depicted through the body of the cyborg, I will provide a brief analysis 
of a selection of key Science Fiction films from the twentieth century in order to elucidate 
on the cultural and ideological contexts that produced the cyborg characters in these films. 
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In addition, I will then offer a close reading of three key Science Fiction films of the 1980s 
and 1990s: Alien (1979); Blade Runner (1982); and Star Trek: First Contact (1996), in 
order to further expand on the use of visual signifiers of deviance to structure the image of 
the cyborg.  
 Amongst others, the work of Anne Balsamo, Claudia Springer, Michelle Chilcoat, 
Georges Didi-Huberman, Glenda Shaw-Garlock, and Marj Kibby will inform my reading of 
these images of deviance, and I will draw on their work in order to further expand on the 
historical and cultural contexts that gave rise to the image of female deviance that 
structures the image of the cyborg.  
 In chapter one, I discuss Donna Haraway’s conceptualisation of the cyborg and 
present the two main concerns that I have with her notion of the cyborg as a figure in a 
socialist feminist discourse. I argue that Haraway’s notion of the cyborg does not make 
reference to its contentious and long history. Furthermore, I argue that Haraway’s cyborg 
is constructed from Science Fiction literature which, in industrial societies of the West, is 
not the dominant mode of communication. The cyborg that is depicted in Science Fiction 
film of the twentieth century is a depiction that more accurately attests to the view of the 
cyborg, technology, and the deviant female, in the twentieth century. Drawing on 
Guy Debord’s discussion in The Society of the Spectacle (1998), I argue that the visual 
depiction of the cyborg communicates ideology more profoundly in industrial societies that 
according to Debord, are an “immense accumulation of spectacle” (Debord 1998:142). 
 I then discuss the history of the cyborg as it has developed from Greek myth, the 
female golem, and automata of the seventeenth and eighteen centuries in order to frame a 
thorough investigation of the history of the cyborg. By investigating these proto-cyborgs, 
their connections to the deviant feminine, techno-scientism, and gendered modes of 
scientific looking, are highlighted. By contextualising the cyborg within the discourses that 
produced it, the history of the cyborg aids in a thorough reading of the image of the 
twentieth-century cyborg body, and its connection to technology, scientism, and female 
deviance are shown. 
 Furthermore, I argue that the conflation of vision and the eye with knowledge 
production act to reify depictions of the twentieth century onscreen cyborg. Following this, I 
expand on the shift from organicism to a mechanistic world-view in the eighteenth century 
and the practices of scientific looking that emerge from this period. The seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries produced a scientific vision that acted to visualise Enlightenment 
ideals that privileged vision, individualism, and the sciences, in this new mechanistic world-
view. The ideologies inherent in this shift to a mechanistic world-view contextualise cultural 
and social practices that inform, structure, and act to ‘contain’ scientific practice of the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Concomitant in this shift from organicism to 
mechanism is the shift in the view of nature as caring and nurturing to viewing nature as 
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deviant and unruly. Similarly, the feminine is often invoked in discussions of nature and 
technology. By unpacking visual practices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
socio-cultural factors that produced the deviant female body of the nineteenth century, and 
later, the cyborg body can be adequately recognised. 
 In chapter two, I discuss Hysteria and the associations between the feminine, 
deviance, and mental illness. I trace the treatment, symptomology, and diagnosis of 
hysteria and female mental illness as these appeared and evolved in Ancient Egypt, 
Ancient Greece, and later on, in Europe in the nineteenth century. My focus in this chapter 
is the alignment of the female body, reproduction, female deviance, and mental illness. I 
provide examples of female revolutionaries in the late eighteenth century and the 
nineteenth century in France, and explain how these women were pathologised by being 
visually depicted as mentally ill.  
 Famous medical practitioners who constructed and developed these alliances are 
discussed, such as Etienne Esquirol and Jean-Martin Charcot, in order to unpack the 
different incarnations of the disease known as ‘Hysteria’ from the seventeenth century up 
until the late nineteenth century. By expanding on the cultural, philosophical, societal, and 
technological changes and ideologies present in the time of Esquirol and Charcot, as well 
as others, an understanding of the production of the visual signification of mental illness 
and female deviance emerges.  
 By expanding on the visual treatment of hysteria and female deviance, a schema of 
mental illness and female deviance, as constructed by medical practitioners such as 
Charcot, emerges. The cyborg is intimately linked with notions of the feminine, nature, 
technology, and the visual. Similarly, its onscreen depiction is constituted by its link to 
pathology, violence, and deviance. By expanding on the visual treatment of the hysteric, 
pathology; the feminine; deviance; techno-scientism; and phallocularcentrism emerge 
against which the twentieth-century cyborg can be read. 
 In chapter three, I discuss Science Fiction as a literary and filmic genre, the role of 
Science Fiction within society and culture, and how it has historically functioned as a 
reflection of technological, social, cultural, and ideological change (from folklore to Science 
Fiction film). A variety of authors writing on Science Fiction film and literature are 
introduced in order to explain the construction of a Science Fiction narrative; stock figures 
and themes; mise-en-scene; and visual imagery and signifiers that are frequently used. I 
also discuss how Science Fiction film functions and its relation to the uncanny, the 
fantastic, and the abject.  
 Three themes that have historically been associated with Science Fiction film, namely: 
the threat of technology; the human double or cyborg; and the monstrous feminine are 
unpacked in this chapter in order to ascertain how these lead to the appearance and 
development of the cyborg in 1980s Science Fiction, and the notion of ‘the cyborg’ as we 
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have come to understand it theoretically. I discuss various characters from the Cyborg 
cinema sub-cycle that relate to this, for example, Cherry from Cherry 2000 (1987); 
Maria from Metropolis (1927); Jobe from The Lawnmower Man (1992), to illustrate how the 
cyborg body has been represented in the twentieth century. 
 In chapter four, I argue that Enlightenment principles, evident in nineteenth-century 
medico-scientific treatments of female mental illness and deviance, still function in 
contemporary depictions of the deviant female – the cyborg. I contend that 1980s Feminist 
discourse on the cyborg conceptualised this figure as ahistorical. The figure of the cyborg, 
although manifested differently in different cultural epochs, cannot be severed from its 
historical and cultural context (the female-automan-machine). These historical and cultural 
contexts, for example medico-scientific discourse of the nineteenth century as well as 
prevailing ideologies about the feminine, inform the treatment of character, narrative, and 
spectacle in Science Fiction film. The figure of the cyborg partakes in a similar visual 
language as that of the nineteenth-century hysteric. The ‘objective evidence’ in the 
photographic images of hysteria stand as scientifically objective renderings of internal 
emotional states. Similarly, the visual treatment of the cyborg also presents itself as 
objective and functions in the same way as the camera – to uncover the secrets hidden 
within the deviant female body.  
 I suggest that the circulation of visual signifiers of female mental illness (deviance) 
operate in the same way in the representation of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
cyborg – to eroticise, neutralise, and expel presumed female pathology and anxiety related 
to technological development. Fear and anxiety are resolved through the 
pathologised/neutralised image of the cyborg, and through this action, the transgressive 
capabilities of the cyborg are undermined. In this process, heteronormative modes of being 
and gender binaries are re-inscribed on the body of the cyborg. By re-locating the 
gendered body in the figure of the twentieth-century cyborg, patriarchal ideologies are re-
inscribed and re-enforced in the Electronic Age.  
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Chapter One 
 
The Evolution of the Automan: Cyborgs, Science Fiction, 
and the Nineteenth Century 
 
1.1 Donna Haraway and the Cyborg 
 
Donna Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto, written in 1985, appeared at a time in Feminist 
discourse that was largely focused on ascertaining the foundations of gender oppression. 
Haraway’s paper critiques the essentialism that emanated from some feminist theorists in 
their attempt to determine the origins of patriarchal ideology; she also examines the ‘return 
to nature’ advocated by many feminist writers and activists of the time. Theresa Senft, a 
cultural theorist writing on Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto states, “Haraway worried [that] 
radical feminism… seemed to promise for women an Edenic ‘starting point’ of gender and 
identity, prior to other mitigating cultural factors” (Senft 2001:2). In essence, advocating a 
return to ‘true womanhood’, prior to its construction by culture and the symbolic. 
 Haraway was specifically concerned with the anti-technological sentiment present in 
much of this writing (Senft 2001:2). The ‘return to nature’ advocated by many feminists of 
the time, such as Adrienne Rich and Audre Lorde, was seen by Haraway as problematic. 
The ‘return to nature’ is a complex and difficult domain from which to create a unified 
Feminist discourse that seeks to challenge the constructed nature of gender. By 
advocating a ‘return to nature’, an a priori idea of ‘nature’ is presupposed, and similarly, a 
unified concept of what constitutes ‘woman’ is assumed.  
 Haraway’s critique is focused on problematizing these established notions of ‘nature’ 
and ‘gender’, as well as patriarchal ideology. By advocating this starting point, feminist 
scholars were in effect assuming the same treatment of ‘woman’ and ‘nature’ as essential, 
definable categories, which had empowered patriarchal discourse for centuries. Assuming 
an established nature of women mirrors the construction of ‘gender’ by patriarchal 
discourse and weakens the attempt to dismantle notions regarding ‘gender’, ‘nature’, and 
‘woman’. Haraway argues that “one of my main premises…is that most American socialists 
and feminists see deepened dualisms of mind and body, animal and machine” (Haraway 
cited in Senft 2001:4). Similarly, the ‘return to nature’ also contrasts ‘technology’ with 
‘nature’, which further reifies the dualisms present in twentieth-century, and previous, 
ideologies of gender that espoused the view that technology was the domain of man, and 
nature was the domain of woman.  
 Haraway advocates the figure of the cyborg as a way to re-imagine the body in the 
twentieth century, as well as weaken the constructedness of gender. The cyborg not only 
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signals woman’s inclusion in the realm of technology and science, but also constitutes a 
thorough re-imagining of ‘gender’ and ‘the body’, which are not dependent on pre-
supposed, pre-cultural, and constructed ideas of gender, the body, or what it means to be 
human.  
 The cyborg, as a hybrid re-imagining of the coupling between human and machine is 
representative of life in the Post-Modern twentieth century. The prolific impact of 
technology on lived human experience by the late twentieth century was undeniable, and 
the cyborg represented the reality of this coupling with the machine in the everyday lives of 
human beings. Haraway positions the cyborg as a truthful representation of woman’s 
experience in the twentieth century which is structured on partiality, and as she states, “the 
cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of both 
imagination and material reality” (Haraway 1991:149-150). 
 The cyborg, although still fictional to some in the 1980s, was to Haraway, a figure 
already in existence, and she states that “the boundary between science fiction and social 
reality is an optical illusion” (1991:149). The coupling of human and machine was already 
self-evident in the late twentieth century because of the integration of technology with the 
lives and bodies of human beings. The developments in medical science (prosthesis; pace 
makers; implants and so forth) and various computer and information technologies (in 
Virtual Reality; email; television) attest to this. Haraway also makes mention of this 
boundary between human and machine as an ‘optical illusion’ to explain the way in which 
the truth of the science fictional, the cyborg, is denied existence in reality; the 
unimaginable, the uncanny, the revolutionary, the abject, the disastrous, the imminent 
threat posed by technology – the stuff of science fiction, is already reality.  
 Although Haraway notes that the cyborg is linked to patriarchal, oppressive, militaristic 
regimes of the past, specifically referring to the exclusion of women from the realm of 
science and technology, she argues that this is no longer the case. Senft (2001:3-4) 
summarises Haraway’s argument as: “cyborg politics have been linked to oppressive 
mythologies: scientific progress; racist; male-dominated capitalism; the exploitation of 
nature to serve the needs of culture. This doesn’t have to remain the case”.  
 Haraway reassures her reader that although the cyborg is the “illegitimate offspring of 
militarism and patriarchal capitalism… illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful 
to their origins” (1991:151). Haraway comments on the history of the cyborg by saying that, 
“to some degree, the cyborg serves as the end-point in the West’s story of escalating 
domination of its environment” (Senft 2001:4). Although Haraway does make mention of 
the influence that the Western patriarchal obsession with the domination of its environment 
has played in the construction of the cyborg, she does not adequately engage with the 
influence that this techno-scientific ‘cyborg origin story’ has had.  
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 Because the cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense, in that it is not formed 
from biological reproduction and the dualisms of nature/culture and male/female inherent 
in biological reproduction, the cyborg is uncoupled from biological reproduction as it is 
created from the marriage between human and machine, and because off this, the 
narrative of “original unity” is weakened. In the psychoanalytic sense, the formation of 
‘gender’ and the ‘subject’ are dependent on the myth of original unity “out of which 
difference must be produced and enlisted in a drama of escalating domination of 
woman/nature” (Haraway 1991:151). 
 However, as I discuss further on in this chapter, early automata1, or proto-cyborgs, are 
some of the earliest attempts by man to reproduce without the female body and without 
nature. This dislocation of the female body from reproduction was not enacted to dislocate 
gender from sex – but as an attempt to finally remove the feminine and nature, from 
reproduction – as a final stumbling block in the pursuit of immortality that these early 
automata represent. By removing the female body and nature from reproduction, the 
female body could finally be excluded from the realm of science and technology, as well as 
be divorced from its status as ‘life giver’.  
 According to Haraway, without the constraints of biological reproduction informing the 
cultural body of the cyborg, it can destabilise traditional notions linking women to 
reproduction/the womb. The weakening of this construction of woman as 
womb/nature/nurturer, effects a change in the social relations of the household (Haraway 
1991:151). The performance of heterosexual coupling and gender dualism are weakened 
in the household, a stronghold enabling gender dualisms and patriarchal ideology. 
Similarly, the polarity of the public and the private, and the performances of normative 
sexuality and gender dualisms that this sectioning of the private/public sphere had 
previously demanded, are challenged and transgressed by the body of the cyborg. 
According to Haraway, “no longer structured by the polarity of public and private, the 
cyborg defines a technological polis based partly on a revolution of social relations in the 
oikos, the household” (Haraway 1991:151). 
 As Haraway (1991:150) states “the cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has 
no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to 
organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher 
unity”. This statement is specifically poignant in that it highlights Haraway’s denial of 
psychoanalysis, gender binaries, the act of dissecting/cataloguing/classifying, inherent in 
scientific discourse, and the references to ‘robotic’ assembly-line workers in early 
twentieth-century industrial Britain. These have all informed the structure of the cyborg and 
will be discussed in detail further on in this chapter, as well as in chapters three and four. 
The twentieth-century cyborg for Haraway is instead constructed from “partiality, irony, 
                                                            
1 Examples of different automata from a variety of periods are discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
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intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence”, and 
is fully capable of employing this partiality and perversity in the act of distancing itself from 
its ‘origins’ (Haraway 1991:151). 
 The cyborg transgresses the boundaries that constitute ‘gender’, ‘nature’, ‘human’, 
and ‘self’ by “subverting myriad organic wholes” and in doing so, “the certainty of what 
counts as nature… is undermined, probably fatally” (Haraway 1991:153). The hybrid 
nature of the cyborg, as representative of lived social relations and women’s experience in 
the twentieth century, destabilises “the ontology grounding ‘Western’ epistemology” 
(Haraway 1991:153). By weakening the claims of patriarchal discourses regarding the 
body, lived social relations, ‘gender’, ‘self’, and ‘being’, the cyborg transgresses these 
dualisms and comes to stand as a more truthful depiction of women’s experience. 
 Haraway furthers her argument by referring to the new economics of the twentieth 
century, which see the inclusion of women in the workplace, as well as the technology 
industry. Haraway states that “the New Industrial Revolution is producing a new world-wide 
working class” of which women from the Third World make up the preferred “labour force 
for science-based multinationals” (1991:166). Although this marks the inclusion of women 
within the realm of science and technology, they are still exploited. Haraway here refers to 
not only women, and states that in the New Industrial Revolution, other groups are 
“feminized” as well. To be feminized for Haraway, is “to be exploited as a reserve labour 
force; seen less as workers than as servants… leading an existence that always borders 
on being obscene, out of place, and reducible to sex” (Senft 2001:9).  
 For Haraway, “some of the rearrangements of race, sex, and class rooted in high-
tech-facilitated social relations can make socialist-feminism more relevant to effective 
progressive politics” (Haraway 1991:165). The cyborg for Haraway is then an iconic figure 
that represents these new arrangements, and can be used to structure a progressive 
politics not based on previous dualisms, but these new fractured identities that are 
mediated by and constructed through technology. For Haraway, the cyborg is an icon 
which can guide our understanding of twentieth-century lived social relations, and a way 
for feminist discourse to incorporate not only technology in a constructive way, but to move 
away from ‘true womanhood’ to more authentic ways of being in the twentieth century. As 
Haraway states, “I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess”2 (Haraway 1991:181). 
 Strikingly, the cyborg of twentieth-century Science Fiction and reality is feminised in 
much the same way as its human counterparts are. With links to nature, the feminine, the 
hysteric, forced labour, obscenity, abjection – the cyborg of the twentieth century is not the 
protagonist in Haraway’s dream of “a powerful infidel heteroglossia”, but rather part of the 
feminized chorus still mediated and constructed by patriarchal techni-scientism (Haraway 
1991:181).  
 
                                                            
2 Hereby referring to feminists who argue for a return to ‘true womanhood’. 
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1.2 From the Automaton to the Cyborg 
 
Donna Haraway’s claims that the cyborg is a figure representative of modes of existence in 
the twentieth century, a “creature in a post-gender world” (1991:150), as well as a figure 
that weakens gender dualisms, need to be adequately unpacked in order to ascertain the 
viability of the cyborg as a transgressive figure in feminist discourse. The first point of 
contention that I find in Haraway’s discussion of the cyborg is the short reference to the 
‘origin’ of the cyborg that she makes. Although she does state that the cyborg was born 
from Western, militaristic, patriarchal, and capitalist intentions, she only states that the 
cyborg is, or has the potential to be, unfaithful to these origins. In order to ascertain the 
value of the cyborg in Post-Modern feminist discourse, the ‘origins’ of the cyborg need to 
be fleshed out and situated historically within the various epochs of cultural and 
technological change in which it has developed. The cyborg of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries has a long history of development and has been in mutable modes of 
existence: as Aristotle’s answer to human slavery, the female lute player of the sixteenth 
century, the moving, defecating duck of the eighteenth century and so forth. The varying 
incarnations of the cyborg need to be unpacked in order to understand the historical and 
cultural significance that this figure holds in popular belief and within popular culture.  
 Aristotle was the first to advocate the invention of the robot in order to resolve the 
problem of slavery; the machine in service of humankind. The word ‘robot’, which was first 
used in Karel Čapek’s play, R.U.R or Rossum’s Universal Robots, is derived from an old 
Czech word meaning ‘servitude’ or ‘slave’ (Etymology Dictionary, sv ‘robot’). The history of 
the robot, automan, cyborg, whichever name is best suited to its technological moment in 
history, was marked from the beginning with its intimate connection to slavery, serving 
human needs, and as remaining subordinate to human beings.  
 The Golem of Prague and Talos are some of the earliest examples of the human 
desire to produce life and were often imbued with a variety of capabilities, ranging from the 
physically powerful to the supernatural. From these early examples of the human desire to 
create, the automaton of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries emerges as incarnation 
of this same desire. Automata were also invented partly in response to, and indicative of, a 
specific technological or cultural epoch. The automan/the double/the cyborg has been 
portrayed in equal measure, either positively or negatively, and it remains in the popular 
imagination to this day as a figure that showcases the advancement of science and 
technology, the changing relationships between human beings and technology, and in 
more positive light has been representative of the varying qualities that human beings 
have aspired to throughout various points in history – immortality and power, to name but a 
few.  
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 Some examples of early attempts to create life include the Ancient Greek myth of 
Talos, a bronze giant protecting Crete from pirates and invaders; the story of the Golem of 
Prague, protector of a sixteenth-century Jewish community; the story in the Iliad of 
Hephaestus making mechanical handmaidens from gold that acted as servants; and 
Chinese accounts from 4 B.C.E in the Lie Zi that tell of Yan Shi creating automata that 
resembled the human form (Atsma 2000:[sp]) (Ganssle 2011:[sp]) (Bedini 1999:[sp]) 
(Turnbull 2013:[sp]). 
 Myths and stories relating to the human obsession with technological advancement 
and progress have been part of the human narrative for millennia. Some of the earliest 
accounts of the human fascination with automata, and the powers of science and 
technology, according to Silvio Bedini in The Role of Automata in the History of 
Technology (1999:[sp]), represented man’s attempt to “simulate nature and domesticate 
natural forces”. The Renaissance era saw a massive rise in the creation of automata of 
many kinds, including human and animal forms, due to a focus on the mechanical and the 
revitalisation of Greek culture and philosophy which significantly influenced scientific 
thought of the time (Bedini 1991:[sp]). Robert Plank (cited in Glenda Shaw-Garlock 
2006:25) suggests that “the motivation to create artificial life represents a symbolic desire 
of the male artificer to reproduce without female participation in the process”. The 
dislocation of the female from the reproductive process would circumvent biological 
processes and perceived constraints in an attempt, by the ‘male artificer’, to preserve and 
further the human race; the ultimate goal being legacy, immortality, and an ode to male 
scientific ingenuity. 
 Early examples of automata were informed by dualisms present in human gender 
relations, and this was communicated as the juxtaposition between inanimate matter (the 
blank substance from which the artificial could be created and shaped) and the animate of 
the male artificer. As Ksenija Bilbija (cited in Shaw-Garlock 2006:26) expands, “Earth as a 
feminine element is juxtaposed with the spirit, identified as a masculine element and actual 
life giver”. The identification of the earth/nature/body aspect as female, structures not only 
the view of the male artificer as the ‘key’ to artificial life, but also informs later divisions that 
exclude women from science and technology all together. Glenda Shaw-Garlock in 
Descartes’ Daughters: Monstrous Machine-Women Through Time describes the ‘active’ 
male element and the ‘passive’ female element of the body, rooted in patriarchal 
discourses of the body, as elements where “the part endowed with the capacity to think 
and reason (associated with man) is the mind and the part located in the sphere of biology 
and nature (associated with women) is the body” (Shaw-Garlock 2006:26). 
 The nature/culture debate, and the notion of the female as always already associated 
with nature, earth, the passive and the anti-intellectual emerge in these early attempts to 
re-create life. They also signal the coding of the artificer as male, and the artificial being as 
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female. Plank (cited in Glenda Shaw-Garlock 2006:25) states that “the project to create life 
through artifice was inflected from the start with a distinction between inanimate matter 
(associated with the female element) and animate spirit (associated with the male 
element), a ‘dichotomy’ of body and soul that implies contempt for the body”. The 
body/nature/inanimate/anti-intellectual matter that make up the (female) body of the 
artificial is contrasted against the mind/culture/animate/intellectual of the male artificer.  
 Early automata, such as the female golem, represented these two themes in the pre-
mechanical age. As Bilbija (cited in Shaw-Garlock 2006:26) states: 
 
  The female golem represents an early example of an artificial woman created as a 
projection of her designer’s erotic desire. Created without agency, the female golem is an 
objectified sexual surrogate, a replacement for a real woman, and without any social 
status beyond that of a private sexual-machine.  
 
 The early female golem highlights the direct control of nature and the (female) body 
through the harnessing of science, and the resultant beings come to stand as private 
eroticised objects purposed for the fulfilment of their male creator. Later automata of the 
sixteenth century, such as the hydraulic singing birds of Agostino Ramelli, and the 
mechanical figures of men and women that played instruments and moved around, which 
were invented by Hans Nuremberg, like many of the automata of the following two hundred 
years, were whimsical, and purposed for entertainment (Bedini 1999:[sp]).  
 The eighteenth century signalled the start of the first stage of the Industrial Revolution 
in 1750; the steady mechanisation of society, and the inception of the factory and the 
assembly line altered the workplace and society irrevocably. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries automata, as Michel Foucault (cited in in Shaw-Garlock 2006:25) 
suggests, “represented ‘small-scale models of power’”. This echoed the emerging anxiety 
about the role the machine would occupy in society, and the need to re-assert control over 
the mechanical.  
 At the same time, technological and scientific progress was lauded because it further 
enabled the human race and improved society as a whole. Modes of mechanical 
production were mirrored in exceeding control of the body within society and socio-cultural 
practices. Architectural; spatial; visual; and socio-cultural practices merged to control and 
structure this new mechanical age.  
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 As Shaw-Garlock (2006:76) states, with reference to Michel Foucault’s Discipline and 
Punish: 
 
Institutions such as schools, prisons, hospitals, and military institutions structured, moulded, 
and contributed to the docility of the body. Subjecting the docile body to the controlling 
forces of prescriptive technologies and the factory system helped to create ‘a culture of 
compliance’. 
 
 The female body in particular became extremely vulnerable to these new systems of 
control, established by new technologies of vision (that acted to discipline and punish);3 
the relegation to the private sphere for women (the home); and new scientific study that 
‘proved’ the link between women and the so-called ‘lower races’.4 As the steady infiltration 
of the mechanical penetrated the lives of people in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries more and more, so the anxiety over the resultant negative impact grew. The 
control of the female body, through technologies of vision and the modes of practice 
inherent in mechanisation, increased steadily.  
 The visual depictions of technology in the nineteenth century were ambiguous. On the 
one hand, they were lauded for the ability of science and technology to positively advance 
society, and on the other hand, as negative, dangerous, and threatening to the social 
status quo. As Shaw-Garlock (2006:68) states, “steam engines, represented in 
exaggerated and enormous scale and juxtaposed with tiny human workers were a 
reoccurring motif among nineteenth century artists, evidence in paintings, engravings, 
lithographs, and weeklies from this period”. Although the creators of automata in this era 
were not particular about the gender of their creations, Science Fiction (SF) literature of 
the time took this theme of automata and the mechanical and transformed it into a direct 
threat to human life (Shaw-Garlock 2006:85). This re-imagined threat was communicated 
through the conflation of uncontrolled female sexuality and the violence of nature 
(intimately aligned with the feminine) which was re-presented as the inherent threat 
emanating from this new mechanised world.  
 Wosk (cited in Shaw-Garlock 2006:69) explains this ambiguity toward the machine, 
and the fertile ground that the mechanisation of society created for the conflation of the 
deviant female and technological threat, as follows:  
 
  The disparity in size between machine and human is suggestive of an ambiguous attitude 
towards the machine. On one hand, sweeping scale seems to reflect tremendous pride 
and wonder in technological innovation. On the other, such representations also signal a 
sense of despair about the potentially deadly dominance of machine technologies over 
human beings… the heightened possibility of dominating and controlling the forces of 
Mother Nature… an implicit feeling of childlike helplessness. 
                                                            
3 For example, Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, designed in 1791. For a detailed discussion of this, please refer 
to Foucault, M. 1975. Discipline and Punish. 
4 This will be discussed in detail in chapter two. 
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 The separation of the mind and body, established in a variety of spheres,5 the past 
narratives of the female golem (as nature/earth), and automata of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, also enabled the conflation of the deviant female with the threat of 
technology. The loss of the sexed body through the image of the ‘docile’ human body of 
the nineteenth century, and the mechanical body of the automan, affected the control of 
dominant gender discourses that espoused gender dualisms. The body, crucial to 
patriarchal domination, needed to be ‘re-discovered’ and ‘re-inscribed’. This act of locating 
the body in the confusion of the mechanical found its focus on the body of the deviant 
female, and the android/cyborg body of the next century. The emergence of the ‘New 
Woman’6 proved a perfect starting point for patriarchal ideology to assert its fears of 
changing socio-cultural practice on, and simultaneously, practices of vision from antiquity 
to industrialisation were critical in establishing the deviant female, and later, conflating her 
with the technological. Practices of science and medicine that changed drastically during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries due to technological advancements (such as the 
camera) and scientific discovery, also altered the way in which body, and specifically the 
female body were seen.7 The resulting figure of the interplay and conflation of female 
deviance and the threat of the technological rests on the figure of the twentieth-century 
cyborg. Its story is told in many Science Fiction films of the twentieth century.8 
 Haraway’s discussion of the transformative cyborg is sourced mainly from 
SF literature, and this denies the power of the visual in structuring the image of the cyborg. 
Haraway’s focus on literature and the literary cyborg is problematic. Her focus is in 
constituting an enabling myth for feminists in the 1980s but ignores the dominance of 
spectacle in societies marked by technology and industrialisations. As I discussed in the 
introduction, Guy Debord has drawn attention to the fact that societies in which modern 
conditions of production dominate are inflected with a focus on spectacle. Western society 
of the modern era, from the nineteenth century onward, is influenced in greater measure 
by image rather than by the written word.  
 Images function to structure and reflect lived social relations far more accurately than 
literature. The nineteenth century in particular is marked by ramifications of the industrial 
complex that resulted in the rise of consumerism, spectacle, and technologies of vision, 
                                                            
5 From philosophy (Plato and Descartes); folklore; automata of the nineteenth century (for a thorough and more 
detailed discussion of these, please refer to Shaw-Garlock, G. Descartes’ Daughters: Monstrous Machine-
Women Through Time [2006]; SF literature (such as Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984)); cyberpunk cinema 
(Johnny Mnemonic); to recent SF films (such as RoboCop and The Stepford Wives). 
6 This will be discussed in further detail in chapter two. 
7 The body is viewed as a complex machine that is made up of parts. The body, particularly the female body, 
hides and holds secrets, and through careful analysis and dissembling the body, these secrets or hidden truths 
would be uncovered. The body, theorised as the machine, is also then viewed as profitable and usable (this 
aligns with the view of the robotic body of Aristotle as created to serve). 
8 For example, Cherry 2000, Westworld; Blade Runner; and The Stepford Wives. 
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such as the camera, that informed and (re)presented social life. This habit continues to this 
day. Debord (1998:143) expands on the implications of this as follows: 
 
  The spectacle epitomizes the prevailing model of social life. It is the omnipresent 
celebration of a choice already made in the sphere of production, and the consummate 
result of that choice. In form as in content the spectacle serves as total justification for the 
conditions and aims of the existing system. It further ensures the permanent presence of 
that justification, for it governs almost all time spent outside the production process itself. 
 
 Modes and processes of vision and spectacle, as they have been conflated with 
knowledge production in philosophy and the sciences, are specifically important when 
analysing the impact and history of the twentieth-century cyborg, and its conflation with the 
signifiers of the deviant female. 
 
1.3 The Conflation of Vision and Knowledge: The Implications  
 of Scientific ‘Vision’ 
 
The conflation of vision and the eye with objectivity, pure truth, and knowledge, as it is 
incarnated in Western epistemology and simultaneously observable phenomena of the 
post-Enlightenment period, are informed by Ancient Greek philosophical treatise, where 
the valorisation of the eye and the visual were prominent in a variety of spheres, ranging 
from art and theatre, to philosophy and politics. Understanding the conflation of vision and 
knowledge, informs a reading of the implications of what I have termed ‘scientific vision’ on 
the female body, as well as the emphasis on the visual that arises in industrialised society 
and informs the construction of the cyborg body. 
 Martin Jay in Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought, examines the role of vision in knowledge production from Ancient Greek 
philosophical treatise on ‘vision’ and the ‘eye’, to later French philosophers, such as 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who praise or contest the role of vision in 
twentieth-century philosophical thought. Jay states that “the perfection of idealized visible 
form in the Greeks’ art accorded well with their love of theatrical performance. The word 
theatre…shares the same root as the word theory, theoria, which meant to look at 
attentively, to behold” (Jay 1993:23).  
 This valorisation of sight is emphasized in Greek philosophy with the word eidenai, the 
Greek word for ‘knowledge’ meaning “a state of having seen” (Jay 1993:24); the meaning 
of the word eidetikos (a different form of eidenai) is “pertaining to images” (Etymology 
Dictionary, sv ‘eidetikos’). These further clarify the role that vision played in producing 
knowledge and truth. Hans Jonas, in his essay The Nobility of Sight, explains that the 
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implications of this ocularcentric tradition in almost every sphere of Greek life are also 
dominant in current Western philosophical thought (Jay 1993:24).  
 The constitutive link between theoria and eidenai in Greek thought is the role of the 
eye and vision in knowledge production and spectacle. ‘Seeing truth’, which was a 
cornerstone of Greek philosophical thought, effectively associates the role that vision 
played in knowledge production with the specular practices of the theatre. Eidenai or 
knowledge was constituted or enabled by the visual apprehension of a subject or object of 
inquiry. After the visual assessment, the ‘facts’ or character of the object could be 
uncovered. Ocularcentric apprehension of the internal and external world was fundamental 
in constituting or framing knowledge about a given subject as factual and truthful.  
 Greek thought furthermore accorded sight the power of simultaneity in that it was 
capable of surveying a large area or visual field at once; it was less temporal than other 
senses such as hearing and could ascertain or ascribe fixed essences over ephemeral 
appearances of objects caught in its gaze (Jay 1993:24). Vision and the eye emerge as 
all-seeing and omnipresent, able to ascertain all aspects of a given subject of inquiry and, 
as a result of this, were singularly suitable in determining the ‘true’ nature of the subject. 
The authorative and all-powerful nature that was accorded to vision in Greek thought is 
evidenced by the fixation on vision as an almost God-like figure, able to survey, uncover, 
and transcend mere human assumptions about the internal and external world that were 
not based in visual observation.  
 The fixed gaze of the omnipresent eye of the mind, and the externality of sight, further 
afforded the viewer the objectivity of impartial and distanced observation. Jay (1993:25) 
states, “the very distinction between subject and object and the belief in the neutral 
apprehension of the later by the former, a distinction so crucial for much later thought, was 
abetted by the ocularcentrism of Greek thought”.  
 Jonas states that this distance created between subject and object gave rise to the 
whole idea of theoria and theoretical truth in that “the thing as it is in itself as distinct from 
the thing as it affects me” (Jonas cited in Jay 1993:25). This is the break in the constitutive 
link between subject and object (Jonas cited in Jay 1993:25). Theory and knowledge 
production were established on the separation of subject and object, in order for ‘truth’ or 
‘fact’ to be established. This is mirrored in later Western medical and scientific thought and 
practice of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The separation of subject and object 
was posited as crucial for knowledge production, and this separation was conceptualised 
in the sciences in the studied observation of the object to ascertain its true ‘essence’, 
define its structure, and to categorise it. The valorisation of the distanced scientific 
observer further attests to the role that Positivism would have in structuring discourses of 
science and technology. The omnipresence afforded to vision further abetted its role in 
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later Western philosophical, cultural, and scientific discourses, as all powerful, all seeing, 
and almost solely constitutive of truth.  
 Although the eye and the visual were valorised throughout Greek life and philosophy, 
we also see the uncertainty of some, such as Plato, in the reliability of the act of seeing by 
the two physical eyes. Plato held this physical act up against the nobility of the intellectual 
eye, and the almost transcendental notion of sight or seeing by the eye of the mind 
(Jay 1993:26-29). In Plato’s Timaeus, for example, he separates the creation of the senses 
into two distinct categories. Sight he places in the category of human intelligence and the 
soul, and the other senses he places in the category of man’s material being (Jay 
1993:26-29). 
 The linkage inferred in situating sight and vision within the category of human 
intelligence and the mind, also posited sight as the key element in the creation of a 
rational, intellectual mind. It simultaneously relegated the other senses to the material 
body, and by inference, anti-intellectual ability. This presages later developments in 
Western philosophical thought that contrast the rational mind (constituted by visual 
acumen) with the natural material body. The mind/body dichotomy, expanded by 
Rene Descartes in the seventeenth century, is further aligned with later nature (body) and 
culture (mind) dualisms that act to inform much eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought 
on the sciences, as well as socio-cultural practices and ideology.  
 Plato’s reservations about the two physical eyes, the eyes of the body, are amplified 
by his statements that posit the intellectual eye of the mind as not merely omnipresent and 
all-knowing, but God-like.  
 
 The human eye, he [Plato] contended is able to perceive light because it shares a 
like quality with the source of light, the sun. Here a similar analogy holds between the 
intellect, which he called ‘the eye of the mind, and the highest form, the God 
(Jay 1993:26). 
 
 Plato’s conceptualisation of the intellectual eye of the mind as similar to the sun aligns 
well with later heliocentric and theocentric models of the world that structured thinking and 
knowledge production. The interchangeable nature of the terms – vision, light, the sun, and 
God, become apparent in the work of Plato and other Greek philosophers, and are re-
constituted, perhaps not so literally, in later technological and scientific developments 
during and after the Enlightenment.  
 Plato’s myth of the cave is an example of his reservations regarding perception, and 
most notably vision.9 Ironically, Martin Jay states that the ambiguities that we find in Plato’s 
                                                            
9 In The Republic [380 B.C.E], Plato uses a parable to explain his Theory of Forms. In the story, people 
imprisoned in a cave are chained in such a way that they can only look ahead of them, and not turn their heads 
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work on vision, and other Greek myths, in fact elevated the status of the visual in Greek 
thought and Western Culture (Jay 1993:28). Similarly, Plato’s questioning of the reliability 
of the physical eyes, elevated the role of the ‘eye of the mind’ that was able to intellectually 
and rationally interpret the world, while the physical eyes of the body were unable to 
adequately compete in this strata of knowledge production. 
 The varying notions and theories regarding vision in Greek thought later gave rise to 
the variations in the ocular tradition that are evident in Western philosophy and culture. Jay 
(1993:29) makes specific reference to Cartesian philosophy and the way in which 
ambiguities regarding vision, whether conceptualised at different points in history, as the 
eye of the mind or the physical eyes, act to circumvent any challenge to the centrality of 
vision in Western philosophy. At either point, one form of sight was privileged, while the 
other was berated, and vice versa. 
 These ambiguities present in the way that the eye and vision were constructed, mirror 
the way that Light was conceptualised. This dual-nature of Light would influence painting 
and optics in the centuries to come. Jay (1993:29) expands on the Greek 
conceptualisation of light, as follows: 
 
  Perfect linear form was seen as the essence of illumination, and it existed whether 
perceived by the human eye or not. Light in this sense became known as lumen. An 
alternative version of light, known as lux, emphasized instead the actual experience of 
human sight. Here colour, shadow, and movement was accounted as important as form 
and outline (Jay 1992:29). 
 
 This conceptualisation of light accorded well with the dual perception of vision, 
although not always congruent, these two forms of light and vision informed each other, 
and could be used abstractly or materially, in different philosophical epochs to reinforce the 
centrality of vision in knowledge production and ascertaining truth. Jay (1993:29) continues 
by stating that “what might be called the alternating traditions of speculation with the eye of 
the mind and observation with the two eyes of the body provided fertile ground for the 
varieties of ocularcentrism that have so deeply penetrated Western culture”. These 
oscillating aspects of vision and light, and their constant re-inscription throughout the 
history of Western philosophy and culture “created opportunities for ocularcentrism to take 
root, so too did the complicated relationship between the eye and its object implicit in the 
idea of theoria” (Jay 1993:29-30).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to see what is behind them. Behind them, puppeteers hold up puppets that cast shadows onto the wall in front 
of the prisoners. However, the prisoners do not know this and so assume that shadows are reality; if they see 
an apple (or any other material thing or concept), for example, on the wall in front of them, they would call it an 
‘apple’. However, the shadow of the apple is not a real apple. Plato’s message here is that what we would call 
an ‘apple’ is not a physical apple, but a word relating to something we can only imagine in our minds. In the 
same way, we cannot always ‘see’ reality, but mistake the metaphorical ‘shadow’ for reality (Cohen 2006:[sp]).  
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 The delineation of various conceptions of vision in Greek philosophical thought and 
myth foregrounds and informs later development in the Enlightenment, the development of 
the sciences as we understand the term today, as well as visual practices of the 
nineteenth century. Greek thought formed the basis for many Enlightenment principles 
surrounding ‘truth’, knowledge production, individualism, and the centrality of man in 
conceptualizing and understanding the universe, these similarly formed the foundations for 
scientific and medical practice of the nineteenth century. The observation of the external 
world was particularly relevant to the careful and detailed study of the natural world in the 
1600s, and similarly, the schism between nature and culture that informs scientific thought 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is rooted in practices of the visual classification 
of the world, particularly nature, of the 1600s.  
 In order to inform a thorough reading of the nineteenth century’s medical and scientific 
practices, a key turning point in how the body, and specifically the female body was seen, 
categorised, and subsequently treated, an examination of the visual practices and 
discoveries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is vital. Discoveries in science and 
the natural world, as well as great technological advancement, would act as the backdrop 
for nineteenth century medico-scientific practice, as well its focus on the visual.  
 
1.4 Natural History, Science and Medicine: Seventeenth and  
 Eighteenth Centuries 
 
As Jane Kromm (2010:73) in, To Collect is to Quantify and Describe: Visual Practices in 
the Development of Modern Science states, “the widespread interest in natural history 
grounded in the visual strategies of collecting and describing specimens increased steadily 
over the course of the 1600s”. Whereas before, collecting specimens and simply admiring 
them was a noble leisure time activity, this era was marked by the change in this practice 
to include a concentrated investigation of every object in a collection; handling every item, 
inspecting it carefully, observing it with intent – were what Kromm (2010:73) calls 
“preambles to ascertaining the order and organizing principles of the natural world”.  
 The botanist Carolus Linnaeus described an analytic gaze as one that could identify 
all the aspects of an object; and to ensure that the identification process would be 
accessible to users at different levels, he propagated the use of visual similarities or 
dissimilarities (Kromm 2010:74). This system connected properties between individual 
objects or groups of objects and aided in the classification of the natural world (Kromm 
2010:74). The fundamental difference in this method, to previous approaches in discovery 
and classification, was characterised by an experimental approach which advocated that 
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known information on the topic of inquiry be set aside, in order for the naturalist or scientist 
to develop his own theories on the subject (Kromm 2010:74).10 
 The fallibility of the physical eye, as suggested by Plato, is circumvented by the 
invention of technologies of vision in the 1600s. These new devices, borne from the 
centrality of vision in scientific inquiry and the production of knowledge, emerge as 
extensions of the human eye. The invention of the telescope by Johannes Kepler in 1611 
and later improvements to it by Isaac Newton, added to the furore of using visual methods 
in naturalism and scientific inquiry. These inventions enabled man to see what he had 
never before been able to with his physical eyes. 
 The use of illustration similarly emerges at this time in medicine, and became 
widespread by the sixteenth century; this method developed into coloured illustrations in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Engel 1961:680). This visual method employed 
to construct a visual schema of disease, or rather the natural world of the human body, 
foregrounds later treatment and usage of the camera in medical practice. The use of the 
camera in medical science became commonplace almost immediately after the 
development of the camera (Engel 1961:680). The use of technologies of vision in medical 
practice as well as in plumbing the secrets of the natural world aligned sharply with the 
focus on progress; advancement; and a shift to a mechanistic/scientific world-view that 
emerged in the early nineteenth century. The move to the mechanistic/scientific world-view 
was concomitant with the emergent view of the body as machine. With the start of 
industrialisation, the rise of the factory, the invention of the assembly line, the human body 
came to be seen as a tool that could be formed to meet the demands of rising 
mechanisation. This view of the body as machine is further developed by medical and 
scientific practice and technology of the time that revealed, for the first time, the interior 
mechanisms of the body.  
 As Michel Foucault (1973:124-126) states in The Birth of The Clinic, autopsy as a 
method of inquiry in the field of pathology emerges during the early eighteenth century as 
a mode of investigation; congruent with scientific trends of the time that advocated vision 
and classification as pertinent to thorough investigation. The development of the X-ray in 
1895 by Wilhelm Röntgen acted as yet another technological extension of the eye that 
aided the techno-scientism of the nineteenth century in its quest to uncover the secrets of 
the human body. Seeing the interior of the human body, uncovering its hidden secrets, as 
well as identifying its ‘inherent’ structure or nature, align with scientific practice of this time. 
Furthermore, this reified the notion of the body as a machine. By discovering the interior 
                                                            
10 This approach highlights the ambiguous nature of scientific inquiry, as well as Enlightenment principles that 
will be discussed further on. Although experimentation, observation of phenomena in order to discover the 
natural world, setting aside ‘inherent fact’, were stressed at this time, simultaneously, this discovery and 
observation would lead to the ‘inherent’ structure in all things; a pre-established order which would reveal itself 
to the keen eye of the scientist or naturalist. The theoretical ‘truth’ of the object of inquiry would in essence be 
revealed. 
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functioning and structure of the body through technologies of vision, scientists and medical 
practitioners were able to control it; alter it; and classify it. 
 This method of classification and visual discovery had special appeal for 
Enlightenment thinkers (Kromm 2010:74). The Royal Society of London, a society for the 
study and discovery in science, was particularly interested in the new sciences of the time, 
made possible by technological invention and the shift toward a focus on visual 
classification and empirical evidence. The motto of the society, which remains the same to 
this day, is “Take nobody’s word for it”, but rather ‘see’ or ‘discover’ for yourself.  
 European Enlightenment11 interest in scientific study, technological development and 
exploration, created the backdrop for the rise of specular practices in many spheres of life 
in the nineteenth century.  
 
1.5 The Deviant Female 
 
The discovery of the interior mechanisms of the body, enabled by a focus on male 
dominated scientism and technologies of vision, remodelled the view of the body to one 
that was aligned with a mechanistic world-view. Female bodies and deviant bodies of the 
nineteenth century are particularly relevant in this discussion, as they were left with the 
visual markers of the shift from organicism to mechanism. They also bear the insignia of 
science and technology, and the central role that these held in structuring this new world 
view. Furthermore, their treatment also attest to the view of body-as-machine that can be 
altered and moulded to fit the dominant order; the role of technology in constructing and 
inscribing gender, deviance, and pathology; and the role of science and technology in 
halting social degeneration and controlling deviance. 
 Haraway’s cyborg as a myth to enable a re-imagining of the body and lived bodily 
experience in socialist feminist discourse is problematized when read against the body of 
the female hysteric in the nineteenth century. The cyborg myth is embedded with 
                                                            
11 The Enlightenment, extending from around the mid-seventeenth century to the eighteenth century is a period 
defined by dramatic upheavals, new discoveries, and revolutions in society, philosophy, science, and politics, 
as well as a rejection of traditionalist medieval world-views (Bristow 2011:1). Enlightenment thinking developed 
in tandem with the scientific discoveries and inventions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Enlightenment thinking culminates in the French Revolution, and its legacy can be seen in the modern Western 
tenets of freedom and equality for all, founded upon the valorisation of human reason and individualism 
(Bristow 2011:1). “D’Alembert, a leading figure of the French Enlightenment, characterizes his eighteenth 
century… as ‘the century of philosophy par excellence’, because of the tremendous intellectual progress of the 
age, the advance of the sciences, and the enthusiasm for that progress” (Bristow 2011:2). The notion of 
‘Aesthetics’, developed by German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten, emerges during the Enlightenment, 
with its focus on the awakening of the subjects’ senses and mental capacities (Bristow 2011:3). ‘Aesthetics’ 
which is derived from the Greek word for ‘senses’ is just that for Baumgarten, “…a science of the beautiful 
would be a science of the sensible, a science of sensible cognition” (Bristow 2011:3). The focus on discovery, 
vision, and classification of this time can be seen in Enlightenment aesthetics, in that by discerning taste, or 
beauty one can establish a distinctive harmony and reveal the order of things through a science of sensible 
cognition (Bristow 2011:4). As Immanuel Kant understands taste (the faculty with which to discern beauty) it is 
“founded on a distinctive sort of feeling, a disinterested pleasure” (Bristow 2011:4). The coupling of science 
and aesthetics provided the milieu in which specular practices of the nineteenth century could thrive. 
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associations to the deviant female, and similarly displays marks of control by ‘scientific 
vision’ and technologies of vision.  
 The body of the hysteric is vital to a thorough reading of the cyborg in that it materially 
and symbolically displays the intersection between scientific vision; technology; art; fact 
and fiction; the conflation of vision and knowledge; constructed pathology; and patriarchy. 
The image of the hysteric reads as an ethnography of the nineteenth century and its 
practices. I argue that similar practices, although re-modelled for the Electronic Age, are 
enacted in the twentieth century, and produce the body of the cyborg – just as the 
nineteenth century produced the body of the hysteric.  
 By unpacking the ‘disease’ Hysteria, its treatment, and its visual treatment, in the 
following chapter, a clear distinction can be drawn between the body of the hysteric and 
the body of the cyborg.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Hysteria: Science, Vision, Technology, and the Visual Construction 
of the Deviant Female Malady 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I introduce and discuss Hysteria and its origins, focusing on the treatment, 
reasons for, and diagnosis of the disease until the nineteenth century. I also explore this 
malady and its relation to the female body and deviance. I then examine the representation 
of female revolutionaries in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in France, and 
explain how these women were pathologised by being visually depicted as mentally ill. 
Similarly, their deviance was neutralised through visually depicting them as hysterical. I 
discuss the role of photography in medical science and society, as well as ‘scientific 
practices of looking’ in the nineteenth century. A major focus of this chapter is the 
influential role of the French physician Jean-Martin Charcot and how he constructed and 
presented the disease within nineteenth-century scientific discourse. I go on to discuss the 
process of visually signifying these women and show how these signifiers are aligned with 
the visual signifiers of French female revolutionaries and the cyborg of the twentieth 
century. I discuss how these women were pathologised and their transgressive abilities 
neutralised through this act by focusing on visual signifiers, deviant sexuality, analogy, and 
the role that technology played in the act of pathologising and neutralising the female 
body.  
 The key focus of this thesis is to examine the gendering of technology, specifically the 
cyborg, in SF film in the twentieth century. By investigating the visual handling of Hysteria, 
and the socio-cultural practices that gave rise to this disease, a similar ethnographic image 
of the Mechanistic Age and the Electronic Age of the twentieth century emerge. Through 
this, I then argue that the visual signifiers and socio-cultural practices inscribed on the 
body of the hysteric, mirror those inscribed on the body of the cyborg. In addition, I shall 
discuss the ways in which the cyborg is frequently represented as hysterical or insane. 
This is worth examining if we consider the history of how insanity or Hysteria has itself 
been gendered and especially when the image of the cyborg has been read as 
transformative with regard to notions of the body, and the body’s relation to technology and 
gender. 
 In order to garner a better understanding of why and how these images of the cyborg 
are depicted in mainstream cinema, I will use the image of the hysteric in 
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nineteenth-century prints; engravings, and photographs to map an ‘aesthetics of the 
Other’. As I will argue, the treatment of hysterics, as well as the roots of this ‘disease’, 
have followed the same trajectory as that of the depiction of the cyborg. Just as onscreen 
cyborgs are ‘diagnosed’ as insane and hysterical in film, the body’s relation to technology 
and the Western obsession with vision played a major role in the ‘diagnosis’ of women as 
hysterical, as these notions do in the ‘diagnosis’ of the cyborg. As Luce Irigaray states (in 
du Preez 2004:48) “investment in the look is not as privileged in women as in men. More 
than any other sense, the eye objectifies and it masters”. Just as the cyborg is subjected to 
a scopophilic gaze (Mulvey:1975)12 by the all-knowing eye that objectifies and sets at a 
distance whilst ordering the image into the Symbolic Order, so too were hysterics 
subjected to this gaze, this scopophilic ordering. Du Preez notes, in Putting on 
appearances: Mimetic representations of hysteria, that the history of the treatment and 
representation of the hysteric in the nineteenth century, particularly those treated by 
Charcot and studied by Freud, reveals the primacy of the ocular. The hysteric was not 
diagnosed through talking to the individual patient, but through observation of certain 
external manifestations of the inner state. 
 The emotional or inward states of these patients were never assessed; just as the 
emotional states of the cyborg, or the reasons for their ‘insane’ or ‘hysterical’ behaviour are 
never assessed on any other level except the visual. In both instances, this visual 
assessment by the all-knowing eye, and the ordering of both into the Symbolic Order, is 
linked with the gendering of both. The medico-scientific trend was related to the primacy of 
vision, and thus in diagnosing this disease the task of the doctor was “to bring the 
condition, which lies outside the boundaries of understanding and language, into the light – 
the symbolic order” (du Preez 2004:49). 
 The hysterics were photographed (a technological extension of vision) for the purpose 
of ‘medical documentation’, but mostly it was an extension of Charcot’s love of the visual 
arts. Du Preez (2004:57) states that “Charcot compared the study of hysterical symptoms 
to the study of an artwork [and]…Foucault [explains] the relation between the clinical 
analytical gaze and aesthetics: ‘the whole dimension of analysis is deployed only at the 
level of an aesthetic’…this indicates that the process of clinical analysis became an 
aesthetic even in itself”. The hysterics in turn were affected by this process, not only in 
their emotional or mental symptoms (which were in reaction to this trend of 
phallocularcentrism), but their bodies were also literally affected in how they reacted to 
being photographed. The history of the hysteric reveals the domination of sight and the 
ocular in the use of photography to represent this figure, and thus mediate this figure. 
Epileptic fits and ‘performance’ of their condition ensued. A mediated and patriarchally 
                                                            
12 Du Preez accessed the 1975 version of Mulvey’s article, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema. 
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constructed view of this ‘disease’ was represented. The image of the cyborg is similarly 
mediated by the technological that valorises phallocular practices of looking. 
 
2.2 Hysteria through the Ages 
 
Hysteria, as a malady rooted in discourses expounding on female ‘nature’ and intimately 
connected to the feminine, has had an extensive, specular and fantastical treatment in the 
annals of medical history. From Ancient Greek treatise on female gynaecology, where 
Hysteria and other female gynaecological ailments took pride of place, right through to 
modern day somatic disorders – Hysteria has seen as many cures and causes as it has 
physical symptoms. However, one aspect has always remained constant; namely, that it 
was a disease related to the female body, and later, the female mind. Here I briefly sketch 
a timeline of the disease and give a brief overview of how it was diagnosed, its 
symptomology and treatment, as well as an exposition of the cultural context that gave rise 
to these symptoms and diagnosis. In order to contextualise and understand later 
developments in the treatment and diagnosis of female mental illness, it is important to 
identify developments that lead to, and structured the specular treatment and diagnostic 
practices related to female mental illness in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. 
 The first known description of the disease known as Hysteria dates back to 
1900 B.C.E. The cause of the disease was described on papyrus by Ancient Egyptians as 
a spontaneous movement of the uterus. Symptoms included seizures; depression; a sense 
of suffocation; and a sense of imminent death and so forth, and treatment ranged from 
placing foul smelling substances near the mouth or vagina (or perfumed substances near 
the mouth or vagina – depending on where the uterus had moved to) (Tasca, Rapetti 
Carta, Fadda, 2012:[sp]).13 For a variety of reasons that will be expanded on further in this 
chapter, it was believed that the movement or displacement of the womb was the cause of 
these symptoms.  
 In Ancient Greece in the fifth century B.C.E, medical science, and more specifically 
gynaecology, was not practiced on the grounds of empirical evidence, but instead was 
based on observable phenomena, deductions made from analogy, and information 
regarding the human body and female traits that were rooted in existing social norms, 
prevailing ideologies, and myth.14 Women were seen as physically and mentally inferior 
(Lefkowitz 1981:12-13). The Hippocratic Corpus, in its exposition on gynaecology, is 
mainly focused on Hysteria and, as Lefkowitz (1981:12-13) states, “although this might 
                                                            
13 Tasca, et al (2012:[sp]) also note that the symptoms mentioned by the Ancient Egyptians are those 
described in Freud’s globus histericus, a lump in the throat; difficulty swallowing; fear. 
14 Presumably much the same as with Ancient Egyptian medical science and gynaecology. 
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seem strange, it indicates that doctors of this time wanted to raise the treatment of 
women’s disease to a medical art”. The overriding view of the female body expressed at 
the time was that the minds of women could be, and most often were, affected by their 
reproductive organs. This body of medical work would also provide the dominant attitude 
toward the female body; it also informed diagnostic practice and the treatment of female 
gynaecological and mental disorder. It would continue to inform and structure medical 
practice relating to female illness throughout antiquity (Lefkowitz 1981:12-13).15 
 During this time the disease was diagnosed through the observation of the patient and 
symptoms supposedly related to the movement of the womb, and almost entirely mirror the 
symptoms displayed by patients suffering from Hysteria under the treatment of Jean-Martin 
Charcot, as we will see later. The Ancient Greek medical fraternity advocated that Hysteria 
was caused by the womb becoming dislodged and travelling around the body, or becoming 
discontented, thus causing a variety of ailments. Plato believed that the womb was an 
animal and states (Dusenbery 2012:[sp]) “[it goes] wandering in every direction through the 
body, closes up the passages of the breath, and, by obstructing respiration, drives them to 
extremity, causing all varieties of disease”. Hippocrates distinguished the disease from 
Epilepsy, which was caused by a disorder in the brain, as opposed to Hysteria which 
causes were rooted in the movement of the uterus in the body (Tasca et al 2012:[sp]).16 
 Symptoms of the disease include, for example, seizures; a loss of consciousness; 
terrors or visions; paralysis; and suffocation. These symptoms were believed to have a 
physical cause. Treatment in Ancient Greece would typically involve foul fumigations 
placed beneath the nose; sweet scented fumigations near the vagina; inserting wool 
pessaries into the vagina; eating garlic; inserting into the vagina a pessary made of twigs 
or opium poppies; marriage; bearing children, and so forth (Lefkowitz 1981:12-16). 
Treatment was usually dispensed to women who had observable signs of the disease, 
young women who had not taken a husband and childless women (Lefkowitz 1981:12-16). 
Hippocrates believed that the cure for this “bad” uterus, especially in virgins; single 
women; widowed women; and sterile women was to marry and “live a satisfactory sexual 
life within the bounds of marriage” (Tasca et al 2012:[sp]). 
 The link between the misogynistic societal norms regarding women, the disregard of 
these ideologies17 – and the subsequent diagnosis of Hysteria cannot be ignored. As 
Lefkowitz (1981:13) emphasizes, these “fantastical doctrines; cures that could only be 
effective because of their symbolic associations, and diagnosis that could be based on 
                                                            
15 Although great discoveries were made in medical science in Ancient Greece as well as throughout history, 
we see that these attitudes and ‘facts’ regarding female anatomy and the ‘characteristic traits’ of women, 
although re-presented, are never fully abandoned by the medico-scientific fraternity. 
16 We see the continued assumption in a physical cause some two thousand years later by 
Jean-Martin Charcot.  
17 By choosing to disregard socially approved appropriate forms of female behaviour, for example, choosing 
not to marry, choosing not to have children and being sexually promiscuous. 
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analogy rather than observation… [and] in maintaining that the womb could become 
dislodged and travel around the body doctors were not concerned so much with physical 
healing as with upholding the established values of society…”. This use of analogy by 
doctors, which we also see later on in the work of medical practitioners of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, indicates a practice of medicine not based on actual medical 
investigation or empirical evidence drawn from the patient, but instead one that used social 
and cultural perceptions of the body and specifically gender, as well as societal and 
cultural norms regarding women, to validate and reify the diagnosis and treatment of 
Hysteria. Specifically delineating women as inferior or feeble minded and Hysteria as a 
traditionally female disease. Analogy, based on entrenched ideologies and the comparison 
of supposed symptoms of mental illness as garnered by observation, forms the basis of 
much diagnostic practice in Ancient Greece, and throughout the next two thousand years.  
 Lefkowitz (1981:13-16) goes on to urge that the disease be regarded as any other 
Greek myth and states that the Hippocratic corpus is merely a consolidation of myth and 
popular belief; citing Prometheus Bound and the Bacchae as examples to indicate that 
“since both myth and medicine describe a similar pattern of behaviour, the sexual definition 
of women’s health would seem to predate the founding of Hippocratic science. Thus the 
doctor’s prose only record’s and sets forth what had been for centuries accepted as truth 
by all members of society” Lefkowitz 1981:17). 
 In the second century AD, through to the Middle Ages we see similar attitudes 
regarding the symptoms of both Hysteria and female mental illness. Although symptoms 
relating to the mental health of women varied from anxiety attacks to stupors, Hysteria still 
remained associated with the idea of the wondering womb. Hippocratic concepts relating 
to Hysteria and melancholia spread throughout medieval Europe and as Tasca et al 
(2012:[sp]) states, “these diseases were treated according to what we shall call the 
“scientific’ vision” that which was purported by the Hippocratic method.18 
 In the thirteenth century, with the inferiority of women firmly entrenched in mainstream 
thinking, the work of Thomas Aquinas played an important role in the way Hysteria and 
female mental illness was viewed. Aquinas maintained that “woman is a failed man”, and 
equates women and Hysteria with witches and sorcery (Tasca et al 2012:[sp]). The many 
maifestations of Hysteria and mental illness are at this time seen as unholy bonds between 
the feminine and the devil, and the idea of woman as witch disseminates fear into the 
collective imagination of the public. In early Christianity, hysterical women were subjected 
to exorcism as a cure for the supposed demonic possesion that caused their symptoms, 
but by the late Middle Ages exorcism becomes a punishment and Hysteria and sorcery 
                                                            
18 The Hippocratic method was revived in Europe at this time. It coincided with the revival of other Greek 
philosophical and scientific treatise that spoke of automata. This revitalised interest in the mechanical and 
resulted in the focus of creating/producing automata of this time (as discussed in chapter one). 
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become interchangeable. Elderly and single women were most at risk and sorcery became 
the scapegoat for every unexplained ailment (Tasca et al 2012:[sp]). 
 Throughout the following three hundred years, many women were put to death as 
punishment for displaying symptoms of Hysteria; unexplained ailments; or supposed 
sorcery. The uterus remained at the centre of this particular manifestation of not only 
Hysteria, but all manner of mental disorders. The idea that women were inferior to men 
remained firmly entrenched. In the seventeenth century, Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689) 
proposed that Hysteria resulted from somatic and psychological origins and posited the 
notion for the first time that it was not related to the movement of the uterus. However it 
would take several decades for Sydenham’s theory to prevail and for the theory of the 
wandering womb to be exorcized (Tasca et al 2012:[sp]). Paradoxically, Sydenham also 
stated that among women, there was rarely one who was wholly free from some form of 
Hysteria (Dusenbery 2012:[sp]). 
 In the eighteenth century, Hysteria began to be associated with the brain, and not the 
uterus (Tasca et al 2012:[sp]); there now existed the possibilty that Hysteria could be seen 
as not only a female disease; however, this shift in thinking would not fully materialise until 
the early twentieth century with Freud’s work on war neurosis. German physician 
Franz Anton Mesmer (1734-1815) would, in the eighteenth century, find ‘suggestion’ as a 
possible treatment for his patients suffering from Hysteria.19 The influence of Mesmer’s 
work could also be seen in the suggestive hypnosis used by Jean-Martin Charcot in the 
treatment of his patients. Mesmer identified what he called ‘animal magnetism’, an invisible 
force of sorts; and that by placing hands on affected parts of the body, he could treat the 
patient (Tasca et al 2012:[sp]). 
 The French physician Phillippe Pinel (1745-1826), a revolutionary for his time, 
believed that treating the mentally ill in a more humane way would greatly benefit them; 
this was a turning point in the treatment of diseases such as Hysteria. However, Pinel too 
saw Hysteria as a female disease (Tasca et al 2012:[sp]). Jean-Martin Charcot 
(1825-1893), whose work and method will be discussed in detail further on, saw Hysteria 
as a hereditary disease that resulted in a degeneration of the nervous system (Tasca et al 
2012:[sp]). Charcot claimed that the disease affected both men and women, however, the 
sheer volume of female patients undergoing treatment in his facility for Hysteria points to a 
different conclusion. 
In the Victorian Age (1837-1901) many women carried smelling salts with them at all 
times. These would be used when emotions were high and it was believed that making use 
of smelling salts would return the womb to its rightful place in the body (Tasca et al 
2012:[sp]). This established a link yet again between rampant emotion, women, the womb, 
                                                            
19 ‘Suggestion’, referring to hypnotism. 
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and the Hippocratic Corpus.20 Medicinal baths were prescribed as a treatment for Hysteria 
as well as pelvic massage (Dusenbery 2012:[sp]). Pelvic massage which resulted in 
“hysterical paroxysm” was widely used as a treatment for the disease from as early as the 
second century up until the twentieth century (Dusenbery 2012:[sp]).21 The belief was that 
as Hysteria was caused by the underutilised uterus, or the movement of it, pelvic massage 
could be used to help the uterus back to its rightful place as well as to stimulate it.22 This 
further aided in the womb being identified as animal-like and untamed. The trained hand of 
the medical practioner was needed to guide this uncontrolled organ back to its rightful 
place. In doing so, the afflicted woman would simililarly be guided back to her rightful place 
(the home), and back to her proper role (as wife and mother). 
 
2.3 Mental Illness in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 
 
Showalter (1987:3) explains that the image of madness as essentially feminine, accorded 
to us by male dominated science and male dominated medical practice, is constructed out 
of two theories surrounding madness that have resulted in the notions that, madness is 
one of the essential bad character traits of women and that madness is “the essential 
feminine nature unveiling itself before scientific male rationality” Showalter (1987:4). The 
first notion being that madness is female because it has been depicted as experienced 
mostly by women, and the second being that the feminine has been characterised as 
nature. 
 If we examine the first notion that mental illness is experienced more by women than 
by men, Showalter argues that it is merely because female madness is represented more 
than male madness. Showalter (1987:4) states that “as early as the seventeenth century, 
the files of the doctor Richard Napier showed nearly twice as many cases of mental 
disorder among his women patients as among men”; as well as over representation, 
mental illness in women, especially Hysteria was thought to be directly linked to the uterus, 
and although these theories were dismissed by the eighteenth century, women were still 
associated with Hysteria and mental disorders as they were thought to be the most 
susceptible to these due to their feeble mindedness.  
 If we examine the second notion, we see a divide that is still present and still 
constructs this in contemporary culture, namely that of woman as nature and man as 
culture. Woman as associated with the irrational, nature, the body, and silence, and we 
see these ‘essential characteristics’ of women establishing themselves in medico-scientific 
discourse most pointedly after the move to a more Darwinian way of 
                                                            
20 In the Hippocratic Corpus, similar suggestions were offered as a remedy for hysterical symptoms. These 
would coax the womb to return to its rightful place in the body.  
21 ‘Hysterical paroxysm’, referring to an orgasm. 
22 Referring to the ‘underutilised uterus’ of the unmarried or widowed woman. 
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thinking (Showalter 1987:4). That being a move to scientific classification, ‘knowing’ and 
‘seeing’ being conflated, the focus on technological progress, and the move to a 
mechanistic world-view. This move was precipitated by a need to know the unknown, to 
control nature and harness the disorder that it brought (we can also see this urge further 
back in history), with the added benefit of technology to aid in this control and visual 
classification, namely, the ‘knowing’ eye of nineteenth century patriarchy. 23 
 The move from an organic worldview to a mechanistic one occurred during the 
seventeenth century with the onset of the Enlightenment and the inception of new 
sciences. Shaw-Garlock (2006:29) states that “these changes are associated with the 
subordination and domination of nature (and woman). The image of a benevolent nature 
and an unruly nature provided rationale for the control and enclosure of nature via the 
technologies of new science”. Various discoveries in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries (as outlined in chapter one), led to the demystification and control of nature 
through technologies of vision and new sciences.24 Merchant (cited in Shaw-Garlock 
2006:30) states that 
 
  The replacement of an organic world-view by a mechanistic one contributed to and 
legitimated the subordination of both nature and women. This transitional period coincided 
with broad cultural shifts taking place in response to Enlightenment ideas, associated with 
the rationalisation and control of nature and individuals and the turning away from faith 
and superstition; belief in human reason as the mode for transforming society and freeing 
the individual from arbitrary authority; and increasing faith in the authority of science rather 
than religion and tradition. 
 
 However, the fear of nature, previously elicited by its unknown factors and seemingly 
uncontrollable powers, explained through mysticism and magic, was now being unravelled, 
sectioned, and controlled through new technologies, as well as new ways of thinking. 
Nature, as traditionally associated with the feminine, was now too under the control of 
patriarchal Enlightenment ideals of science and technology.  
 Previously, nature was understood through the anthropomorphized vision of mother-
nature; the dual-character of this figure, one caring, fertile, and kind-hearted, the other, 
disruptive, chaotic, and deadly. The caring ‘mother’ was the central image before the 
change to a mechanistic world-view (Shaw-Garlock 2006:31). However, with the move 
away from organicism, “the image of nature, as gentle and nurturing woman, was cast 
aside during the period of scientific revolution and replaced with a new metaphoric 
worldview based on the principles of mechanism. The unruly and uncontained view of 
                                                            
23 The folkloric tales of the past; the move from organiscm to a mechanistic world-view brought on by the 
Industrial revolution. 
24 Shaw-Garlock (2006:29) also states that “at the same time, the automaton, a mechanical contrivance that 
seemed to animate of its own accord and therefore seemed endowed with spirit also introduced new fears”; the 
fear of these automated beings, products of new scientific and technological discoveries, was founded on the 
fear of the threatening unknown of the power of technology.  
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nature provided the rationale for domination and control over nature” (Shaw-Garlock 
2006:31). New discoveries lead to the mystical caring view of nature to be re-examined, 
and re-imagined as disorderly and dangerous (Shaw-Garlock 2006:30-31). 
 Undoubtedly, the move away from the benevolent figure of mother-nature influenced 
the status of women culturally and ideologically. Similarly, it reignited old fears about the 
chaotic and disruptive sexuality of women which had been mirrored in the 
anthropomorphic mother-nature, and nature as female. This uncontrolled and deviant 
character of nature was mirrored in witch-hunts of the time in Europe and America; as 
Shaw-Garlock (2006:33) explains: 
 
  The connection between women and witchcraft was developed in the witch-hunting 
manual entitled Malleus Maleficarum (The Hammer of Witchcraft) written by Heinrich 
Kramer Institoris [1487]…. Above all, he linked witchcraft to supposedly uncontrolled 
female sexuality… The dual faces of nature (benevolent mother/unruly witch) reflect a 
deep cultural ambivalence towards women and the tendency to characterize her as one of 
two extremes: either as virtuous or witch. 
 
 The relationship between women, nature, and witchcraft was further complicated with 
the implied relationship between chaotic deviance, evil, and rampant sexuality. As 
Bovenschen, Blackwell, Moore and Weckmueller (cited in Shaw-Garlock 2006:32) state 
“the image of the early modern witch links violent and unruly nature to the wild and 
uncontrollable woman. In popular myth, witches stand side by side with the ancient mother 
goddesses”.25 The image of the witch, aligned with evil and forceful sexuality and 
empowered by the forces of nature, corresponded well with this new vision of women that 
started to take hold in the early seventeenth century. Images from this period attest to the 
approval of the chaotic-sexualised-witch in popular thought.  
 This tradition of observation and classification uses images of women’s bodies to 
create a visual schema of mental illness and as Showalter (1987:4) states “while the name 
of the symbolic female disorder may change from one historical period to the next, the 
gender asymmetry of the representational tradition remains constant”. Therefore, even 
when a man has experienced or been diagnosed with madness (there were a number of 
male hysterics in the charge of Jean-martin Charcot) we can see that symbolically, what 
was being experienced was essentially a female disease. Furthermore, men then “appear 
not only as the possessors, but also as the dispensers, of reason” (Showalter 1987:4). 
Even when they acted irrationally, it was classed as symbolically female and a separate 
anomalous event, distinct from their true masculine rational selves. 
                                                            
25 Haraway’s move away from the return to true womanhood/the goddess is evident when the associations of 
the mother goddess are unpacked. However, as I will argue in chapter four, these classifications still structure 
the cyborg. 
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 Approaching the Golden Age of Hysteria in the mid-nineteenth century, we see that 
the numbers of women admitted to asylums and seeking care at private institutions 
increased dramatically.26 The fact that this increase could have been due to over-
representation or social factors, is a moot point, because essentially ‘woman’ was 
Hysteria, and this notion is cemented in the etymology of the term; Hysteria literally 
meaning ‘womb’. Women were thought to be impressionable, emotional, sensitive, and 
susceptible in their nature, and thus, Hysteria being a disease of impressionability, 
sensitivity and high emotion, it is accepted that Hysteria is the feminine (du Preez 
2004:47-48). 
 A precursor to the way mental illness was depicted in the nineteenth century, and 
particularly relevant to the French tradition that culminates with Jean-Martin Charcot’s 
treatment and construction of Hysteria, was the depiction of revolutionaries during the 
French Revolution of the late eighteenth century. One figure in particular, Théroigne de 
Méricourt, is emblematic of pictorial practices of the time that linked women, madness, and 
revolt in the pages of popular media at the time.  
 Images of de Méricourt and others developed out of the demand for eyewitness 
accounts of the revolution and its key participants (Kromm 2002:208); drawn by artists 
such as Georges F. M Gabriel, these images were keenly consumed by the public. The 
visualisation of popular claims of “enraged, maniacal madness” that were willingly 
associated with the most militant of female revolutionaries further reified the accepted 
notion that only the most “insubordinate, rebellious, disorderly, and mentally unstable” of 
women became involved with politics (Kromm 2002:209). 
 The focus on de Méricourt is of importance as she was not only a key figure in the 
revolution, but a key figure in the media due to her involvement in the revolution. 
De Méricourt was diagnosed as mentally ill later on and was to spend the remainder of her 
life interned at the Salpêtrière, further establishing the link between mental illness, women 
and revolutionary tendencies. As Kromm (2002:906) states “this convergence in her case 
was particularly significant, because here the conventional wisdom about mania in its 
contemporary construction as a politically sensitive ailment was validated by the emerging 
specialisation of psychiatry”. This emerging field of study acted as a device to validate 
popular or traditional notions surrounding women, madness, and acts of defiance by 
situating these within a scientific discourse that would not only provide empirical ‘proof’ of 
these ideas, but also visually represent them within a medical context, which added 
scientific gravitas to these ‘truthful’ claims. The images of de Méricourt circulated in the 
popular press would be mirrored by later images of her during her internment at the 
                                                            
26 The ‘Golden Age’ of Hysteria is typically identified as the period between 1870 and World War I (Bondevik 
2010:183). 
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Salpêtrière, establishing these well-known ‘facts’ about female deviance visually and 
scientifically. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Charles Devritz. 1845. Théroigne de Méricourt.  
 
 As Kromm (2002:210) explains, some depictions of de Méricourt make use of 
allegories of pride or vanity, or show her in amazon dress, depicting liberty. In Figure 2.1 
the exposed breast conveys clarity and nurturing, however it also conveys the sexual 
availability associated with female revolutionaries, as well as other allegories relating to 
civic disorder (Kromm 2002:210). These visual cues were well known in print culture 
throughout Europe and visually resembled images of madwomen – the resultant 
commentary intimating that mental disorder could be deduced from her demeanour and 
features (Kromm 2002:210). 
 Commenting on the image in the 1860s, Jules Michelet was under the impression that 
the image was one of de Méricourt when she was a patient at the Salpêtrière (Kromm 
2002:210). He stated that this image spoke of heroic beauty, but that it also indicated the 
“violent passion for revolutionary ideas that had overwhelmed her reason” which could be 
assumed by her exposed breast and unkempt appearance (Kromm 2002:210).  
 During de Méricourt’s time at the Salpêtrière, the “enraged madwoman” and her 
mental state were documented; however, the records are incomplete (Kromm 2002:211-
212). Yet, what does speak clearly from these is the “maniacal condition associated with 
revolutionary ideology” (Kromm 2002:212). In 1816, Georges F.M Gabriel was 
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commissioned by Etienne Esquirol to do a portrait of de Méricourt for the purposes of 
medical study.27 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Georges F.M. Gabriel. 1816. Théroigne de Méricourt á la Salpêtrière.  
 
 Esquirol was a student of the famed Phillipe Pinel, and was a pioneer in the field of 
visual case histories. In Figure 2.2, we see de Méricourt depicted exhibiting some of the 
key ‘traditional’ visual markers of the female asylum inmate. Kromm (2002:214) explains: 
 
  [This image shows] de Méricourt in a bust-length profile view, wearing a loose, open-
necked dress or robe, and with her hair shorn. These features attest to the severity of her 
condition: cropping the hair was commonly done in the asylum for agitated, maniacal 
women patients, and the casual aspect of dress is a mark of her penchant for disrobing, 
another traditional symptom of mania. 
 
 This image of de Méricourt succinctly orders previously dissimilar elements of 
madness, revolution, and allegory seen earlier in a variety of disparate images. As well as 
linking these disparate elements the image transformed the figure of de Méricourt into a 
disempowered revolutionary, sunken into madness and disorder (Kromm 2002:215). This 
was encouraged by the professional and political climate of nineteenth-century Paris in 
which state sponsored appointments in the medical fraternity were influenced by the ability 
of the doctors to minimise the political and revolutionary ideals surrounding mania (Kromm 
2002:215). Many ambitious doctors working in this field, such as Esquirol and Pinel, and 
later Charcot, would benefit greatly from their ability to neutralize mania, especially in 
female patients, by simply describing it as pertaining to the female mind and its vulnerable 
                                                            
27 Gabriel was well known in the popular press for his on-the-spot renderings of revolutionaries during the 
French Revolution of the eighteenth century. 
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nature.28 The transgressive abilities of the female revolutionary were neutralised in the act 
of assigning pathology to her, through visual (re)presentation. 
 Other variations of the image of the madwoman also permeated nineteenth-century 
popular culture; with reforms in England and Europe regarding the treatment of the 
mentally ill, as well as the move away from the maniacal brute who was mostly 
represented as male, the image of the victimised madwoman, as embraced by artists and 
writers of the time, gained popularity. The shift away from viewing lunatics and the 
mentally ill as brutish and incurable occurred around the end of the eighteenth century 
when this image of the violent maniac was transposed by the image of the youthful, 
beautiful romantic female madwoman. This transpired at the same time that the notions of 
‘reason’ and ‘unreason’ took on gendered meanings, reason being male and unreason 
being female (Showalter 1987:8-10). Although, as I have discussed previously, these 
gendered notions of rationality and irrationality have structured gendered discourses from 
the time of Plato. 
 The victimised madwoman of the eighteenth century became almost a cult figure and 
the images and depictions that resulted from this visualisation of madness were numerous. 
As this image took hold in the popular imagination of the time, three key figures appeared, 
namely, the sentimental Crazy Jane, the suicidal Ophelia, and the violent Lucia (Showalter 
1987:10). We see these images in the popular imagination as a way of controlling and 
directing female difference (Showalter 1987:17). As with the images of de Méricourt, the 
neutralisation of female rebellion or disobedience through the policing of visual 
representation was tantamount to the continuity of patriarchal notions regarding presumed 
female characteristics, behaviour, and sexuality.  
 As Showalter (1987:10) explains “all three established female sexuality and feminine 
nature as the source of the female malady, but each also stood for a different interpretation 
of woman’s madness and man’s relation to it”. Whichever form the depiction of female 
madness took, it spoke to every nuanced and differing theorisation of female mental illness 
and reasoned away any plausible explanation for this behaviour, all of which returned to a 
male discussion on presumed female insanity, which revolved around the supposed 
vulnerable and sexualised nature of women which gave rise to it. 
 The proliferation of these images from popular culture to scientific discourse can again 
be seen with the image of ‘Crazy Jane’ and various incarnations of her in depictions by 
artists such as George Sheppard and Thomas Barker, entering psychiatric textbooks of the 
time (Showalter 1987:14). The theme of women escaping bondage that inevitably lead to 
violent madness, was also popular on stage in nineteenth-century Romantic opera 
                                                            
28 This mirrors the role that filmmakers have in minimising the threatening nature of the cyborg. By 
pathologising and neutralising the image of the cyborg, the fear and anxiety related to this figure of 
transgression, are allayed. 
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(Showalter 1987:14). With the mass proliferation of visual representations of female 
madness, an almost frenzied aura surrounded the vast amount of images available and 
the variety of mediums they were depicted in in popular culture.  
 Situating these images of female mental illness within scientific discourse affirmed 
popularised notions of femininity and mental illness by adding the gravitas of reason and 
logic afforded by scientific inquiry. It also thoroughly neutralised any heroic acts of 
deviance against tradition that these representations might hold (and that might be 
appealing to the revolutionary mind) by contextualising it within the solemn and serious 
domain of male dominated scientific discourse. The burgeoning field of psychiatry swiftly 
appropriated these images of female mental disorder and along with reforms in the 
treatment of the mentally ill, they emerged as scientific and cultural snapshots that 
captured not only the view of mental illness at the time, but also how women, technology, 
and spectacle, became interrelated and formed the basis for the golden era of Hysteria. A 
painting of Phillipe Pinel freeing the mentally ill at Bicêtre highlights this conflation as early 
as the eighteenth century.29  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Tony Robert-Fleury. Phillipe Pinel freeing the insane. 1795. 24,4 cm x 30,5 cm. 
 
 In Figure 2.3, we see Phillipe Pinel freeing the mentally ill. This act came at a time of 
psychiatric revolution, with the humane treatment of the mentally ill becoming a metaphor 
for the measure of culture that a society had. It is said that Pinel obtained permission to 
unchain the mad at Bicêtre and La Salpêtrière, and proceeded to unchain many of the 
                                                            
29 Some authors have argued that the setting of this painting was at Bicêtre while others have argued it was 
La Salpêtrière. 
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male inmates, attending to the female patients only a few weeks later (Showalter 1987:2). 
Kromm (2002:216) however, argues that Pinel was incorrectly credited with this action. 
 In this depiction, Robert-Fleury has represented ‘madness’ as mentally ill women in 
varying states. The male figures in this image all represent rationality and the bringing to 
light of the female irrational into the realm of vision, reason, and rationality. This boundary 
between female irrationality and male rationality and sanity is further emphasized by “the 
three figures at the centre. In the foreground is a lovely, passive, and dishevelled young 
woman, her eyes modestly cast down, upon whose exposed bosom an erect and dignified 
Pinel gazes with ambiguous interest. The keeper who holds up her arm while he unlocks 
her chains seems less to be releasing her than winding her up, like some huge doll; her 
nominal freedom, the composition suggests, exists in a complex tension with male control” 
(Showalter 1987:3). Some of the women are in a state of melancholia on the ground, 
others seemingly in the midst of a hysterical attack, while one kisses Pinel’s hand in 
gratitude (Showalter 1987:2).  
 The description that Showalter proffers of this image of insanity in the eighteenth 
century is an apt description for how mental illness was viewed at the time as well as at the 
height of Hysteria in the late nineteenth century. The conflation of madness and the 
feminine was a long entrenched concept, just so in the disease Hysteria where women 
were seen to be more susceptible than men to mental illness. Although changes in the 
cause of Hysteria as a disease related to the brain and not the uterus may have been 
developed, women were still seen as most susceptible to mental illness. 
 These notions regarding the susceptibility of women to mental illness were further 
perpetuated and reinforced by the representations of female madness in popular culture as 
well as the long standing tradition within the medical fraternity that regarded exterior visual 
appearance as a truthful depiction of an interior ailment. One of the first medical texts to 
combine a visual representation concerned with the physiognomical aspect of a case with 
the traditionally used neuroanatomical illustrations was Pinel’s Traite medico-
philosophique sur l’aliénation mental ou la manie in 1801 (Kromm 2002:216). Pinel was 
appointed head of the Bicêtre asylum and later the Salpêtrière, and although he was 
politically liberal, he later on came to see revolution and revolutionary acts as forces which 
created social upheaval and caused mental imbalance (Kromm 2002:216).  
 Pinel was also greatly influenced by the prevailing French medical-philosophical 
thinking that focused on reasoning and diagnosis that was based on observation, with the 
outcome being various illustrated medical treatises’ (Kromm 2002:216). This focus on 
observation led to a delineation of symptoms that were often mistaken as the disease itself 
(Kromm 2002:216). Pinel’s illustrated plates, negatively comparing the physical 
appearance of an ‘idiot’ to that of a ‘maniac’, with their relevant skull sizes and shapes, 
effectively made the case for his use of illustrations for visual comparison (Kromm 
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2002:216); as Kromm (2002:216) states “[the] maniac, who… exhibits the classical 
proportions of an Apollo. The plate gives pre-eminence to mania, and corroborates the 
point of visible difference between the two conditions”. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Anon., Phillipe Pinel. 1801. Traite medico-philosophique sur l’aliénation mental ou la 
manie.  
 
 This plate (Figure 2.4) depicts Pinel’s observations regarding different forms of mental 
illness. In the image at the top, a ‘maniac’ is depicted. Pinel argued against previous 
assumptions that mania entailed the impairment of not only the ‘passions’, but of mental 
function as well (Kromm 2002:217-218). However, in this depiction of mania, as 
juxtaposed with the image of an ‘idiot’ below, Pinel aims to visually depict an obvious 
difference. Pinel urges the viewer to note the difference in visual signifiers of the ‘maniac’ 
and the ‘idiot’. The ‘maniac’, with his intellectual capabilities still fully intact, retains visual 
markers of the ‘Apollo’ as Kromm (2002) states, with his angular features, prominent and 
fashionable nineteenth-century nose and small lips. Seemingly arbitrary visual signifiers of 
intellectual capability, yet visually and academically aligned with images emerging from 
ethnographies on race and gender at the time.  
 The ‘idiot’ on the other hand, with his large lips, prominent forehead, protruding ears, 
and large, bent nose, visually aligns with these same ethnographies, and culminates in 
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communicating the same message of supposed intellectual inferiority through well-known 
visual signifiers. The visual ‘markers’ of intellectual impairment as depicted in Figure 2.4 
were no doubt easily recognisable during the nineteenth century, at least in medical and 
scientific circles. Diagnosis was based on observation and deciphering these visual 
signifiers; with these signifiers of inferiority borrowed from scientific ethnographies and 
applied to the study of the mentally ill. The inter-disciplinary nature of visual signifiers being 
traded throughout the scientific community and applied to different disciplines resulted in a 
diagnosis not only based on observation and visual signifiers, but on analogy too.  
 The scientific community’s penchant for analogy during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries has been well documented, and this fondness for creating narratives that could 
be applied to many different groups of people via well-worn visual signifiers continues 
within the realm of culture up until the twenty-first century. This in turn mirrors the act of the 
production of these visual signifiers; the medical illustration and later the camera, in their 
use of analogy to communicate meaning. As in painting, the camera itself draws on 
analogy through similar acts of framing, staging, and selecting subject matter. Similarly, in 
subjects of medical illustration and in images produced from the camera, cues flowed from 
the illustrator or photographer. The camera emulates the vision of the painter. The rampant 
pictorialism of the nineteenth century ensured that the images produced, especially those 
situated within scientific and technological discourses, were not seen as imagined, 
untruthful, constructed, or ideologically driven.  
 Along with this passion for the visual, Pinel also ceaselessly campaigned for the moral 
treatment of the mentally insane and maniacal (Kromm 2002:216). The celebratory image 
of Pinel freeing the interned at Bicêtre pays homage to this, as well as offering the viewer 
key visual markers of mental illness, gender bias, and hierarchies that prevailed within this 
system of institutionalism as well as societally. Pinel’s student Etienne Esquirol rejected 
Pinel’s claim that mania could exist without mental inferiority, but continued his mentor’s 
tradition of visual observation and documentation (Kromm 2002:218). 
 As Kromm (2002:220) states “the interest in obtaining images of asylum inhabitants 
can be documented to around 1800, and appears to have been the particular concern of 
medical professionals in the Paris hospital system”. Pinel was first to promote the 
collecting of a variety of illustrations and portraits of patients during their illness and 
treatment and Esquirol keenly followed in Pinel’s footsteps by using visual appearance as 
a tool of comparison during diagnosis and treatment (Kromm 2002:220). As Esquirol 
(Kromm 2002:220) stated “the study of the physiognomy of the insane is not an object of 
futile curiosity, but one that allows us to unravel the character of ideas and affections 
through which delirium is maintained”.  
 With this statement Esquirol takes the previous theatrical depictions of revolutionaries, 
the majority of which are strikingly similar to depictions of the mentally ill in his work and 
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Pinel’s, and adds the mark and seriousness of scientific discourse. By positioning these 
images within a scientific discourse, Esquirol neutralizes any attempt at questioning the 
image and its validity by removing it from its previous context within the popular 
imagination, yet keeping the visual element of theatricality so essential to the popularity 
and perception of the image.  
 He further aligns the study of these images with a thorough and necessary scientific 
practice that would result in an accurate and in-depth diagnosis of the cause and 
symptoms of mania. The link between the depictions of revolutionaries and the scientific 
depictions of the mentally ill in his work is further strengthened by using 
Georges F. M. Gabriel, the well-known artist responsible for on-the-spot renderings of 
revolutionaries, to produce the images Esquirol used in his diagnostic practice.  
 Gabriel’s drawings for Esquirol, dating from about 1813 were also exhibited in the 
salon of the following year, and as Kromm (2002:224) states “[this was] an event that 
established the subject’s claim for fine art status, and made the new genre of case history 
portraiture known beyond the medical community”. This transition from illustrations of 
revolutionaries, to scientific practice, and eventually to a new genre worthy of artistic 
inquiry maintained the initial theatrical and spectacular qualities of these renderings. 
However Esquirol, keenly aware of the post-revolution political atmosphere in France at 
the time felt that Gabriel’s intimate attachment to the visual culture of revolutionary France 
could overshadow his work and hamper his advancement in this new medical field (Kromm 
2002:229). As well as this Kromm (2002:229) points out that at the time “the visual 
expertise of artists might be seen as competing with the scientific status of medical 
observation”.  
 Although portraits of the mentally ill were assumed to be objective simulacra, Esquirol 
wished to align himself with more modern techniques of depiction as well as allay any 
suspicions of pro-revolutionary tendencies by parting ways with Gabriel, and employing the 
reproductive engraver Ambrose Tardieu instead (Kromm 2002:229). This move benefitted 
Esquirol by not only aligning him with anti-revolutionary ideals of the time and affirming his 
position as a practitioner abreast of technological innovation, which in turn benefitted his 
career, it also added to the image of Esquirol as a scientist at the pinnacle of his field.  
 Esquirol’s new association with Tardieu also spelt a change from a portrait style 
depiction to full-length studies that included not only bodily movement and gesture, but 
also integrated features of the asylum (Kromm 2002:231). This not only marked the 
renewal of a former pictorial practice that depicted the mentally ill as physically dangerous, 
but also gave reason for, and validity to, the conditions for their internment, whilst 
simultaneously adding a sense of objectivity through the addition of the mise-en-scene of 
the asylum in the picture plane (Kromm 2002:231). The pictorial practices in these images 
is evidenced in the crude way that they are rendered, highlighting their construction; the 
way that mental illness as inscribed by the hand of Tardieu is theatrical and performative; 
and how Esquirol’s description of mental illness is prescriptive in the construction of these 
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images. In this way, these illustrations accentuate mental illness and are prescriptive of its 
reading. The camera would later function in the same way, with staging, lighting, and 
framing, accentuating and constructing the reading of the photographs. (See Figure 2.5 
and Figure 2.6.) 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Ambrose Tardieu. 1838. Dementia. Des maladies mentales.  
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Figure 2.6: Ambrose Tardieu. 1838. Manie. Des maladies mentales.  
 
 As Kromm (2002:231) aptly states, “the combination of these visual features in a 
medical treatise established a novel, so-called ‘display culture’ for mental disorder that 
incorporated previous iconographies but made them seem the invention of a modern 
psychiatric mentality”. This ‘display culture’ of mental disorder further reaffirmed theories 
about women and their susceptibility to mental illness. Esquirol’s treatise featured mainly 
women, who are the majority amongst those patients with mania, intellectual inferiority, as 
well as dementia (Kromm 200:231).  
 Within the highly sexualised representations of these women are prominent features 
that communicate deviance and the uncontrolled nature of the deviant female. Esquirol 
placed particular emphasis on representing the untidy and scantily clothed visual signifiers 
that had previously identified mania (Kromm 2002:231). As Kromm (2002:231) states, “the 
sexual display and uncivilized demeanour, along with the maniac’s combative agitation, 
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validated – by their very presence in such an authoritative treatise – those full-bodied 
visual factors familiar from past iconographies of possession and mania”.  
 Esquirol’s student Etienne Georget followed, as Esquirol had, his mentor's predilection 
for the visual aspects of scientific inquiry. Georget commissioned the artist 
Théodore Gericault and although the professional climate in France at that time 
disapproved of collaboration between doctors and artists, Gericault’s famous portrayals of 
the mentally ill offered what Kromm (2002:233) calls a “major shift in representations of the 
insane by substituting a more reticent and sympathetic portrait style for their subject that 
what was usually regarded as the overt sensationalism of all previous work in this area”.  
 However, when interrogating the work of Gericault the sensationalism associated with 
the depiction of the mentally ill in past iconographies is still present. In Figure 2.7, although 
the woman is indeed represented in a more sympathetic light, she is still wholly aligned 
with Esquirol’s continuum of visual signifiers related to mental illness. The portrayal of this 
woman presents traditional signifiers of mental illness, namely, agitation, an unkempt 
appearance, and the grimace on her face. These traditional signifiers of mania were also 
represented in Esquirol’s depictions (Kromm 2002:236). This more sympathetic visual 
representation by Gericault was however regarded with suspicion. Gericault’s treatment of 
mental illness, specifically of female mental illness, did not align with popular thinking of 
the female as deviant, uncontrolled, violent, and hyper sexual. 
 Similarly, these pictorial works that were deemed sympathetic towards the mentally ill 
were also conversely regarded as aligning themselves with liberal tendencies, and as 
Kromm (2002:241) states, “Esquirol’s writings make numerous references to the revolution 
as a precipitating cause of disorder…such remarks demonstrate that emphasizing 
negative correlations between mental disorder and revolutionary political change were a 
regular feature in Esquirol’s work and in that of his circle”. 
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Figure 2.7: Théodore Gericault. 1819-20. Monomanie de l’envie.  
 
 By negatively aligning mental illness with the politics of revolution, medico-scientific 
discourses regarding women neutralized any acts against those in power by situating 
political upheaval and defiance within the context of mental illness. Secondly, the act of 
claiming the depiction of mental illness and situating it within a medico-scientific discourse 
afforded the medical practitioners commissioning these works the power to remove any 
linkages with pro-revolutionary visual signifiers by purely stating that these images were 
now being produced within a scientific discourse. 
 However fruitful the depictions of the mentally ill by artists might have proven to the 
medical practitioners such as Pinel and Esquirol, the link to liberal politics would prove 
dangerous with regard to career advancement and within the general medico-scientific 
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community. By limiting the role these artists played within the production of these images, 
either by not citing them at all in the publication of these images or by making use of 
engravers such as Tardieu, medical practitioners were once again in control.  
 Even though images produced after this shift in the medico-scientific politics of 
representation occurred, images produced of the mentally ill still maintained the same 
well-worn visual signifiers of mental illness as before. The creation of a ‘display culture’ of 
the mentally ill proceeded from this point, uninterrupted by the previous politics of defiant 
revolutionary politics that had been associated with these depictions.  
 
2.4 From Mania to Hysteria: Social and Cultural Degeneration 
 
Showalter (1987:17) divides the evolution of the ‘madwoman’ from the nineteenth century 
onwards into three phases, namely: Victorianism (1830-1870); Darwinism (1870-1920); 
and psychiatric modernism (1920-1980). In the period between 1830 and 1870, a more 
humane and sympathetic approach to mental illness was deemed most socially 
acceptable. This altered approach was influenced by an increase in prosperity and an 
unyielding belief in progress of Victorian society (Showalter 1987:33) .The expansion of 
the colonies, the boom in technological invention, as well as scientific discovery, led to a 
more ‘cultured’ treatment of the mentally ill. In Victorian times, the texture of daily life was 
to change, society, law, economics, the technological and physical surroundings of daily 
life, how people were educated, how they worked, and their beliefs were transformed 
(Mitchell 1996:xiii).  
 New social and moral concerns led to new laws that would improve the lives of 
citizens as well as align with the newfound patriotism and pride present in English society 
and other European countries in the nineteenth century (Mitchell 1996:3).30 The 
construction of large public asylums was mandated by parliament and the care of the 
insane was to be legally supervised by appointed government officials. The Board of 
Commissioners in Lunacy undertook the care and inspection of these new public asylums 
and would inspect the care provided in them, care that was being provided by trained male 
professionals (Showalter 1987:26). Public interest in the health and well-being of citizens 
rose dramatically; this concern was reflected in new laws and physiognomic discourse that 
detected and policed public and cultural ‘well-being’.  
                                                            
30 Three key events took place that shaped the tone of nineteenth-century England and held as the basis for 
the social, political and economic changes that occurred. The victory at the battle of Waterloo in 1815, this 
instilled in the nation a new sense of pride and patriotism and led the development of a national mythos based 
on pride, self-discipline, and entitlement; the Industrial Revolution, which led to an altered daily existence due 
to the technological and scientific boom and resulted in the urbanisation of England; and the Reform Bill of 
1832, one of many Reform Bills during this time, that aimed to increase the number of eligible voters (Mitchell 
1996:1-2). Tellingly, the word ‘male’ was also added to the description of the voters, a sign that change for 
woman was starting to take root in societal thinking (Mitchell 1996:3). 
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 “In the late nineteenth century, far-reaching changes engendered by technological 
progress and industrial expansion intensified anxieties about social and medical 
pathologies and cultural decline”. Within the sociological discourse, this was linked to 
theories related to social degeneration (McPherson 2010:105). 
 Industrialisation and technological expansion threatened established, traditionally 
male dominated areas of public life and work spaces; and the locus of the nineteenth 
century, technological and cultural progress, became the biggest threat, and 
simultaneously the answer to socio-cultural progress and degeneration. Traditional 
ideologies about the feminine and traditional female roles were also being interrogated 
during the nineteenth century.  
 The figure of the ‘New Woman’ emerges during this time in England, America, and 
Europe, where technological advancement and progress in various spheres impacted lived 
social relations in numerous ways. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the idea of 
the New Woman, single, educated, and economically independent posed a serious threat 
to patriarchal conceptions of womanhood (Smith-Rosenberg 1985:245).  
 The New Woman embodied the new opportunities available to women, as well as 
being “demonized as a primary force threatening the nation’s social, moral, physical, and 
economic stability” (Biro 2009:204). The New Woman had more political freedom, rejected 
marriage, and fought for professional acceptance and visibility, and in so doing 
destabilised patriarchal and traditionalist structures in the workplace and politically (Biro 
2009:204). 
 In 1920s America, the New Woman was used politically as a “sexually freighted 
metaphor for social disorder and protest” (Smith-Rosenberg 1985:246). In Europe 
however, this political metaphor emerged earlier on and resulted in a pathological policing 
of the female body through medicine, technology, vision, and scientific discourse during 
the course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
 This shift in gender relations in numerous spheres, which were traditionally afforded to 
men only, also led to the New Woman emerging as a very real threat to Victorian ideals of 
public and private space. To counteract the metaphoric and material New Woman, the 
debate surrounding the ‘place’ of women was assigned to scientific analysis to define, and 
subsequently control (Lord 1994:137). The challenge of the metaphoric and material New 
Woman appeared to cause most disruption not only in the workplace but also in the home. 
Subsequently, a reassertion of the ‘natural’ biological delineation between women and 
men in the late nineteenth century was called upon by scientific discourse to re-establish 
these previously unchallenged ideologies of place. As Lord (1994:137) states:  
 
  The biological delineation of sex difference as incommensurable provided the social 
delineation between the private and public realms with greater clarity. The bodily 
inscriptions of this incommensurability were then to ensure the subjugation of women in 
the private world to the laws of the ‘fraternal’ state; ensuring as well that ‘women’s politics 
must be the politics of morality’. 
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 By firmly, and ‘biologically’ placing the New Woman back in the home, as dictated by 
the laws of nature, and inscribed historically by a discourse of scientism, any defiance of 
this ‘natural’ law ensured that the New Woman would be inscribed as deviant. In 
destabilising the “order of things”, the New Woman situated herself historically within the 
public sphere, and in so doing, defied the “naturally ensured division between private and 
public life” (Lord 1994:137).  
 As previously discussed, any deviance from ‘natural’ and accepted forms of being 
woman, from Théroigne de Méricourt, to eagerly single women, resulted in pathologising 
this aberration through technologies of vision and processes of signification that invoked 
mental illness. At the core of this policing of female being was the notion that the 
New Woman was evidence “of the Enlightenment gone awry [and] she also embodied the 
disintegration of idealized love and beauty” (Lord 1994:137).  
 Lord (1994:137) adds that “the ‘impropriety’ of the public woman both revealed and 
reflected the contradictions underpinning the modern polis”. The ‘modern polis’, 
constructed from Enlightenment ideals of subjectivity and progress, was still singularly 
hampered by bourgeoisie values and Victorian ideals relating to public spaces; private 
spaces; and the role of women in society. The visibility of the New Woman was seen as a 
threat to patriarchal public spaces and male autonomy and also as a destabilizing agent 
economically and politically.  
 Lord cites the prostitute and hysteric as examples of the ‘public’ woman and argues 
that these figures were placed “under the sign of pathology and criminality” (Lord 
1994:139). This act aligns with previous discourse surrounding ‘deviant’ women, as well as 
the obsession in the nineteenth century with the visual trace and its ability to uncover 
pathological; criminal; intellectual; and moral deficiencies and aberrations. With 
technological improvements of the camera running concurrently with and because of, 
discourses of science and medicine that focused on visual signification as evidence of 
pathology and difference, the nineteenth century abounded with visual proof of this 
Otherness. As Lord (1994:139) states: 
 
  The optical technologies of the period were crucial in the production and evaluation of the 
‘evidence’. As photography was now institutionalized in the form of taxonomic ‘portraits’ 
for legal, anthropological, and medical purposes, documentation was compiled and edited 
so as to prove the theory that such women were inherently and radically ‘different’. Hence, 
the female body was entering the public sphere as image, its suffering erased and its 
secrets deciphered, by way of technology.  
 
 This emerging female difference in the minds of the public became a pivotal factor in 
social and cultural degeneration and policing of this difference became a vitally important 
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process to keep social and cultural regression at bay; as McPherson (2010:105) states, 
“from a narrowly defined medical concept, degeneration mutated into a self-reproducing, 
empirically demonstrable pathological spectre that seemed to threaten the very fabric of 
society and the future of civilization”. Private and public asylums across England, Europe, 
and America, were essential in policing this deviance that had the potential to undo the 
very fabric of nineteenth-century life. 
 
2.5 The Function of Photography 
 
The contribution of the camera and the photographic image to the construction of culture 
and knowledge production are immense and pervasive and, as Srivatsan (1991:771) 
states, “photographic vision has a way of penetrating any discourse and powerfully 
reconstituting its logic and practice”. Photography emerged in the mid-1820s with the first 
documented photograph having been developed by Nicéphore Niépce. Louis Daguerre, 
however, can be credited with developing the first practical photographic process with the 
invention of the Daguerreotype process, which was introduced commercially in 1839. Art 
photography emerged shortly thereafter in the late nineteenth century and was similar to 
oil painting with regard to perspective; this perspective remained analogous with the 
perspective theorised by da Vinci (Srivatsan 1991:772). The aesthetics of art photography 
and documentary style photography of this time retained many painterly practices relating 
to the use of perspective, staging, and framing.  
 The development of photography and a specularised society coincided with, and was 
concomitant with, the rise of capitalism and modernisation in Europe at the time. These 
cultural and political shifts developed alongside new forms of leisure that were either visual 
in nature or required a visual aid of some sort, for example window-shopping, the circus, 
photography, the café-concert, strolling through the city, and so forth (Balducci 2010:136); 
as Jean-Louis Comolli noted, the “second half of the nineteenth lives in a sort of frenzy of 
the visible” (Jean-Louis Comolli cited in Balducci 2010:136).31 
 Balducci describes a pertinent aspect of photographic practice, whether for scientific 
or leisure purposes, in that the photograph and the camera mediated nineteenth century 
life, yet also constructed it simultaneously. The development of the camera and 
photography during 1800s emerged as a result of previous practices of knowledge 
production that centred on the visual, from the Ancient Greeks to the Enlightenment. In the 
early stages of photography, the image was sought after due to the novelty associated with 
the production of the image (Srivatsan 1991:772). “The esoteric, unpredictable and 
                                                            
31 The concept of the flâneur, the male city stroller, observing as he walked the streets of the urban city centre 
emerges during this time as an icon of modern Europe. The flâneur is indicative of the changing social and 
cultural matrices of the nineteenth century. Borne from ascending Capitalist ideologies and a shift in cultural 
practices inflected by Industrialisation, the flâneur also marks the boundary breakdown between public and 
private spaces. However, primarily, the flâneur is symbolic of the nineteenth century’s fixation with the visual. 
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manually skilled nature of the early photographic chemical developing 
process…contributed to an air of curiosity around an original” (Srivatsan 1991:772).  
 As Srivatsan (1991:772) notes, “this worship of performance, to the exclusion of all 
other considerations is often…closely associated with a technical discourse”. We can see 
this in the skill associated with the act of photographing; the composition of the subject 
material, the influence of the light, the aperture size and shutter speed as well as the 
process of development, all influenced the final presentation of the image and thus its 
effect on the viewer. The image in later photography is framed with details about the light, 
aperture and so forth, as Srivatsan (1991:772) states, “the discussion is coded in the 
(performative) language of efficiency”. The camera in this way functions as an example of 
human ingenuity in the production of this technology. The photograph, in its reproduction 
of ‘reality’ however, is plagued by numerous philosophical and technological concepts that 
influence this ‘re-creation’ of reality. 
 Susan Sontag in On Photography states that in the photograph “reality is summed up 
in an array of casual fragments –an endlessly alluring, poignantly reductive way of dealing 
with the world” (Sontag 1977:80). She explains the way in which image production selects, 
frames and produces an image to be consumed, and in this way, the photographer 
reduces reality and his subject to a single moment in time. The photograph, indicative of 
only the moment of time of its production and framing, can be viewed as indicative of that 
subject and that time in general.  
In this way, the photograph acts as a “cultural artefact that not only presents as reality, 
but structures that (re)presented reality as well” (Sontag 1977:69). Sontag expands on this 
by stating that “their appeal is that they also seem, in a world littered with photographic 
relics, to have the status of found objects- unpremeditated slices of the world. Thus, they 
trade simultaneously on the prestige of art and the magic of the real. They are clouds of 
fantasy and pellets of information” (Sontag 1977:69). The status of the subject, specifically 
in nineteenth-century medical photography, was taken as exactly this – an unpremeditated 
slice of the world. Framing, staging, posing, background and so forth were not taken into 
consideration when viewing the photograph; and questioning the objectivity of the camera, 
the photographer, or the doctor, were not probable within nineteenth-century socio-cultural 
contexts fashioned around the marvels of science and technology, the objective nature of 
the eye; and the ocularcentrism that pervaded this period.  
 Detail in the photograph plays an important role in the process of discrediting the 
human eye in the quest to uncover truth. This exaggerated fragment of ‘reality’  that the 
photographer isolated and captured, however trivial, was imbued with special significance 
in the mere act of photographing it (Szarkowski 2003:100). By recording even the most 
seemingly inconsequential detail, the photograph implies that the subject has never truly 
been seen before and that the photograph was the only way to uncover these hidden 
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truths (Szarkowski 2003:100). The selection of this detail was a crucial aspect in 
discovering the ‘hidden truths’ inherent in the subject of the photographic gaze. 
 Szarkowski points out that “since the photographer’s picture was not wholly conceived 
but selected, his subject was never truly discrete, never wholly self-contained, the edges of 
his film demarcated what he thought was most important” (Szarkowski 2003:100). In 
selecting the specific elements to include inside the frame, the photographer highlighted 
specific details and discarded others. Additionally, whatever elements had been selected, 
were forced into a relationship with each other (Szarkowski 2003:100). Whether this 
relationship was realistic or even probable, was a moot point. Furthermore, this 
relationship, especially within medical photography, juxtaposed, highlighted, and 
constructed meaning between the details in-frame. 
 In the act of isolating and highlighting specific elements of the subject, the photograph 
presents the viewer with an atomized-narrative. In the act of singling out specific elements, 
or just one element, the photograph is unable to be read as narrative, but instead can be 
read as symbol (Szarkowski 2003:100). A sequence of image symbols, truncated as each 
image may be, could however act as an interrupted narrative of hyper exaggerated detail. 
Each picture, for example, in a medical iconography, presenting a narrative of symbols 
deemed important. 
 This narrative, because it is interrupted and erratic, highlights the role of the 
mechanical in the construction of these images. However, as opposed to inducing 
reflexivity and questioning of the truth value of the image, the sequenced picture-book 
produced within nineteenth-century medico-scientific contexts, instead values the role that 
technology played in uncovering and verifying the ‘truth’ of the image. The creator of these 
images, the photographer, is equally afforded this so-called inherent objectivity. 
 Sontag describes the photographer as one who “both loots and preserves, denounces 
and consecrates” (Sontag 1977:64). The objectivity afforded to the medical practitioner of 
the nineteenth century, due to the camera’s positioning within scientific discourse, was 
analogous with that of the camera itself, which was seen as a product of technological 
progress; this association with science and technological progress kept the 
problematization of the images that were produced at bay.  
 Yet this ‘objectivity’ is called into question when Sontag notes that “like the collector, 
the photographer is animated by a passion that, even when it appears to be for the 
present, is linked to a sense of the past”  (Sontag 1977:77). Similarly, as I expand on 
further in the chapter, Charcot and Esquirol, both at the forefront of dynamic psychiatry, 
still structured their interpretations around ancient visual signs of female mental illness; in 
a sense, almost honouring the work of those that had come before them. 
 John Szarkowski in Introduction to the Photographer’s Eye speaks of the impact that 
learning that photography deals with the actual, has on the photographer. The 
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photographer learns that the factuality of the image, and reality, however similar, are in fact 
not alike. And although the photographed subject and the image were different, they would 
seem like the same thing afterwards. With this in mind, careful consideration of how the 
camera highlights some aspects of the subject and disregards others needs to be taken 
into account. Szarkowski (2003:99) points out that  
 
  It was the photographer’s problem to see not simply the reality before him but the still 
invisible picture, and to make his choices in terms of the latter. This was an artistic 
problem, not a scientific one, but the public believed that the photograph could not lie, and 
it was easier for the photographer if he believed it too. 
 
 This is evidenced in the photographic output of nineteenth-century medical 
practitioners. The visualisation of what the image should look like was constructed by pre-
existing ideological structures and these were further communicated and strengthened by 
using established visual signifiers of mental illness. The structure of the medical 
photograph was therefore pre-determined by an a priori belief system and various visual 
cues that indicated and structured mental illness.  
 Sontag speaks to this ‘a priori belief system’ when she notes that “photography 
executes the Surrealist mandate to adopt an uncompromisingly egalitarian attitude toward 
subject matter (Everything is ‘real’)”  (Sontag 1977:78). We see this particularly in the 
prolific use of the camera and varied subject matter, in the nineteenth century. Anything 
could become the subject of the photographic eye, and every exposed detail could lead to 
a new discovery.  
 Sontag goes on to interrogate this ‘everything-is-real’ view afforded to the camera 
when she says, “the view of reality as an exotic prize to be tracked down and captured by 
the diligent hunter-with-a-camera has informed photography from the beginning (Sontag 
1977:55). The ‘objectivity’ of the photographer is called into question when, as Sontag 
notes, “the photographer’s ardour for a subject has no essential relationship to its content 
or value…it is… an affirmation of the subject’s thereness” (Sontag 1977:77).  
 The act of photographing the subject justifies it as a valued source of scientific interest 
and in addition justifies its need to be investigated. The subject is uncovered by the 
photographer, and his technological extension, the camera. Sontag expands the ‘role’ of 
the camera as social interpreter when she notes that “for more than a century, 
photographers have been hovering about the oppressed, in attendance at scenes of 
violence – with a spectacularly good conscience. Social misery has inspired the 
comfortably-off with the urge to take pictures. The gentlest of predations, in order to 
document a hidden reality, that is, a reality hidden from them” (Sontag 1977:55). 
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 William M. Ivins (cited in Szarkowski 2003:99) explains, “at any given moment the 
accepted report of an event is of greater importance than the event, for what we think 
about and act upon is the symbolic report and not the concrete event itself”. Despite the 
supposed ‘objectivity’ of the camera and photographer, the act of photographing any 
subject is informed by the ideologies present in the culture of the photographer; the 
photographic image is a bearer of these ideological messages, messages with which the 
viewer of the photographic image is consistently interacting.  
 The display culture of revolution, and consequently social and cultural deviance, was 
well established by the nineteenth century. The public’s fascination with regard to new 
‘medical’  ways of ordering the human race, seen in the study of facial expressions, 
craniology and visual signifiers, was concomitant with the virulent need to visually 
ascertain markers of degeneration, madness, illness and so forth. As McPherson 
(2010:105) states: 
 
  In the late nineteenth century, far-reaching changes engendered by technological 
progress and industrial expansion intensified anxieties about social and medical 
pathologies and cultural decline. Within the sociological discourse, which was 
documented by the binary opposition between progress and decline and the social and 
the individual, the concept of degeneration became a corollary of social evolution. 
 
 The anxiety produced by these cultural and political shifts resulted in Hysteria as 
malady emerging as a metaphor, both medically and culturally, as the embodiment of 
degeneration and a symptom of these changes and anxiety (McPherson 2010:108). By 
combining the obsession with the visual and the need for the ordering of humanity, 
inherent in this era, the image of the hysteric imbues these images of female deviance with 
icon-building ability. The well-worn visual signifiers of female deviance used in these 
images created a display culture of the anxieties of nineteenth-century patriarchal society.  
 Just as Sontag interrogates the notion that the “magic box insures veracity” (Sontag 
1977:53), Sturken and Cartwright (2001:280) also question the supposition of the camera 
as ‘objective’, and state: 
 
  The notion of photographic truth hinges on the idea that the camera is an objective device 
for the capturing of reality, and that it renders this objectivity despite the subjective vision 
of the person using the camera. Hence, the photographic image has often been seen as 
an entity stripped of intentionality, through which the truth can be told without mediation or 
subjective distortion. 
 
 The use of the camera in nineteenth-century medicine furthered the aims of 
patriarchal positivist science in ‘uncovering’ the secrets of nature (conceptualised as the 
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feminine) as well as coinciding with the focus on technological development in modernity, 
and the notion of spectacle. Seeing further and better than the human eye characterised 
nineteenth-century medical practice and informed its use of the camera and other 
technologies of vision in capturing the hidden truths not only on the surface of the skin, but 
within the body as well. The mechanical nature of the camera and the pursuit of 
surpassing the human eye and its abilities, combined within a nineteenth-century 
discourse of positivist science, ensured that photography became “the quintessential 
modern medium” (Sturken & Cartwright 2001:281). 
 With the invention of the X-ray in 1895, new visions of the body ‘came to light’ and the 
photographing of the human body, both inside and out, further solidified the aim of 
improving on the ‘technology’ of the human eye and its ability to expose hidden truths and 
uncover knowledge. Embracing technologies of vision in the pursuit of truth in scientific 
discourse continues to this day (Sturken & Cartwright 2001:281).  
 Images produced within a scientific discourse are understood to be objective. These 
images are also seen to have surpassed the ability of the human eye in uncovering the 
inherent structure of a subject, depicted in these images (Sturken & Cartwright 2001:281); 
coupled with this notion of objective truth that is so intimately connected to photography 
and the camera, is the notion that the camera is simultaneously magical and objective. As 
Sturken and Cartwright (2001:280) state, “much of the meaning of camera generated 
images is derived from the combination of the camera’s role in capturing the real and its 
capacity to evoke emotion and present a sense of the unattainable- in other words, to 
appear to both magical and truthful at once”. Similarly, Sontag’s evocation of the “magic 
box” attests to the dual nature of the photograph and the camera, as both veracious and 
mystical.  
 This belief in the capacity of the photograph to see beyond the human eye and to 
create a sense of new frontiers of vision was coupled with its increased use for institutional 
regulation and categorization or archiving of people according to types. Hospitals, mental 
institutions, and government agencies all employed (and many still employ) photography to 
catalogue subjects, diseases, and citizens in the late nineteenth century (Sturken & 
Cartwright 2001:281). 
 Various practices of visual diagnosis that developed into fully formed ‘sciences’ within 
the medical fraternity further established the apparent need for technologies of vision to aid 
in diagnostic practices. Physiognomy, branching out into pseudo-sciences such as 
craniology, and phrenology, used the visual signifiers of the human body to classify types 
and sought to establish concrete characteristics of these types, as well as outwardly 
expressing interior moral, social, and intellectual capacity or deviance (Sturken & 
Cartwright 2001:281-282). 
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 Various visual signifiers, from eyelashes; facial expression; skull shape or size; jaw 
shape or size; to the size and angle of the nose, were used to uncover and define the 
hidden truths of the body. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the photograph was 
used as a means of refining these physical markers and aiding in measurement and 
classification (Sturken & Cartwright 2001:281-282). A number of pseudo-sciences dealing 
with visual markers appeared in the nineteenth century and produced numerous volumes 
of work dealing with various classification methods and their resultant ‘truths’.  
 The Races of Man written by John Beddoe in 1862 argued that variations in jaw size 
and how far the jaw protruded pointed to not only physical, but also intellectual differences 
in various races. The racist ideologies that structured and produced this text suggested 
that the Irish, Welsh, and other supposed lower classes were akin to Cro-Magnon man, 
and therefore also linked to African races (Sturken & Cartwright 2001:281-282).  
 Sir Francis Galton advocated the use of eugenics as a way of controlling and 
improving the human race through specific breeding practices. In his book Hereditary 
Genius (1869) Galton expands on his assumption that not all races are created equal, and 
therefore not all races are deemed worthy of reproducing (Sturken & Cartwright 2001:282). 
Galton, just like Beddoe, used statistical methods to ‘read’ various pathologies that were in 
his opinion, evident in visual markers on the surface of the body (Sturken & Cartwright 
2001:282). Galton, as with Esquirol and Charcot, was interested in creating a visual 
schema of pathology, ranging across a wide range of social and medical ailments;32 a 
schema of pathology, ranging across a wide range of social and medical ‘abnormalities’. 
These included composites of people with tuberculosis, prostitutes, and criminals, which 
were produced in order to garner an understanding of the general ‘type’ (Cartwright & 
Sturken 2001:282). In another mid-century practice, anthropometry was used to measure 
different races in order to make distinctions between them and subsequently draw 
conclusions about the characteristics of these races (Sturken & Cartwright 2001:284).  
 As discussed before, the practice of illustration and later on, the photographing of the 
body in order to visually decode it, has existed in medical discourse since Hippocrates. 
The use of vision and technologies of vision to aid in diagnostic practices, as well as the 
conflation of the eye with pure and objective knowledge, resulted in nineteenth-century 
medical discourse valuing modern technologies of vision above all else in uncovering the 
hidden truths of the human body.  
 Martin Jay (cited in Jenks 1995:2) states that modern culture elected the visual as 
“both the primary medium for communication and also the sole ingress to our accumulated 
symbolic treasury”. This resulted in the emergence of a cyclical and non-reflexive model of 
seeing-as-knowledge and knowledge-as-seeing. This also established the dichotomy of 
                                                            
32 Charcot’s work will be discussed in detail further on in this chapter. 
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self as receptacle and other as spectacle (Jenks 1995:3). Metaphysical questions that 
address notions of being and knowing for example, have also been taken for granted and 
subsumed into the systemic nature of vision-as-knowledge and knowledge-as-vision cycle 
that has been established over the last two hundred years.  
 Jenks (1995:4) also notes that the social theorist has progressed knowledge on 
human communities informed by the premise that science is based on three principles, 
namely, “a mechanistic view of the universe as a whole interrelated totality; a principled 
acceptance that an intrinsic order resides within phenomena as external forms, and the 
necessary contingency being that understanding proceeds through the ‘independence’ of 
an observers sight”.  
 Jenks reiterates that this pure reason was equated with the pure eye and 
understanding through sight and this notion of observation reduced social experience and 
vision to pure perception (Jenks 1995:4). This act forgoes phenomenological and 
ontological study or experience. Instead experience is ‘arrested’ by technologies of vision 
and displayed for study. Furthermore, this new ‘clear’ sight was ingrained even more so in 
the popular imagination and theory; as well as the conflation of reality with sight, aided by 
technological inventions such as the lens, the telescope, and the microscope (Jenks 
1995:6).  
 This new realism of sight further distances itself from actual social interactions and 
bodily interactions, when it is based within scientific discourse and its practices. Any other 
value judgement is dismissed, except those made by the eye; “we now have a vision that 
regards itself as pure and which also parades both its a-morality and its anti-aesthetic” 
(Jenks 1995:7). Paradoxically however, this clear vision has its roots in Enlightenment 
philosophy, which in fact coupled science and aesthetics through observation. As Jenks 
(1995:7) states: 
 
  This visual fixity is one that is dominant and consistent within our Modern, Western 
cultural cognitions, upheld largely through the agency of scientific practice. Such a ‘plain 
view’  of reality must surely rest upon and also project a consensus ‘world-view’. The 
programme set within modern culture for the supposed unification of seeing obviates the 
disruptive abrasion of conflict and the necessity of difference. Any alternative ‘visions’ or 
‘perspectives’ can be rendered intelligible in the form of deviance. 
 
 This world-view is structured upon imaging the most ‘truthful perception’ of the world 
through scientism and is a part in the whole project of scientism that manufactures ‘truth’ 
throughout any era associating itself with modernity (Jenks 1995:7). The partial vision of 
‘truth’  attained by this sight is manifested through the selection, abstraction and 
transformation of specific signs and actions present in society (Jenks 1995:8). Not all 
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signs, experience or possibilities are taken into account in the formation of this ‘perception’ 
of the truth presented to us by scientism, and worryingly there are few sciences, theory or 
technologies that are not in some way, partial or totally predicated upon the power of 
pictorial symbolization (Jenks 1995:7).  
 What is structured then is a world-view not just totalising in its apparent unified 
depiction of truth and absolute in its power, but one that is structured by and structures 
signs, symbols, and experience that further the doctrines of Western society; science; 
technology; capitalism and patriarchy. No possibility is available for a disruption of this 
view, and if one is indeed taken, the resulting action is condemned as deviant and 
pathological.  
 This scientific vision extracts, separates and decontextualizes the image, and as 
Jenks (1995:9) states it is “an extracting of essences, or elements, or generalities from one 
original plane to another”. These new and changed images, become malleable because of 
their removal from an original context, and yet, they still retain significations and links to 
their original context (Jenks 1995:9). The resultant image then can be changed and 
moulded to best suit the needs of dominant ideologies found in the context of this 
scientific-world view, which enables a manipulation of the original image in its original 
context. This separation and manipulation of the image leaves us with a very powerful 
(re)presentation that has been structured by, and for, dominant ideologies. These 
(re)presented images then work to form the governing principles or discourse of the natural 
world which the dominant order have conjured into existence, and from which all meaning 
subsequently flows. 
 This (re)presented image is then contextualised in its own original plane and avenues 
for questioning are removed. To problematize this (re)presentation would be to 
problematize the discourse that structured it and allowed for its creation. As we have read 
in Jenks, this foregrounding of the problems related to the process of selection, abstraction 
and transformation that images undergo is made impossible by the labelling of such 
problematizing as deviant. There is no available discourse or even alternative to discourse 
with which to attack this dominant structuring of the image as discourse and culture are 
underwritten by the dominant ideologies that support and reify the scientific visual culture 
that orders and manipulates our modes of imaging, perception, and representation.  
 Instances of institutional photography and image structured by dominant patriarchal 
discourses during the nineteenth century are many and varied. Ranging from medical 
photography to ethnographic studies, as discussed by Kromm, many authors have written 
on the role of visual surveillance in the policing and reification of dominant ideologies, with 
specific reference to the work of Michel Foucault and his notion of the panopticon. 
Emily Godbey in Picture Me Sane: Photography and the Magic Lantern in a Nineteenth-
Century Asylum states that “at the nexus of work combining photography and mental 
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illness, patients usually become subjects of the doctor’s penetrating gaze. These patients 
assume their places in photography’s numbered and ordered filing cabinets, while the 
‘machinery’ [of power] that is both immense and minute courses through the system with a 
deafening whisper” (Godbey 2000:31-32).  
 In Charcot’s Iconographie de la photographique purposed for the documentation of 
Hysteria, we see a unnerving resemblance to Paul Richter’s line illustrations for 
Les Démoniaques dans l’art in which he and Charcot effectively “mined past art, compiling 
a sort of ‘musée imaginaire’  that historicized Hysteria and conflated the clinical with the 
aesthetic”  (McPherson 2010:109). This illustration of madness was a perfect fit for the 
cultural imagination and cultural process of the time.  
 The image of the hysteric in the late nineteenth century (taking into account that 
photography was still seen as a skilled practice, as well as esoteric), was spectacularised 
by the Tuesday lectures of Charcot. The images produced were viewed by many in these 
lectures and were disseminated in books, journals and newspapers. They were produced 
in a discourse of scientism in that they were commissioned by a medical professional and 
were captured by the fairly new invention of the camera; they were deemed truthful 
representations of reality because they were produced within medico-scientific discourse 
and by the ultimate tool of modernity — the camera. As Srivatsan (1991:773) states: 
 
  Science’s use of photography or verification and falsification of its theories’ imparts to the 
photograph the respectability and power of modern science as a legitimate (and 
legitimating) seeker of knowledge…the aura of respectability spreads throughout the 
photographic field by connotation, infecting the photographic images we perceive with the 
attributes of truth and authority. 
 
 These attributes of ‘truth and authority’ go a long way in reifying the plausibility and 
believability of the aesthetics and desires that are formed in scientific photography, 
‘everyday’ photography and the art image. If we consider the so-called objective scientific 
documentation of the hysterical body by Charcot, it is evident to the viewer that these 
images were not created for ‘truth telling’  purposes, but for the purpose of displaying a 
deviant aesthetic of the time. Images of the cyborg body in the media and in the cinema, 
although cloaked in the discourse of scientism, are images that similarly represent their 
cultural moment. The aesthetics of the deviant cyborg body, empowered by the gravitas of 
a pseudo-scientific discourse, lays claim to a truthful representation of the world, and a 
truthful depiction of the physical markers and attributes of deviance or degeneration. 
Similarly, the hysterical body and the cyborg body both reflect the deviant aesthetic, or the 
marks of defiance against the dominant patriarchal order. They create an aesthetic of 
pathology that act as visual ethnographies of the socio-cultural conditions that gave rise to 
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them; specifically that of the Othered, deviant female body, as seen in the Hysteric, and 
the cyborg.  
 These images act to reify heteronormative ideologies through the dominant visual 
mode of scientism while aesthetisizing the object of the gaze. They operate in the realm of 
scientific ‘truth’  and normalise the marginalisation, aesthetisization, and punishment of 
these deviant bodies. The scientific photograph of Charcot’s time, although not widely 
distributed, was nevertheless disseminated through Charcot’s weekly Tuesday lectures. In 
addition, the actual object of the photographers gaze was on show simultaneously, re-
creating the aesthetics and action taking place in the image. A continuous reinforcement of 
the messages of the image, through varying modes of visuality provided the basis for the 
construction of the image which was paraded as transparent and truthful. In chapter four, I 
discuss how the depictions of cyborgs in my chosen films similarly act as truthful 
depictions, or as truthful as depictions of the future could be, of the hysterical cyborg body 
as a threat to humanity. 
 The looking at “attentively” as described by Martin Jay (1993:23) is an intrinsic part of 
the event of displaying the hysteric in the lecture theatre – staged, taking place in the 
theatre constructed in La Salpêtrière by Charcot. The ‘truth’ of these images was further 
corroborated by the fact that Charcot was a respected practitioner in the medical 
profession. Not only were they being created by a medical practitioner, but in an 
establishment of medical science, the asylum. As Amirault (1993:51) states: 
 
  The rapid proliferation of photographic technology corresponded with the establishment of 
medicine as a science and a profession. This correspondence, grounded in similar 
constructions of vision, the body, and representation of the real, allowed photography and 
medicine to reinforce each other.  
 
 As Barthes noted about the photograph (cited in Bowen 1999:1), “in it nothing can be 
refused or transformed”. Not only were they being created by a medical practitioner, but in 
an establishment of medical science, the asylum. As Barthes (1999:1) states: “In as much 
as photography is an ellipse of language and a condensation of an ‘ineffable social whole’ 
it constitutes an anti-intellectual weapon and tends to spirit away politics”. The conditions 
of production of these images as previously stated, all aided in placing these images 
above the realm in which representation could be adequately problematized.33 The subject 
matter was pathologised and neutralised and therefore “spirited away politics”. The politics 
of these images, or rather their modes of communication, the messages they deliver and 
the trust placed in them as being truthful representations, are sealed off from 
                                                            
33 Referring to conditions within a discourse of scientism. 
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interpretation. The patronage of a scientific discourse and the dominant visual mode of 
scientism that created them, lead the viewer into accepting the image at face value.  
 Furthermore, as Bazin (cited in Bowen 1999:3) states in The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image, “photography…embalms time” and he goes on to say that in fact 
photography does not have a code per se, but that it images a moment of contact, 
captures a cultural time. This is evidenced in the image of the hysteric and the lack of 
problematization during that period, due to the inability to question, in the realm of 
patriarchal discourse, the claims that these images make to truthfulness and realistic 
representation. Politics is indeed “spirited away” and an unpacking of these images seems 
impossible. Added to this, the degree of support and construction by the discourse of 
science attached to these images creates a wholly unwelcoming atmosphere within which 
questioning of these images might be possible. 
 
2.6 Charcot and the Salpêtrière 
 
The Salpêtrière, one of the most notorious asylums in Europe, has had a long and arduous 
history with female mental illness and the objectification of women. The most notorious 
physician to work at this institution was the French doctor, Jean Martin Charcot. A leader 
at that time in the field of mental illness and more specifically Hysteria, Charcot was head 
physician at the Salpêtrière from 1862 until 1893 (Bogousslavsky, Walusinski & Veyrunes 
2009:193). Principally a neurologist, but an artist at heart, Charcot successfully 
constructed a ‘hold-all’ disease for the wayward women of France in the nineteenth 
century and his aim to classify, catalogue a thorough schema of Hysteria; and develop an 
archetype of the disease was undertaken at the Salpêtrière during his time there.  
La Salpêtrière, as an asylum, was established by Louis XIV as a hospital for 
amongst other ailments: beggars; prostitutes; the criminally insane; female adulterers; 
epileptics; and hysterical women. After the French Revolution, it became one of the largest 
brothels in Europe. Later on, in the words of Georges Didi-Huberman (2003:13) “it was the 
general hospital for women, or rather for the feminine dregs of society”. Historically, this 
site has centred on the objectification and eroticisation of the human body, but most 
notably and in the greatest majority, that of the female body. The hospital at the time of 
Charcot mirrored and re-presented the social, political and economic climate of Paris at the 
time (Justice-Malloy 1995:133).  
Charcot’s work and that of his colleagues at the hospital, displayed a new and 
experimental modernity that was underfoot in Paris, and the world at large. As Rhona 
Justice-Malloy (1995:133) states “the acceptance of a bourgeoisie value system of 
patriarchy and sexual asceticism in a Paris on the brink of modernity was coincident and 
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perhaps related to the appearance of hysteria”. The threatening spectre of the 
New Women in nineteenth-century Europe and fears about socio-cultural degeneration, 
aided in, and reinforced institutional involvement in the policing of deviance.  
 In early nineteenth-century statistics on Hysteria, approximately 1 % of the female 
inmates at La Salpêtrière were diagnosed with Hysteria. Most of these women were 
working-class individuals who some critics say lived ‘outside’ of the bourgeoisies 
parameters of the modern world and therefore would have no reason to revolt against this 
value system, as later hysterics did (Justice-Malloy 1995:133).  
 By the time Charcot arrived at La Salpêtrière, the incidence of woman diagnosed as 
hysterical rose dramatically; 20,5 % of women admitted to the hospital were diagnosed 
with the malady of Hysteria, and the majority of these were housewives and upper middle 
class citizens of Paris (Justice-Malloy 1995:133). It was seen by physicians, especially 
Charcot, as some sort of flamboyant revolt of women rejecting their ‘natural’ roles (Justice-
Malloy 1995:133). 
 Max Nordau, a physician who had studied under Charcot, saw socio-cultural 
degeneration and Hysteria as a result of changes to the landscape of the nineteenth 
century. As McPherson (2010:104) states “he attributed the rise of Hysteria and 
degeneration to far-reaching technological changes, urbanization, the wear and tear of 
modern living, and nervous fatigue”. Among these changes was the rise of the 
New Woman and changes in the structures of gendered daily life. 
 Charcot served his medical internship at the Salpêtrière in the 1850s and while the 
hospital was of little interest to other medical interns, Charcot was fascinated by the very 
large and diverse patient population. At the Salpêtrière Charcot found a veritable 
warehouse of mentally ill women, and with the approximately five thousand patients, he 
had found the ideal situation in which to conduct a comparative study of mental disorders 
(de Marneffe 1991:73). Charcot would later go on to refer to the hospital as “a museum of 
living pathology” (de Marneffe 1991:73).  
 Between 1862 (the year he began working at the Salpêtrière) and 1870, Charcot 
made numerous contributions to the field of neurology and aided in its establishment as a 
respected field of scientific inquiry. In addition, his position as principal neurologist of the 
time was solidified by his work there (de Marneffe 1991:73-74). In 1870 the Salpêtrière 
was restructured and women diagnosed with Hysteria and Epilepsy placed in the same 
ward. During this time, Charcot was put in charge of this ward and it was here that he 
began his quest to distinguish Epilepsy from Hysteria (de Marneffe 1991:74). Here Charcot 
was able to establish his taxonomy of Hysteria and develop the archetype of the disease. 
 After Charcot began working with hysterics in 1870, he was made professor of 
pathological anatomy in 1872 and began his infamous ‘Tuesday Lectures’, with nearly one-
third of these detailing his work and findings on Hysteria (de Marneffe 1991:74). Charcot 
 62 
 
made use of the clinicoanatomic method, developed in France during this period, and it 
was through this that he developed the archetype of the disease Hysteria (de Marneffe 
1991:74).34  
 Charcot pioneered research in the neurological sciences and as he continued to 
expand his research, technological improvements in the hospital followed (de Marneffe 
1991:74). More sophisticated and modern technological innovation, such as the 
construction of a photographic studio in the hospital aided Charcot in his quest to create a 
taxonomy of mental disorder. Charcot’s clinical description of Hysteria relied heavily on 
visual signs; and the addition of a photographic studio and photographers that were 
available permanently, continually assisted in structuring and forming the basis for his 
clinical description and construction of the archetype of Hysteria. Charcot’s use of 
observation is well documented and this formed the basis of his clinical findings on 
Hysteria. Photography as it was utilised in the Salpêtrière functioned as a technological 
extension of Charcot’s scientific method of observation. His clinicoanatomic method; 
scientific discourse; the construction of the disease Hysteria; and class and gender 
relations were reified through technological innovation and specifically the use of 
photography in medical science. 
 
2.7 Charcot’s Method 
 
  Susceptible to ‘invisible’ forces such as hypnotism, easily and unknowingly swayed, 
emotionally labile, often young and pretty, Charcot’s hysteric sums up the period’s fears 
and aspirations. She is – in her hypnotized, sleeping, paralysed or mute state – a parody, 
an excessive, caricatural version of that Victorian vision of the feminine which would have 
woman passive, angelic, malleable, and utterly desirable while undesiring, her skin 
anaesthetic. Yet the hysteric also embodies the time’s often secret desires for a certain 
sexual freedom… both for herself and for the fascinated men who watch and help to 
invent her (Appignanesi 2008:126). 
 
                                                            
34 The central thesis surrounding the clinicoanatomic method was that disease developed from an anatomical 
lesion. This method was therefore best suited to diseases with a clear biological base, for example Tabes, 
which Charcot had researched previously (de Marneffe 1991:75-76). However, with diseases of a 
psychological nature, this method proved problematic. Whereas before, an observation of symptoms was 
favoured for each specific case, this new method focused on and favoured the identification of these 
anatomical lesions and their localisations (de Marneffe 1991:75-76). By the time Charcot was put in charge of 
the newly restructured ward housing hysterics and epileptics, he was well practiced in the clinicoanatomic 
method and set forth to identify the anatomical lesions that he was convinced were at the root of Hysteria. 
Through this method he endeavoured to create an archetype of the disease that would be distinct from 
variations and could be ordered according to the scientific tradition of modernity. Interestingly, this method also 
aligns itself with another nineteenth- and twentieth-century tradition in scientific discourse creation, that of 
analogy. In aiming to construct an archetype of Hysteria, Charcot was mirroring traditions in scientific enquiry 
at the time which aimed to draw generalised conclusions about specific groups of people; disease; or 
behaviour; for example, the study of phrenology; race and gender studies; the study of criminal behaviour or 
tendencies; and the study of hereditary diseases. 
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  For his students whom he fascinated and who dedicated themselves to helping him 
construct his theoretical edifice he was both a professor and a magician. For the patients 
who made up his clinical tableaux vivants, serving as the objects of investigation and 
models for the iconography of hysteria he sought to fabricate in this pathological museum, 
he was both a miracle worker and a zoologist (Bronfen 1998:175). 
 
 Charcot as Bogousslavsky et al state (2009:194), “considered hysteria a ‘neurosis’ 
with an organic base, but with no demonstrable cerebral damage and where a “dynamic 
lesion” of the brain was responsible for the “stigmata” (sensory dysfunction, hyper-
excitability, visual filed narrowing), i.e. permanent clinical features in patients who were 
also prone to paroxysmal fits (grandes crises d’hystérie). This ‘dynamic lesion’ was 
emphasized by Charcot in order to explain the organicity of hysteria in the absence of a 
morphological lesion”. In other words, Charcot’s explanation of Hysteria as a neurological 
disease, in the absence of any neurological reason for it, was based on an ‘organic lesion’ 
that could have been caused by a traumatic event; a disease with physical symptoms but 
no physical cause.  
 Through the use of the camera in the diagnosis of Hysteria, Charcot and his students 
recorded the hysterical symptoms and supposed “erotic misbehaviour” of the female 
hysterical patients interned at the Salpêtrière in alarming detail (Justice-Malloy 1995:134). 
Although some images of male Hysteria can be found in the publications that resulted from 
Charcot’s work at the Salpêtrière, the majority of the images of hysterical patients were 
female. These female patients, as Charcot stated, were more susceptible to mental illness 
“due to their vulnerable natures and inability to control their feelings” (Justice-Malloy 
1995:134). 
 Charcot developed a strata of definable and observable stages of a hysterical attack, 
as well as clearly defined visual symptoms that accompanied each phase. In the hysterical 
attack, the following four phases presented:  
 
  (1) Tonic rigidity; (2) “grands movements” also called “clownisme” because of the circus-
like acrobatics produced; (3) “attitudes passionnelles” or vivid physical representations of 
one or more emotional states, such as terror, hatred, love; the patient endowed with an 
acrobat’s agility in the second period, now displays the talents of a mime or dramatic 
actress; (4) a final delirium marked by sobs, tears, and laughter, heralding a return to the 
real world (Justice-Malloy 1995:134). 
 
 As well as this, hysterics copied and mimed many of the symptoms and ‘attacks’ of 
epileptics, prompting Charcot to ‘discover’ a new disease, Hysterio-Epilepsy. The 
convenience of these shared symptoms arguably prompted Charcot to assume the same 
cause or organic neurological issue for both, based on similar visual symptoms. Charcot’s 
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style of medical procedure and use of technological aides in structuring his archetype of 
Hysteria was aligned with medico-scientific discourse and practice of the late nineteenth 
century. Charcot’s focus in the case of Hysteria was that of individual cases that would 
assist him in structuring an archetype of the disease and a specimen type (Appignanesi 
2008:130). These clinical observations of specific cases no doubt lead to an 
over-recognition and an over-diagnosis of the condition. Hysteria was also diagnosed if 
any one of the four phases of the hysterical attack was observed (Appignanesi 2008:130). 
 As an artist Charcot’s description of the four phases of the hysterical attack focus on 
the visual and the kinetic, rather than the unseen reasons behind the attack or even a 
psychological focus, and it was this talent for observation and the significance that he 
placed on detail that his contemporaries would call ‘the method of Charcot’ (Justice-Malloy 
1995:134). Henry Meige, a student of Charcot remarked that “at the first glance he was 
able to recognize some oddity or other of the human habitude. Now to be able to discern a 
comic anomaly and to project it in relief, that is the very essence of the art of caricature… 
this talent served him well in his profession as a clinician” (Justice-Malloy 1995:134).  
 Although seemingly strange praise for a physician, this comment by Meige 
foregrounds the visual and artistic nature of Charcot’s practice as well as his personality 
which so heavily influenced his work. In 1881, the artist and writer Emile Zola challenged 
fellow artists to imitate the practice of the scientist “in both method and aim, the method 
being the careful study of objective phenomena, the aim an exact analysis of man” 
(Justice-Malloy 1995:134). Charcot as artist and medical practitioner adopted this 
sentiment in his practice as a physician. He used his artistic perception to not only 
enhance, but also to structure his diagnosis of Hysteria, and the use of the camera in this 
artistic-medical perception is mirrored in the comments of one admirer of Charcot who 
stated that “the camera was as crucial to the study of hysteria as the microscope was to 
histology” (Justice-Malloy 1995:134). And as Amirault (1993:73) states:  
 
  By posing the subject, medical photography constructs and thereby asserts the pathology 
of the patient; by revealing the “truth” of the illness of and to the patient, medical 
photography claims to reveal the true subject to be the patient, constructed only in relation 
to that illness. 
 
 Visual observation as integral to Charcot’s practice, often replaced actual interaction 
with his patients (de Marneffe 1991:78). Charcot completely stopped ward visits by 1862, 
and instead had patients brought to his office one at a time. De Marneffe (1991:78) quotes 
two of Charcot’s students, as follows, in order to expand on Charcot’s method: 
 
  He would seat himself near a table and immediately call for the patient who would be 
studied. The patient then was completely undressed. The intern would read a clinical 
summary of the case, while the master listened attentively. Then there was a long silence, 
during which Charcot looked, kept looking at the patient while tapping his hand on the 
table. His assistants, standing close together, waited anxiously for a word of 
enlightenment. Charcot continued to remain silent. After a while he would request the 
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patient to make a movement, he would induce him to speak; he would ask that his 
reflexes be examined and that his sensory responses be tested. And then again silence, 
the mysterious silence of Charcot. Finally he would call for a second patient, examine him 
like the first one, call for a third patient, and always without a word, silently making 
comparisons between them. 
 
 The focus on the visual aspects of Hysteria can also be seen as a rational 
continuation of medical practice that had come before him. Prior to the invention of the 
camera and its use in medical photography, the medical illustration of a case would be the 
task of a professional medical illustrator. Trained in both anatomy and illustration, the 
medical artist was dually skilled to meet the needs of both the aesthetic elements of the 
illustration, as well as the medical (Amirault 1993:55). With the implementation of the 
camera in medical diagnosis and research, the physician took the place of the medical 
illustrator. Robert Ollerenshaw writing in The Journal of the Biological Photographic 
Association (Amirault 1993:55) writes that “[the] pose, made possible by the simplicity of 
snapping a photograph, exhibits the doctor/photographers’ lack of aesthetic 
understanding”.  
 The minimal regard for aesthetic practices in these images by the 
doctor/photographer, encouraged by the simplicity and ease with which the camera 
‘illustrated’ for them, resulted in revealing too much in the image (Amirault 1993:55). The 
illustrator, educated in aesthetic practice, was highly skilled at removing or adding various 
elements or focus to the image that assisted in the illustration’s proper clinical function: to 
diagnose (Amirault 1993:55). The resultant ‘illustration’ in nineteenth-century medical 
photography was an image with excessive detail and little concern for how that detail 
impacted on the supposed proper clinical function of that image (Amirault 1993:55).  
 No limitations existed for the doctor/photographer/artist of the nineteenth century in his 
photographic studio. As Amirault (1993:56) states “since early photographic technology did 
not seem to provide any way to limit this flood of detail, photographers sought to control it 
through pose. Early medical photographers relied on existing artistic conventions for their 
poses”, and in doing so, aligned these images with an aesthetic tradition that also 
simultaneously undermined their clinical function (Amirault 1993:57). 
 The popular belief about the role that the camera played in medical objectivity was 
that, unlike the medical artist/illustrator, the camera in fact disposed of any and all 
subjectivity in its production of the image (Amirault 1993:57). Whereas the illustrator could 
include or exclude any detail, the popular view of the nineteenth century was that the 
camera was capable of no such thing, and Amirault (1993:57) goes on to say that the 
supposed “objective, indexical truth-value of the photograph” was lauded and celebrated in 
the nineteenth century, whether the image was produced for medical purposes or not.  
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 One of the earliest and most ardent supporters of medical photography was 
Doctor Hugh Diamond, chief physician at the Surrey County Lunatic Asylums’ Female 
Department, who lauded medical photography for its ability to act objectively, and its 
usefulness in classification and research (Amirault 1993:57). Diamond focuses on the 
ability of medical photography to construct a “true world” and compares it to other leading 
discourses of the nineteenth century. He states: 
 
  The metaphysician and moralist, the physician and physiologist, will approach such an 
inquiry with their peculiar views, definitions, and classifications. The photographer, on the 
other hand, needs, in many cases, no aide from any language but his own, preferring 
rather to listen with the picture before him, to the silent but telling language of nature 
(Hugh Diamond cited in Amirault 1993:58). 
 
 This sentiment about the marvels of photography anticipates the use of medical 
photography in the diagnosis of the female hysteric at the Salpêtrière. The 
photographer/doctor/artist, in his quest to expose the hidden truths of nature, here read 
‘female’, uses the camera to research, classify and plough the silent depths of the deviant 
hysteric; her feminine nature unveiling itself before the knowing eyes of the 
photographer/doctor/artist. Now the photographer was able to “transcend the limits of 
language and discursivity” through a technology that “could erase itself from the 
representation of “nature” (Amirault 1993:58). And unlike the illustrator, could present a 
truthful and objective reproduction of the real.  
 Diamond’s statements regarding the role that photography was to play in the field of 
medicine, mirror other contemporary nineteenth-century writing on medical photography. In 
addition, the support of this new medium by the majority of the medical fraternity also 
played a vital role in the development of photographic technology (Amirault 1993:57-59). 
As Amirault (1993:60) states, “as these and other texts [on photography] reveal, the 
discourse of medical photography intersected with a more general epistemological drive 
linking structures of vision with knowledge and truth”. The use of the camera and 
photograph within medical discourse further posited the physicians that made use of the 
camera, as those practitioners of medicine who were at the forefront of their field. As 
Diamond and Charcot, and Esquirol and Pinel before them, with their engravings and 
illustrations of the mentally ill, medical practitioners of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries were as obsessed with progress and technological advancement and vision. 
 As Amirault (1993:60) states, “photography was constructed as the perfect technology 
at a moment in which medicine was staking its claim as a discourse of scientific, objective 
truth through visual knowledge”.  
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 Hugh Diamond, stated in 1856 that “the photographer secures with unerring accuracy 
the external phenomenon of each passion, as the really certain indication of internal 
derangement” (de Marneffe 1991:78). Charcot’s use of the camera assisted in his practise 
of distilling the symptoms and characteristics of observing many patients. Using a 
photographic record as a means of diagnosis, he was able to create a schema of 
observable and clearly defined stages, traits, symptoms and so forth, of Hysteria. As 
de Marneffe (1991:79) states, “by capturing various hysterical poses on film and then 
superimposing negatives from different cases, a general picture of the syndrome was 
created that expunged individual difference”.  
 Diana Hulick in The Transcendental Machine? Speaks to the marriage of science and 
imagination in photography, and how this union allows us to create a reality based on both 
‘fact’ and fiction (Hulick 1990:419). The scientific and technological base of photography is 
well known, but the structuring of the image through the subjective imagination, at least 
during the nineteenth century, was not (Hulick 1990:419).  
 The camera and photograph during the nineteenth century stood as reliable, truthful 
depictions of reality, and although the photographic pictorial practices of this time still 
aligned photography with painting, the objective realism that was thought to emanate from 
this technology of vision, surpassed painting in its complete objectivity and ability to 
accurately reproduce reality.  
 Hulick (1990:419) explains that “the reproduction of the external world 
via…photography places mimesis at the service of the imaginative experience”. This 
imitation of the real, and the camera’s propensity for detail, strengthened the claim that 
proponents of the camera had made of its ability to realistically render reality. In Realism, 
Symbolism, and Pre-Raphaelitism, artists would “convince the viewer of the reality of their 
particular vision through detail” (Hulick 1990:420). Similar conventions in photographic 
practice of the nineteenth century attest to this in images produced during this time. 
Detailed and foreshortened images of deviance, with focus on visual markers of pathology 
in specific facial characteristics abound in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Similarly, Charcot’s alignment of images of his patients, such as Augustine, with 
representational practices was “effected through both the application of paint and pose” 
(de Marneffe 1991:84).35 
 The Victorian obsession with realism and detail, evident in the works of Ibsen, Darwin, 
and Ruskin, to name but a few, were evidenced in the understanding of the camera as a 
tool able to truthfully ‘capture’ reality. The ability of the camera to capture and imitate 
reality, and the innate objectivity afforded to the camera and photographic process (as it 
was borne from a union of technology, science, and the mechanic age), ensured that the 
                                                            
35 Augustine is discussed further on in this chapter. 
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camera came to be seen as the only way to adequately serve these Victorian 
preoccupations with realism and detail.  
 With a shift in the subject matter of painting, daily life and events became topics of 
interest; since no distinction was made between important events or people, and daily life, 
and with no one of them taking precedence over the other, Hulick states that “every aspect 
of every subject acquired potential importance” (Hulick 1990:420). Every detail needed to 
be ‘exposed’ in order to render the depiction adequately ‘real’. Simultaneously, every detail 
could lead to exposing the inherent ‘truth’ in the image. 
 As Hulick (1990:420) states “with the scientific origins of photography, objectivity was 
to a great degree conflated with the mechanical rendering of space and of detail”. The 
mechanism of the camera, in and of itself, rendered reality. This reproduction of reality was 
additionally valued as objective because it was created by a product of scientism and 
technology: the camera. The discourse of scientism and technology, which dominated the 
landscape of the nineteenth century, was also aligned with anxieties about social and 
moral degeneration, and photography, as the offspring of techno-scientism, was the 
perfect modern tool with which to recognise, capture, and arrest this degeneration.  
 As Ulrich Baer (2002:26) notes in Spectral Evidence: The Photography of Trauma: 
 
  Instead of constituting visual evidence of a malady, several of the photographs in 
Charcot’s collection make readable- in the effects of the flash- the link between the 
camera’s mechanism and scientific faith in the possibility of incontestable knowledge. 
They also reveal a structural similarity between hysteria and photography, for it is the flash 
that links pathology and technology and teaches us something about the origins of 
photography. 
 
 The scientific and technological origin of photography, its objectivity, and its ability to 
record detail, were particularly emphasized when comparing photography to other visual 
arts in the nineteenth century (Hulick 1990:420). This set photography, specifically 
photography situated within medico-scientific discourse, at a distance from other visual 
arts of the century, legitimised the use of the camera as a tool in medical practice, and not 
just as an extension of the artist’s eye. The belief in the camera’s ability for precise 
renderings of reality defines the use of photography within medico-scientific practice of the 
nineteenth century, and as Hulick (1990:420) states “this love of the literal reflects both the 
scientific bent of the age and the continuing human need for mimesis. In fact, mimesis 
stands at the juncture of art and science of this period”. The reproduction of ‘reality’ 
rendered in the manner of past pictorial practices, allows the camera to occupy both a 
space in artistic and scientific practice. 
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 The photographer, in creating his mimetic, subjective, imaginative rendering of reality, 
legitimizes his personal belief system through the use of the camera. Whether artist or 
doctor, the camera enabled this subjective view to construct the image. As Hulick 
(1990:420) states, “this superimposition of fact on a belief system shows that Victorian 
notions of truth were generated not only by observation but also by an a priori opinion 
about the moral structure of the world, as manifested by the telling detail”. By exposing 
never before seen detailed reproductions of reality, the photograph aligned with 
nineteenth-century ideas about observation and the rampant scientism that would purport 
to halt socio-cultural backslide. By exposing the ‘essence’ of photographed subjects, the 
inherent nature of the subject would reveal itself to the all-knowing eye of scientism, and in 
doing so, the subject would emerge into the symbolic realm of language, ready to be 
captured and controlled. 
 Hulick cites Darwin and Marx as two examples of this practice. As discussed before, 
Darwin’s minute and detailed categorization of the natural world and his detailed 
description of its evolution, aligned with the fascination of the nineteenth century with 
realism, collecting, cataloguing, defining, and societal progress through science and 
technology. Hulick (1990:420) refers to this as a “focus on the facts of a particular time and 
place in order to generate encompassing explanations that link moral evolution to a series 
of physical states”.  
 Reductionist thinking, emblematic of this time, further aided in the construction of a 
subjective version of reality, produced by the photographer, through the image. By 
categorising and cataloguing the natural world hierarchies, for example, could be 
established, and conclusions could be made about a whole network or group. Similarly, in 
medical photography, specific cases were painstakingly scrutinized, and a composite could 
be drawn up from this that indicated what the characteristics of this specific area of study 
were. Hulick (1990:419) states, “[photography] has changed our ability to create our own 
microcosm and understand the macrocosm”. This is no more evident than in the work of 
Charcot, who used numerous case studies to create a tableau of Hysteria, and female 
mental illness in general. 
 As William Irwin Thompson (cited in Hulick 1990:421) declares, “when scientists 
generalize to tell us what we are, where we come from and where we are going, they 
ineluctably move from science to myth”. Hulick (1990:421) expands on this by adding “in a 
like manner, social philosophers and artists of the nineteenth century did not use facts or 
photography as a method for gathering information about the world but rather as a way of 
constructing theories or communicating visions of what they believed to be true”. Charcot’s 
use of, and application of, the camera in his medical practice only furthered a priori 
‘knowledge’ about women and female mental illness. His own deductions about his female 
patients, who he eventually did not consult with at all, further strengthened the cyclical 
process of subjective view or a priori knowledge- ideology- photographic evidence. 
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 By creating a visual schema of Hysteria, he was able to make use of analogy in his 
diagnosis by drawing on centuries-old visual signifiers of female mental illness. This use of 
analogy also coincided with the many pseudo-scientific applications of physiognomic 
practices such as craniology and phrenology. These similarly made use of analogy in order 
to ‘diagnose’ and ‘conclude’ on supposed pathology that was evident in various visual 
signifiers. 
 As Ulrich Baer (2002:26) states, “photographs taken in the early 1880s at the 
Salpêtrière hospital… seem to mark uncannily a particular kind of social ‘disturbance’”. 
This “social disturbance”, so ingrained in nineteenth century fears of social and moral 
degeneration, was a subject of study that was vitally important to the maintenance of 
socio-cultural ideologies, hierarchies, and daily life in the nineteenth century.  
 By making use of the camera to capture the variety of symptoms displayed by 
hysterics, “Charcot’s assistants snapped their shutters to arrest this oscillation and resolve 
this difference. The resulting images promised to render Hysteria graspable to the doctor… 
Charcot… hoped to master the hysteric’s astounding propensity to simulate symptoms” 
(Baer 2002:30). 
 Charcot’s use of the camera in uncovering the ‘truth’ inherent in Hysteria aligned with 
nineteenth-century medico-scientific discourses, as well as various cultural discourses 
about women, mental illness, technology, and the camera. The variety of symptoms that 
accompanied Hysteria, from fits and seizures; to melancholy; paralysis; numbness; 
blindness; and visions, to name but a few, needed to be ‘captured’ by the camera, as the 
variety of symptoms not only evaded physicians, but also threatened to undermine them.  
 
2.8 ‘Augustine’ 
 
Louis Aragon and Andre Breton, in La Révolution Surréaliste, state that “Hysteria is not a 
pathological phenomenon, and can, in all respects, be considered as a supreme means of 
expression” (cited in Hunter 1983:465). 
 Arguably the most infamous and well-documented case of Hysteria, namely that of 
Augustine, whose body was used to theatricalise and spectacularise the disease through 
the photograph and Charcot’s many Tuesday lectures, and remains central to any 
discussion of the spectacle of female mental illness. Augustine was admitted to the 
Salpêtrière in 1875, aged fifteen, and exhibited an abundance of ‘hysterical’ symptoms 
(de Marneffe 1991:79). In the Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière, images of 
Augustine representing various phases of a full hysterical attack dominate the volume (de 
Marneffe 1991:79). Justice-Malloy (1995:135) states: 
 
  The “iconography” of hysteria as defined by Charcot, with all its evocations of the circus 
and theatre, seems to have been so widely publicised at the end of the century, in both 
pictorial and verbal form, as to constitute for that historical moment a cultural 
preconception of how to act when insane. 
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 The Iconographie which depicted Charcot’s photographic studies of his patients 
focused on the emotions displayed by his hysterical patients. Emotions such as ecstasy, 
passion, pleasure, fear, surprise, and religious enthusiasm garnered the most 
documentation (Justice-Malloy 1995:134). Gestures and physical movement were also 
displayed against the background of the asylum setting. This added to the tension of the 
juxtaposition of a hysterical attack with all its violence and movement versus the calm and 
clinical setting of the asylum; this not only added to the theatricality and spectacle of the 
attack, but also justified the internment of the patient. 
 De Marneffe (1991:76) states that “Charcot… insisted that ‘hysteria is governed, in the 
same as other morbid conditions, by rules and laws, which attentive and sufficiently 
numerous observations always permit us to establish’”. Through the use of the camera in 
his diagnostic practice, Charcot established a conduit through which the inherent ‘nature’ 
of hysteria could be exposed. Its fundamental structure, hierarchy, and every detail, 
unavailable to the human eye, could be established through the lens. 
 
  Though some critics consider photography a medium of non-intervention, Charcot 
employed it actively, to arrest hysterics’ antics. Catching the hysteric in the act, the 
camera produced a ‘motionless image’ he hoped would stall the patient’s efforts to 
manipulate those around her (Baer 2002:27). 
 
 By ‘capturing’ the disease, and arresting the symptoms through careful photographic 
study, Charcot was able to categorize and catalogue hysterical symptoms into a readable 
visual sequence. Although Augustine experiences many incomplete attacks, with a 
different variety and combination of symptoms displayed in these, the sequencing of this 
chaotic display renders it as organized and readable from an omniscient view (de Marneffe 
1991:79-80). 
 The photographs of Augustine, sequenced in such a way as to confirm Charcot’s 
explanation of the different episodes and order of the hysterical attack, betray the frenzied 
and vocal nature of the attack. As de Marneffe (1991:80-81) explains, “the photographs… 
validate Charcot’s model of hysteria by giving fixed physiognomic, psychological, and 
medical content to the variable emotional states of the attitudes passionnelles”. The 
subjective meaning of these various symptoms and attacks are also simultaneously 
silenced, as they are not included in the description of particular plates. Furthermore, 
captions below each plate affix meaning and the imaging of the hysterical attack “renders 
primarily visual a subjectively meaningful state” (de Marneffe 1991:81). 
 De Marneffe (1991:81) goes on to say that “in fact, the style of the photograph has 
much less in common with other early photographs of mental patients than with the 
theatrical portraiture of the day”.  
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Figure 2.8: D.M. Bourneville and P. Régnard. 1875. ‘Augustine’ Etat Normal. Iconographie. 
Vol. 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: D.M. Bourneville and P. Régnard. 1875. Attitudes Passionnelles. Hystéro-Épilepsie 
Attaque. 
 
 In Figure 2.8 the image is of Augustine in her ‘normal’ state, whereas Figure 2.9 
presents four plates from the series, depicting Augustine in various phases of a hysterical 
attack. 
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  Beginning with a picture of Augustine fully clothed in the ‘Etat normal’ (normal state), 
staring out at the viewer with an arresting gaze. These are followed by ‘Debut de l’attaque 
(beginning of the attack) and two manifestations of ‘Tétanisme’ (tetanism). The next ten 
plates represent the ‘Attitudes passionelles’: ‘Menace’ (threat) (two), ‘Appel’ (call), 
‘Supplication amoureuse’ (amorous supplication), ‘Erotisme’ (erotism), ‘Extase’ (ecstasy) 
(two) [seen here in the first plate], ‘Hallucination de l’ouie’ (auditory hallucination), 
‘Crucifiement’ (crucifixtion), and ‘Moquerie’ (teasing) (de Marneffe 1991:79). 
 
 Through the silencing, imaging, captioning, and sequencing of the hysteric, Charcot 
curtailed any subjective utterances made by his female patients, and any objection to 
established notions of ‘being female’ by the hysteric was simply ignored. The visualisation 
of the disease and its proper sequence of events, as prescribed by Charcot, were 
prioritised. The female hysteric was deemed more of a hindrance in her deviant antics, 
than patient, in the process of visually corroborating Charcot’s medical narrative of 
hysteria. The visual tableaux, in aligning with the nineteenth century’s conflation of vision-
knowledge-technology, reified Charcot’s theories on hysteria, and served to finally 
‘conclude’ on the topic. As Georges Didi-Huberman (2003:85) states:  
 
  The Iconographie is arrayed as a series of images, itself riveted to another sequence that 
grounds it in a complete narration, the case’s script. This script supplements and 
explicates the images, providing a commentary or legend for that which, in the end, is 
supposed to be its essential enigmatic tenor; the images were, after all, meant merely to 
illustrate, clarify, and prove the truth of the clinical discourse. 
 
 The sequenced images were additionally posed and staged to adequately reflect 
Charcot’s clinical discourse. In Figure 2.9 we see Augustine, juxtaposed against the 
austere and clinical mise-en-scene of the hospital, fully immersed in the throes of a 
hysterical episode. Augustine, clearly displaying constructed visual signifiers of mental 
illness, takes the viewer on an optical narration of female pathology.  
 Strikingly similar to images of Théroigne de Méricourt, Augustine’s blouse alternately 
hangs loose, open, or only on one shoulder, exposing her chest. Her hair, wild and 
uncombed, adds to the sense of chaotic movement in the image. The bed and blanket, 
props indicating the asylum in the images, are displaced, and the blankets are ruffled, 
indicating Augustine’s effect on the space and further emphasizing the hidden frenzy just 
below the surface of the image.  
 Augustine’s facial characteristics, aligning with nineteenth-century physiognomic 
discourse, further aid the viewer in understanding her mental state. Her eyes are wild, 
bulging, and seem frenzied; the exposure of her tongue (as inappropriate and improper 
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behaviour for a woman, and indicative of pathology); and the contortions of her face, all 
reified existing visual discourse on pathology and sought to confirm the anxiety of social 
degeneration. By using centuries-old visual signifiers of female mental illness, and drawing 
on a display culture of mental illness that had been established by doctors such as Pinel 
and Esquirol, Charcot’s images of hysteria were in fact not surprising, or new, but rather 
just the pinnacle of a tradition that had spanned hundreds of years before him. 
 By ceasing all linguistic contact with his hysterical patients Charcot de-contextualised 
their suffering; just so, the viewing public had no access to any other signs of mental 
illness, other than visual signifiers provided by the photographer-doctor-artist. By using the 
established visual mode of communicating female pathology, Charcot also managed to 
strip away and neutralise any defiance of traditional patriarchal constructions of ‘being’ 
female, just as Esquirol and done with de Méricourt. The hysterical outburst was no more 
than socio-cultural deviance and degeneration, and the mode of delivery, the emotional 
and physical hysterical episode, was deemed wholly inappropriate and a definite indication 
of pathology. As Lord (1994:140) states: 
 
  The asylum exchanges women by marking women’s refusal to submit to traditional, 
socially acceptable forms of exchange, it registers them for attempting to challenge the 
forms of expression to which they had been assigned. The dossiers of the Salpêtrière 
swell with cases of women handed over by their husbands for flirting too much, of 
daughters turned over by fathers for refusing chosen mates, of mothers committed by 
sons for showing too much religious fervour. Once institutionalized, women became the 
special objects of experimentation and surveillance, the special objects of the new 
technologies of the body, and the property of science. 
 
 Charcot presented his work at the hospital amphitheatre in twice-weekly lectures, with 
the upper echelons of Parisian artistic community as well as fellow medical practitioners 
present (Justice-Malloy 1995:135). The infamous Tuesday Lectures, where Charcot held 
an impromptu case viewing and discussion, foregrounded Charcot’s focus on the visual, 
theatrical and specular nature of the disease as constituted by him. These theatrical 
lectures constituted a carefully rehearsed study on specific cases. Memorizing a script that 
would end in a simple explanation of the lecture, he often included quotes from writers 
such as Molière and Shakespeare, and treated these lectures as if they were theatrical 
productions (Justice-Malloy 1995:135). 
 Because of the popularity of these lectures, a new amphitheatre was built on hospital 
grounds capable of seating a crowd of five hundred, footlights and a spotlight were 
installed to illuminate the stage and increase the drama and theatricality of the production 
to be staged by Charcot (Justice-Malloy 1995:135). To add to the drama, specular, and 
theatrical nature of these lectures, Charcot had his patients costumed; he also used 
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diagrams, sculpture, paintings and drawings as stage props (Justice-Malloy 1995:135). 
Patients such as Augustine were regularly displayed in these lectures, to further reinforce 
the truth and objectivity of the photographic record of Hysteria. Gestures and 
re-enactments of hysterical patients as photographed in the Iconographie and in the 
Tuesday lectures were to be found on Paris stages at the time, with actresses such as 
Sarah Bernhardt and performers in the opera seeking to outdo the famous stars of the 
universally known French hospital (Justice-Malloy 1995:135). The stage of the hospital 
combined with Charcot’s lectures and images added to the theatrical and fictional nature of 
these images. 
 In the following chapter, the nature of the fictional narrative, in the form of the Science 
Fiction genre is discussed. The film camera is not only an extension of the photographic 
camera, but also an extension of its practices. By investigating the way that Science 
Fictional narratives function in conjunction with the film camera, the fantastical and fictional 
nature of the Hysteric is linked to the fantastical spectacle of the cyborg. By discussing key 
SF texts that represent the cyborg body over the course of the twentieth century, such as 
Metropolis (1927), Cherry 2000 (1987), and The Lawnmower Man (1992), the cyborg body 
of the twentieth century is brought into focus for its detailed discussion in chapter four.  
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Chapter 3 
Science Fiction: Film, History, Function 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
  The genre of science fiction in literature, film, and television has had an important 
influence on the popular imagination of science and scientific practices. While much of 
science fiction can be seen as a distortion of what scientists actually do, it can also be 
examined as an important cultural domain in which both the fears about the promise of 
science are represented (Sturken & Cartwright 2001:309). 
 
By examining the role that Science Fiction (SF) plays as a space in which to communicate 
scientific practices of specific technological epochs, as well as a space within which to 
work though anxieties related to technological change, an understanding of how SF 
narratives function within culture can be formed. By unpacking the historical function of SF 
within culture and expanding on the differing concepts, incarnations, and themes of SF film 
throughout the twentieth century, the emergence of Cyborg Cinema in the 1980s and 
1990s can be adequately contextualized and examined within the broader historical 
context of SF and film.  
 Understanding SF film as a product of social mores, socio-culture change as a result 
of technological change and invention, and specific ideologies, is vital to understanding the 
various elements that are present in Cyborg Cinema of the 1980s and 1990s. Situating 
SF film within a broader historical understanding of science fictional narrative, film, and the 
ocular traditions of the previous century that firmly entrenched the photographic camera as 
the locus of scientism, progress, and modernity, informs a reading of the cyborg that does 
not sever this figure from its historical ties. Positioning the cyborg as ahistorical denies the 
role that past ocularcentrism, scientism, and worn visual signifiers have in structuring this 
figure of the Post Modern era.  
 
3.2 Science Fiction Literature 
 
Science Fiction (SF) literature has received an immense amount of both critical and 
scholarly attention. This genre of literature has traditionally been associated with the 
fantastical, the imaginary, and as a sphere in which societal, technological, and scientific 
inventions, changes, or discoveries could be communicated, explored and interrogated. 
Due to the scope of this research, only SF literature as it pertains to, and differs from, 
SF film will be considered. 
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 Brian Aldiss (cited in Roberts 2005:3) suggests that SF literature begins in 1818 with 
the publication of Mary Shelley’s book Frankenstein due to the fact that the term ‘science’ 
as we understand it today, only gained cultural importance in the nineteenth century. With 
the onset of new technologies, discoveries, and the changes elicited by the Industrial 
Revolution now noticeably impacting the everyday lives of citizens in the West, the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were periods of significant change in many 
spheres of life. The early SF novel aimed to unpack, critique, explore, and unravel what 
these changes meant for society, as well as to speculate on the possibilities of cadavers 
made animate through human ingenuity, travels to alien worlds, or fantastical journeys to 
the bottom of the sea, to name but a few key themes. The SF novel, concomitant with 
Enlightenment theories of individualism; science; exploration; and inquiry, evolved as a 
product of these Enlightenment principles and served these ideals in the engaged, 
exploratory, and questioning manner in which they are written.  
 Per Schelde (1993:2) observes that the Science Fiction novel “at its best, [is] not 
afraid of experiments, of intellectual speculation. It asks… the question ‘What if?’”. The 
impact of technological innovation could no longer be denied and the SF novel deals with 
these immense changes to the fabric of everyday life induced by technological 
development in order to probe the implications of these. Applied forms of scientific 
investigation, such as Mathematics; Biology; Geography were eclipsed in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries by ‘instrumental’ sciences – scientific investigation that could only 
be practised or was progressed, by technology. Roberts comments on this by stating that 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century SF literature reads rather like an examination of 
technological invention (Roberts 2005:4). Darko Suvin (cited in Roberts 2005:1) defines 
Science Fiction literature as:  
 
  A literary genre or verbal construct whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the 
presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main device is an 
imaginative framework alternative to the author’s empirical environment. 
 
 Suvin introduces the concept of the ‘novum’: a central focus which highlights the 
differences between the empirical and fictional worlds. This may take the form of a fictional 
device, premise or artefact in the narrative. The novum could also take the form of a 
spaceship or any other material form, such as another new form of technology, or it could 
be something conceptual, such as a new form of class consciousness or gender (Roberts 
2005:1). 
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 Damien Broderick (cited in Roberts 2005:1) conceptualises SF as that which is 
representative of a specific cultural, technological or scientific moment or upheaval of the 
society that it speaks to. He argues that 
 
  SF is that species of storytelling native to a culture undergoing the epistemic changes 
implicated in the rise and supersession of techni-industrial modes of production, 
distribution, consumption and disposal Broderick. 
 
 With the start of the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century, we see writers 
such as Mary Shelley and Jonathan Swift start to engage with the concepts of ‘future 
fantasy’ and ‘technological progress and invention’. Themes relating to advances in 
technology, science and medicine, utopian fantasy, debates about current political 
concerns, as well as Imperialist progress can be seen in the SF literature of this time 
(Roberts 2005:88). This time of ascendance to the scientific world view “an ideology 
justifying scientific research as intrinsic to the nature and purpose of human existence – 
began with the technological triumphs and the erosion of traditional religious beliefs 
caused by the Industrial Revolution” (Parrinder 1979:67). Simultaneously, industrialisation 
resulted in changes in the traditional role of women, and the occurrence of the 
public/private sphere; these changes came about as a result of mechanisation in many 
spheres of nineteenth century life. 
 Authors such as H.G Wells and Jules Verne, two late nineteenth century SF writers, 
explored two sides of this new scientific landscape. Verne, unlike Wells, took a more 
idealistic approach to these new developments by focusing more on real scientific fact. 
Wells took a more pessimistic approach and stunned his Victorian audience with his focus 
on the darker and more negative aspects of these technological and scientific 
advancements (Suvin 1979:210). Author T. H. Huxley elaborated on what he called the 
'ethical spirit' of science, a ‘spirit’ that was sceptical, experimental and rigorously 
impersonal, and which had a significant impact on social thought, literature and the arts. 
Science and technology were thought to hold the key to cultural and societal progress and 
thus represented bourgeois society's investment in its own future (Parrinder 1979:68-69).36 
Progress, technology, and the inherent cultural change in both, whether depicted positively 
or negatively, was the main theme throughout the novels of this era.  
                                                            
36 This statement by Parrinder is vital to understanding the role that technology played within nineteenth-
century life. As discussed in chapter two, social and cultural degeneration could seemingly only be stopped 
through the intervention of technology and science. Although SF literature of this time does reflect some of the 
anxieties caused by technological and scientific change, the reservations regarding the role that science and 
technology played in culture were more often than not thinly veiled accusations directed at the social changes 
wrought by technological and scientific change. This is specifically relevant to later treatment of similar themes 
in 1980s and 1990s SF film. 
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 The turn of the century brought about advancements in powered flight and disease 
control. Moreover, the innovations brought about by the Industrial Revolution were by now 
commonplace in society. However, it was not until the 1920s that we have a cohesive body 
of SF literature and thought that brings together all the elements of the Industrial 
Revolution and future vision that we can call ‘science-fictional’ (Parrinder 1979:70). 
 This ‘Golden Age’ of SF, from approximately 1938 to 1950, produced a host of classic 
SF stories, stories that would go on to form the basis for many of the SF films we see 
today. One such example is Asimov’s I, Robot (1950), on which the film i, Robot (2004) is 
based. A large number of the short stories, articles and novels in the ‘Golden Age’ explore 
themes of future societies, space travel, aliens, technological boom and so forth; all 
manifestations of the Industrial era and nineteenth- and twentieth-century life in the 
developing world. Many of these narratives have an underlying theme that centres around 
the hope that technology and science will bring about a new world, or a dystopian theme 
surrounding the same subject matter.  
 In the 1960s and post-World War 2, there was a marked loss in confidence in the 
scientific world view that had been the basis and inspiration for much of the SF literature 
written before then, and this was seen in SF novels that followed (Parrinder 1979:67). This 
era is known as ‘New Wave’ Science Fiction, and continued into the 1970s. This era in 
SF literature is marked by experimentation in form, themes and motifs as well as focusing 
on ‘soft’ Science Fiction. Some key authors from this period are Ursula K. Le Guin, 
Phillip K. Dick, and Theodore Sturgeon. 
 The 1980s brought about yet another ‘New Wave’ of SF writing with the onset of 
cyberpunk novels. William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984) was a key text in New Wave 
SF and was the first of its kind within the Cyberpunk genre (Landon 2002:159). The 1980s, 
with the onset of new computer technologies, brought about new anxieties and cultural 
change that SF literature addressed.37 
 SF literature differs significantly from SF film, and although many SF films that have 
reached iconic status are based on SF novels or short stories, the treatment of themes; 
characters; narrative; and imagery, differ considerably. The ‘what if?’ of SF literature, 
especially with regard to the cyborg cinema sub-cycle, is lost in these later SF films. The 
exploratory, inventive, and questioning nature with which many SF novels and short stories 
approached technological and societal change is diminished in the visual treatment of 
similar themes, characters, and narrative. 
                                                            
37 Neuromancer focuses on new computer and information technologies, and was a seminal work in the 
Cyberpunk genre which emerged during the 1980s. This genre, which emerged within SF literature and film of 
this time, focused on the impact of new technologies (such as Virtual Reality and information technology) on 
established notions of ‘self’, ‘human’, and ‘gender’.  
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3.3 Science Fiction and Film 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the camera was as prevalent in the laboratory as it 
was in leisure activities of that era. The nineteenth century, with its frenzied focus on the 
visual, welcomed motion pictures as the logical next-step in the evolution of the camera 
and photography. The end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century was a time marked by the extension of the photographic lens and its ability to 
‘capture reality’, by the hypnotic effects of the moving image.  
 Georges Méliès, often referred to as a ‘Cinemagician’, is one of the most well-known 
early filmmakers. His early films, Gugusse et l’Automaton (The Clown and the Automan) 
(1897), and Le Voyage dans la Lune (A Trip to the Moon) (1902), are some of the earliest 
examples of film, and SF film in particular, and, as Mark Bould (2003:80) in Film and 
Television states, they were “primarily a compendium of special effects whose ‘story 
merely frames a display of cinema’s magical possibilities’”. These early films focused on 
the technological ability of early cinematic invention, through the spectacle of special 
effects and the ability to depict reality through the moving image onscreen. 
 Early cinema, not just SF film, was structured around two different aesthetic goals, 
namely realism (as seen in the work of the Lumière brothers) and fantasy (as seen in the 
work of Méliès), and this continued tension between these divergent aesthetics continues 
to this day (Bould 2003:80).38 Although film, like the photographic camera, was lauded for 
its ability to capture the ‘real’, the early Realism of the Lumières for example, was thought 
to be a realistic rendering that was true to life, however, these films were constructed 
through the same staging and effects used by Méliès for example. By choosing a subject 
or object to film, and by sealing the shot off from further signification by framing it, the 
image, whether it be of a landscape or a futuristic trip to the moon, is equally fantastical 
and un-realistic. Although the spectacle and fantastical nature of the moving image might 
be more overt in some cases, as in the work of Méliès, the image is no less constructed, 
and no less of an illusion that merely alludes to the real.  
 The framing and staging of the events onscreen of these early examples of SF cinema 
extend the same practices of staging and framing that were used to produce the 
photograph. Medical photography of the nineteenth century as discussed in chapter two, 
similarly structured the visual reading of the photograph through pictorial practices, as well 
as a keen focus on framing, staging, and mise-en-scene. Aesthetic considerations were 
fundamental to the construction of the photograph. Although located within a discourse of 
scientism, which assumes an objective treatment of the image, the construction of the 
                                                            
 38 The Lumière brothers were responsible for patenting the Cinematograph, the start of film technology as we 
understand it today. They were also credited as the first filmmakers in history with their screening of ten short 
films in 1896 (Pruitt 2014:[sp]). 
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photograph communicated a subjective reading of the subject matter through the use of 
well-worn visual signifiers; framing; staging; lighting and shadow; and pictorial practices 
that led to the images being ‘touched up’ with paint.  
 The emergence of film in the late nineteenth century expands these practices in the 
treatment of the moving image. Although early cinema was not situated within medico-
scientific discourse of the century, the visual treatment of the moving image and past 
ocularcentric traditions in philosophy and the sciences inform a similar reading. The 
ambiguous nature of photography of the nineteenth century, the unsteady nature of the 
oscillation between reality and fiction, similarly informs film. The dual aesthetic goals of 
medical photography, although obscured by scientism and its inherent objectivity, still 
appear in the subjective and patriarchal treatment of the subject matter. With regard to 
film, the focus on spectacle similarly obscures these dual aesthetic intentions.  
 The ability to ‘capture reality’ which was afforded to film, is weakened by the framing 
and staging that are naturally implicit in ‘capturing reality’, and this destabilises the 
‘objective’ nature that these early films were imbued with. The use of spectacle in these 
films, as well as later films of the twentieth century obscures the fictional nature of the 
SF film.39 The “cinema of attractions”,40 which primarily focused on spectacle, whether the 
landscapes of the Lumière brothers, or the fantastical visual trickery of Méliès, centred 
around “using cinema to present a series of views to audiences, views fascinating because 
of their illusory power” (Bould 2003:80). The singular position that spectacle held in SF 
narrative cinema is confirmed by the feature-length SF films that were produced from 
about 1915, up to today (Bould 2003:80).  
 Bould (2003:80) goes on to state that “much later innovations (widescreen rations, 
3-D, IMAX, studio tours and so forth) would replicate these efforts to transform the 
exhibition space into one of overwhelming spectacle [these later films] would draw on 
cutting-edge cinema technology to narrativize and investigate the possibilities inherent in 
the cinema of attractions”; a narrative of technologies of vision and their evolution, through 
the production of spectacle. 
                                                            
39 The SF films of this time, as well as throughout the twentieth century parade the fictional visualisation of 
technological change as reality. The machines could really turn on human beings; the cyborg could really try to 
kill a human and so forth. This blurring of the boundary between reality and fiction is enabled by spectacle and 
the focus on the technological nature of the camera and film. The paradox in SF film is evident here – the 
valorisation of the technological (the invention of the film camera) and the simultaneous destruction of our way 
of life through products of science and technology. The invocation of ocular traditions of the past 
simultaneously conflate vision and knowledge in the SF film, and the outcomes of technological and scientific 
progress as they are imagined onscreen are paraded as truthful possible future scenarios. At the same time, 
this message is reinforced by the camera (as a product of technological progress and situated within a 
scientific discourse that imbues it with objectivity) and the camera’s association with the eye and vision (again 
linked with the conflation of vision and truth/knowledge). 
40 Non-narrative cinema prior to the emergence of narrative cinema as we understand it today. Narrative 
cinema emerged between 1908 and 1914 (Bould 2003:80). 
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 This cinema of attractions, as Susan Sontag argues in The Imagination of Disaster, 
has its narrative base set in a combination of reason, science, and technology (Sontag 
cited in Telotte 2001:19). Implicated in this narrative focus is the film camera itself, 
involved as the photographic camera was, in the production of the image and spectacle. 
By producing the spectacle, the camera similarly informs the narrative and the reading of 
characters/settings onscreen through the visual rendering of these. Specific visual 
signification of the setting and characters inflect meaning and structure a reading of the 
film in a particular way that is specific to SF and to spectacle. Meaning is created in the 
spectacle, and not in the narrative, as with SF literature. 
 Garrett Stewart (cited in Telotte 1993:29) suggests this process of meaning making is 
further inflected by the fact that, “the form always carries a potential for demonstrating its 
movieness: for reminding us of film’s technological base whenever our films look at 
technology and for throwing us back into the present as we glimpse images of a possible 
future”; a process of signification and narrativisation that occurs through the production 
and signification of the narrative through spectacle; this spectacle is further mediated 
through the lens of the camera, a technology of vision. 
 Just as the early films of Méliès and the Lumières displayed the dual aesthetic goals 
of the SF film, the tension between realism and fantasy, this dual nature is mirrored in the 
ideological underpinnings of SF film, summarised here by Telotte (1993:37): 
 
  Here is a key, if often overlooked, struggle that our science fiction films continue to play 
out… It is a struggle not simply between the forward-looking forces of science and a 
stubbornly conservative, nonvisionary, timid humanity … Rather, it is a struggle to hold 
both those forces and our own natures in focus, to grasp both our potential and our reality.  
 
 The SF film however acts to communicate the dual nature of modern life that Telotte 
points to, through invoking and (re)presenting stereotype and a visual language developed 
in the nineteenth century to ‘guard’ against social degeneration. SF literature, in 
questioning the ‘what if’ of new technological and scientific development offers a 
comprehensive space to unpack these changes and their effect on society and lived social 
relations. The SF film however communicates a closed message that is constructed 
through well-worn visual signifiers and spectacle (that acts to highlight the visual as 
opposed to the intellectual). The 2-D space of the film becomes reality, not only reflecting 
current socio-cultural modes of being, but informing us on what will come to pass in the 
future.  
 In this way, the SF film often embalms time and patriarchal heteronormative modes of 
being, even while presenting visions of the possible future. Regardless of how utopian or 
idealistic some of these films may seem, the message being communicated is frequently 
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done purely on the basis of spectacle. The spectacle is constructed in part by the illusory 
nature of film as objective; the valorisation of technological advancement of the camera; 
and the use of nineteenth-century visual signifiers that communicate deviance. 
 In Fredric Jameson’s essay Progress versus Utopia (1982), he argues that 
SF narratives are essentially the transposition of current ideological contradictions into 
future scenarios. And that self-reflexive SF makes us conscious of the fact that we do not, 
or are unable to, imagine utopian changes taking place in the future space of the SF film 
(Csicsery-Ronay 2003:120). 
 
3.4 Conventions, Themes, and Traditional SF Imagery 
 
Per Schelde (1993:2) explains that SF film focuses on the effects of science on the 
everyday lives of humans on Earth, and also where science, and whatever it has created, 
intersects with human beings. He goes on to say that “SF movies assiduously (with a few 
exceptions) avoid being intellectual and speculative”. The viewer is instead handed a 
version of events or reality that carefully plot similar narrative developments in a vast 
majority of SF film. The threat of technology or the product of technological 
mismanagement is undoubtedly defeated or overcome by the end of the film. 
 Schelde (1993:3) suggests that “SF films are a kind of modern folklore” and situates 
modern SF within the discourse of folklore by pointing out the similarities in both, although 
SF has replaced the ogres and trolls of the past with threats emanating from technology; 
science; or aliens, instead. He argues that  
 
  Folklore, among other things, is a fictional account of the ongoing battle between human 
beings and the environment, the battle between nature and culture. Typically, nature is 
anthromorphized and is given some kind of human-like – but awful and dangerous – form. 
Nature in folklore is represented as trolls, monsters, ogres, leprechauns, elves, nixes, and 
other such creatures… The battle is between the raw power of the ogres and trolls and 
the ingenuity and inventiveness of humans: science and technology (Schelde 1993:3). 
 
 Folkloric tales of ogres, trolls, and monsters, products of the natural world emphasised 
the battle between humans and the natural world in ancient times. As Schelde (1993:3-4) 
states, “they were metaphorical expressions, shorthand, anthropomorphized 
‘embodiments’ of the things humans did not understand in wild nature, the powers, the 
dangers, the unknown”, and the forces that they had no control over; by 
anthropomorphizing natural forces, “humans created a counterintellect to mirror their 
own… humanlike, but not quite human creatures” (Schelde 1993:14). The assertion of 
culture (humans) onto nature was in effect the defeat and control of the natural world by 
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human beings and culture; and, as Schelde (1993:13) states, “both folklore and SF depend 
to a large extent on the distinction between culture and nature”. 
 As the move from organicism to mechanism took place, a scientific and mechanistic 
world-view became the dominant mode of evaluating the world and re-structured previous 
modes of investigation, and as Schelde (1993:3) states, “once humans were in a position 
to explain virtually everything that occurs in nature in scientific terms, the anthropomorphic 
monsters withered away”. These monsters of the past, rooted in the magic and mysticism 
of folklore, were replaced with the monsters of the modern world; products of alien worlds 
or science and technology gone awry.  
 Although SF films are often replete with seemingly implausible beings from other 
worlds, giant gorillas, cyborgs from the future, and so forth, the reality of the setting or 
situation in which these monsters appear, anchor “the audience in some kind of 
recognizable reality” because “for the fantastical to have an effect on us, we have to 
believe it could happen to us” (Schelde 1993:7).  
 Thus SF film must make use of the everyday in two ways: firstly in order to anchor the 
audience in a familiar reality that would suspend disbelief of the narrative events onscreen, 
and secondly, to highlight the differences between the ‘normal’ of the everyday and the 
‘abnormal’ of the action or character(s) of the film. An example of the striking use of the 
‘everyday’ and its function within narrative to suspend disbelief and to highlight the 
‘abnormal’, would be the scene of small town America being invaded by alien pod seeds in 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956).41 By visually contrasting 1950s America, and the 
heterosexual, patriarchal, family values that are imbued in this setting and the characters 
of the film, with the alien Other, the film communicates an on-going theme in SF film where 
the ‘normal’ is sharply contrasted with the ‘abnormal’ Other. This is further highlighted by 
the use of visual signification that acts to firmly highlight difference. 
 The function of the ‘everyday’ further reifies the notion that the Other could realistically 
disrupt, or destroy traditional ideologies and the rationality that structure this ‘everyday’ 
world. The diegetic onscreen mirrors real lived social relations and the very fabric of 
twentieth- and twenty-first century life, and in doing so, the monster onscreen becomes a 
realistic threat to the ‘everyday’ of the audience member.  
 As Schelde (1993:9) states, SF film is “a mirror of the lives and reality of those for 
whom it is made”, and by using comparative realities of the here and now, or the near 
future, scenarios are played out in which the threat of the Other or science and the various 
manifestations thereof, are fleshed out and taken to their ‘realistic’ (or unrealistic) 
conclusion.  
 
                                                            
41 Invasion of the Body Snatchers is discussed in more detail further on in this chapter. 
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 As Schelde (1993:9) points out: 
 
  The main argument is that science, as depicted in the movies, threatens not only to 
destroy the physical world…but, more to the point, science and technology are slowly 
invading our minds and bodies, making us more mechanical, more like machines. Science 
is robbing us of our humanity, metaphorically expressed as our soul: it threatens to 
replace the individual, God-given soul with a mechanical, machine-like one.  
 
 Although the scenarios depicted in SF films are at times not probable (time-travel for 
example), they do however, represent current fears of the Other and the possible threat of 
mismanaged science and how these could affect or destroy our current lived reality and 
social relations. Like the anthropomorphized folklore monsters of the past, SF monsters 
and the scientific and technological advances that often allow for their creation, in 
whatever form they may take, similarly represent the uncontrolled, the unknown, and 
forces that threaten us and our way of being in the world. 
 Changes in lived social relations throughout the last ninety years or so are reflected in 
the monsters, situations, or societies that are present in SF films, and as Vivian Sobchack 
(1988:237) states, “[SF] offers us new symbolic maps of our social relationship to 
others...”, as well as our relationship with nature, culture, and science. A few stock 
SF narrative conventions, characters, and imagery, can be viewed as a barometer of these 
changes over the last few decades. They also underscore how many SF films actively reify 
traditionalist ideologies in order to quell anxiety over the loss of, or challenge to, particular 
ideologies relating to subjectivity; identity; gender; and patriarchy. 
 Reflected in SF film of the 1940s and 50s, as well as many later films, are the fears of 
social degeneration and the destabilisation of fixed identities and difference through anti-
Communist sentiments of the McCarthy era of 1940s and 50s America; the threat of 
Nuclear war; the alien Other infiltrating society in the 1960s with the rapid advancement of 
space exploration; the threatening spectre of information technology, networks of power, 
and the questioning of subjectivity with the rise of computer technology in the 1980s and 
90s as well as the differing forms of imagined social degeneration and their effect on 
traditional ideologies of ‘self’, ‘gender’; ‘community’; and ‘morality’. 
 J. P. Telotte in Science Fiction Film states that although SF film has many well-known 
iconographical elements that immediately bring to mind the ‘science fictional’ – robots; 
futuristic cityscapes; space ships; scientists; aliens; fantastic technology, and so forth, 
these, however, do not encapsulate the genre as a whole. Susan Sontag (cited in Telotte 
2001:19) in The Imagination of Disaster offers some resolution by stating that 
 
  It seems almost self-evident that a great part of the science fiction film’s special character 
derives from this focus on the concerns of reason/science/technology. It has proven such 
a popular form… precisely because its peculiar argot not only provides us with a most 
appropriate language for talking about a large dimension of technologically inflected 
postmodern culture, but also because its fundamental themes help us make sense of our 
culture’s quandaries.  
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 This language of SF functions in relation to what Telotte calls “the fantastic”. The 
fantastic exists in between a “sliding scale” of the marvellous and the uncanny. Telotte 
(2001:11) states, that “while the uncanny narrative focuses on the unconscious… the 
marvellous [focuses] on the supernatural or spiritual realm as it intrudes into and 
challenges our everyday world”. In addition many of the films dealt with in this research, 
make use of the ‘fantastic’ as a device with which to purport alternate realities, for example 
in The Stepford Wives (2004). Telotte explains the ‘fantastic’ as functioning in a border 
zone between the ‘uncanny’ and the ‘marvellous’, and explains it as “the realm of what 
might or might not be… one that exists in a liminal situation, as we try to sort out how the 
narrative relates to and challenges our normative view of reality” (Telotte 2001:11).  
 Telotte (2001:12) further explains that these three function within three common 
narrative types in the SF film: firstly, the influence of forces outside of our reality, for 
example aliens and alien worlds; secondly, “the possibility of changes in society and 
culture, wrought by our science and technology”; and thirdly, the technological or other 
alterations to the human self, that produce doubles, cyborgs, Artificial Intelligence(s) 
(A.I’s), or substitutes (Telotte 2001:12).  
 These three narrative types fall into the larger definition of ‘genre’ as theorised by 
Rick Altman. He describes two conventions of a genre that help us to define the meaning 
in the specific text, as well as aiding in identification of the film’s icons. He describes the 
process as “considering the generic text, first, as ‘a list of common attitudes, characters, 
shots, locations, sets, and the like’, and second, as a group of ‘certain constitutive’ 
relationships… into which they are arranged” (Altman cited in Telotte 2001:17-18).  
 It is these “constitutive relationships” that this research focuses on. The reconstitution 
of specific (re)presentations of traditionalist heterosexist ideologies and the reformulation 
of these (re)presentations within a large majority of SF films, and how these function in 
relation to the fantastic, the marvellous, and the uncanny, in reifying and normalising these 
ideologies, need to be problematized when reading an SF film.  
 A discussion of specific plots, iconography, iconic characters or metaphorical 
‘characters’ that appear across this genre are important in order to adequately foreground 
the ideologies and relationships that they present onscreen. Vivian Sobchack in Science 
Fiction (1988:229) explains that “SF film has always taken as its distinctive generic task 
the poetic mapping of social relations as they are created and changed by new 
technological modes of ‘being-in-the-world’”. Plot conflicts arise from the cultural 
consequence that are as a result of great technological change or development, and the 
film acts as a test of the abilities of society and its institutions, in either accepting the 
societal transformation, or by resisting it (Sobchack 1988:229). 
 Telotte (1993:29) expands on some of the specifics of different SF plots; “the 
marshalling of great technological forces to transform the earth…efforts by the scientifically 
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informed to convince the sceptical of the benefits of technology, demonstrations of the 
‘better life’ that scientific advances will bring… the utopian effort to design a different and, 
one hopes, better world”. Some examples of Utopian SF narratives include Weird Science 
(1985), Elysium (2013), the Star Trek franchise, and Things to Come (1936). Alternately, 
the consequences and products of the change wrought by technology have negative, or 
often deadly, effects. Countless SF films, especially of the 1980s or 1990s are outright 
dystopian visions of the future; however, many SF films include elements of both.  
 The drastic changes afoot in the film, whether utopian or dystopian, take place against 
a fluid iconographic backdrop. Robots, aliens, spaceships and so forth give an SF film the 
‘feel’ of the genre, but differ in meaning from film to film. Sobchack (1988:230) states that 
instead it is rather a “broad focus on the transformational powers of advanced science and 
applied technology and its narrative and visual attempts to make these sensible…the 
genre’s primary visual project is to produce wondrous and unfamiliar imagery”.  
 With its focus on the visualisation of the transformational powers of science and 
technology, spectacle is used to communicate these changes in the film. Bould (2003:81) 
highlights that in many SF films, particular sequences in the film are artificially extended, 
and, by disregarding temporal logic, the audience is able to savour the visual acrobatics 
produced in the spectacle onscreen. Examples of this can be seen in films such as 
Alien (1979), Blade Runner (1982), The Stepford Wives (2004), and Cherry 2000 (1987), 
to name but a few. 
 Bould goes on to refer to the critique levelled at many blockbuster SF films of the 
1970s, that allowed “the production of spectacle to override more traditional concerns with 
character development, narrative coherence and thematic elaboration, and thus produce 
extremely conservative text” (2003:81); these films, no doubt, are more concerned with the 
visual effect of the film than with critically reflecting on or unpacking the concerns about 
technology or societal impact that the films depict.  
 Bould refers to films such as Weird Science (1985) and Back to the Future (1985), 
which characterise much of the 1980s SF film scene. He states that “such movies 
demonstrate not only the extent to which SF ideas and imagery had become integrated 
into the popular imagination, but also the shift in 1980s cinema away from the social 
towards the magical resolution of personal problems” (Bould 2003:92). Engaging with 
technological advancement in a critical way, or even realistically, did not mark many SF 
films of the decade. Vivian Sobchack offers an alternative reading of SF film as a whole 
and says: 
 
  In sum, the SF film gives concrete narrative shape and visible form to our changing 
historical imagination of social progress and disaster, and to the ambiguities of being 
human in a world where advanced technology has altered both the contours and meaning 
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of personal and social existence. Its very spatial and temporal fluidity, its visual plasticity 
and focus on technological transformation, mark SF not merely as a genre of the fantastic 
but also as the film genre most readily able to symbolically respond to and poetically 
figure the anxieties and hopes that inform its contemporaneous historical context 
(Sobchack 1988:231). 
 
 This excerpt is problematic in that Sobchack acknowledges the ability of science 
fiction to “symbolically respond to and poetically figure the anxieties and hopes that inform 
its contemporaneous historical context” but does not interrogate how SF symbolically 
responds to cultural anxiety about the machine and social degeneration. The visualisation 
of cultural fears and anxiety in the majority of SF films produces a largely paradoxical 
spectacle that simultaneously valorises and crucifies technology and its creations. 
Similarly, the difference inherent in pitting the human body against the technological 
invokes centuries’ old debates that pit nature against culture. The SF film deals with this 
discourse in a problematic and ambiguous way.  
 As Schelde (1993:13) states, “both folklore and SF depend to a large extent on the 
distinction between culture and nature”. In the folkloric tales of the twentieth century, 
SF films make use of this distinction between nature and culture somewhat differently, and 
often illogically. Whereas previously, culture signified the human, culture now comes to 
signify the threat of technology. Many SF films critique the excesses of science and 
technology and showcase the nature of their threat; the act of re-establishing ‘humanness’ 
and traditional notions of human subjectivity is an important aspect in the critique of 
science and technology and their impact on the human race and traditional notions of 
humanity. This re-establishment of traditional humanness is enacted and portrayed in 
various ways in SF film. 
 Emotion, as we see in films such as Invasion of The Body Snatchers (1956), 
Cherry 2000 (1987), and Star Trek: First Contact (1996) are key indicators of ‘humanness’ 
in the Modernist sense, and the ‘emotionality’ of the human characters are juxtaposed 
against the un-emotional nature of the robot, android, or cyborg character in these films. 
Paradoxically, presumed ‘over-emotional’ behaviour is considered deviant, and the visual 
signifiers that accompany over-emotional behaviour act to reify the uncontrolled and often 
violent nature of technological beings in the film. Similarly, the visual coding of these non-
human characters as uncontrolled and violent mirrors the visual coding of the deviant 
female in medical photography of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Images of 
female mental illness are juxtaposed with the nineteenth-century female-as-robot, 
highlighting their uncontrolled nature as opposed to the composed female ideal of the 
nineteenth century – the mother at home. 
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 Gendering of technology; sexual deviance; overt sexual behaviour; inappropriate 
sexual behaviour; non-heterosexual love, are all juxtaposed against the male/female 
heterosexual coupling of human characters onscreen. Traditional binaries are enforced to 
counteract the boundary crossing technological force onscreen. Through visually coding 
the cyborg onscreen as sexually deviant, this further contrasts the ‘unhuman’ nature of the 
cyborg with that of the human characters. This image of the sexually deviant cyborg is 
further complicated by notions of the monstrous feminine, and contained within notions of 
the abject and the uncanny. Clear gender binaries of the characters onscreen and 
‘appropriate’ heterosexual love also act to highlight difference and deviance when 
juxtaposed with the cyborg character.  
 The uncanny is also invoked with the interaction of the human double in the figure of 
the cyborg. The uncanny has been described as a feeling of intellectual uncertainty. This 
intellectual uncertainty is a result of a human character not being able to visually ascertain 
the status of the cyborg — is it a human? A challenge is posed to the hegemony of the eye 
and vision, as the key factors in determining the world, understanding, and knowledge 
production through the very body of the cyborg and what it has come to represent, from 
early conceptions of the automan, to the cyborg body of the twenty-first century. 
 
3.5 The Threat of Technology gone Awry 
 
Many SF films over the last one hundred years have warned of the excesses of technology 
and the havoc that could result from mismanagement, over use of, or over dependence on 
technology and science in the ‘everyday’ of human existence. The threats posed to 
traditional notions of subjectivity; gender; humanity; community; and the self, are depicted 
in numerous SF films. Detailing the full range of SF films dealing with the excesses of 
technology is beyond the scope of this research, but by examining some of the most 
seminal SF films dealing with the negative effects of science and technology, a better 
understanding of the treatment of the unease associated with rapid technological and 
scientific change can be garnered. 
 
Metropolis (1927) 
 
J. P. Telotte (1993:27) states in The World of Tomorrow and the “Secret Goal” of Science 
Fiction that early SF films, such as Metropolis (1927), critiqued the excesses of technology 
and its ideological underpinnings. Directed by Fritz Lang, the film is set in the future city of 
Metropolis, where hordes of disadvantaged workers toil in the shadows of the massive and 
ominous machines located in the underbelly of the city, while the wealthy live in luxury 
aboveground.  
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 Telotte (1998:77) states that “the period was marked by big change… change that 
was freighted with a large measure of uncertainty, even anxiety. As the American industrial 
designer Norman Bel Geddes noted: ‘although we built the machines, we have not 
become at ease with them and have not mastered them”. Metropolis emerges as a 
visualisation of this anxiety, and specularises the presumed immensity of this threat in the 
juxtaposition of man and the colossal machines that enslave him. 
 As Christine Cornea states (cited in The Film Genre Book 2009:144), “Metropolis 
emerged at a time of political and economic uncertainty during the Weimar period in 
Germany… [and] rather than depicting an entirely alternative world, the city of Metropolis 
can therefore be seen as an exaggeration of a known world”. Post World War I anxieties 
about technological development and its impact on society and human lives are 
foregrounded in this film. It details the impact of mismanaged technology and the 
disastrous ramifications of this on lived social relations. As John Sanders states in The 
Film Genre Book (2009:141-142): 
 
  The film certainly foreshadows the growth of modern super states where military 
technology would play a growing role in underpinning totalitarian power bases. The 
superstructures and technological developments also mirrored the look of modern cities 
like New York and looked forward to the more modern concerns of advancement at the 
expense of humanity. 
 
 The film critiques the perceived loss of humanity that seems to run parallel to 
technological development and the greed and totalitarianism that this level of technological 
development invokes in human beings. As Sanders (2009:144) states, “the workers are 
ant-like next to their metal masters, and make jerky movements as they fulfil their roles, 
moving like instinctive, but not sentient, beings”. The visual treatment of the machines 
ensure that they become characters themselves, enslaving the workers and forcing them 
into a robot-like existence; the indignation in the human-slave machine-master role that 
emerges further pits humanity against technology in a negative way. Although the film 
indicates that the wealthy citizens are the perpetrators of this enslavement, the machines 
are depicted as the true offenders. Technology is presented as the dehumanizing and 
corrupting force, for both the human slaves below, and the wealthy above. 
 J. P. Telotte in Things to Come states that “it is the period’s science-fiction films that 
most directly reflect technology’s impact and suggest the full scope, the very ‘big’ ness of 
the challenge it poses” (1998:77). Monumentalizing the machine through “depicting it in 
extreme close-ups, by accentuating its aesthetic dimensions…” (Telotte 1998:77). And 
“this approach drew the technological out of its everyday context, detached it from our 
common experience… a sense of distance and detachment that increasingly marked our 
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modern experience, as well as our science-fiction films” (Telotte 1998:77). By detaching 
the machine from the context of ‘the everyday’, it also lost its ability to be controlled, and 
through this, human beings lost their ability to control technology.  
 This distance, from ourselves and from technology invited us to observe from the 
margins, “and that spectatorial imperative inevitably had what she [Anne Friedberg] terms 
‘subjective consequences’, a fallout for the way in which we saw ourselves vis-à-vis the 
power and values implicit in the machine which seemed to be displacing us from the centre 
of our world, pushing us to the periphery where we might observe this new, technological 
spectacle that was unfolding” (Telotte 1998:78). 
 The dislocation of traditional notions of human identity and subjectivity through the 
visual monumentalisation of the machine inflected the machine with anthropomorphic 
qualities. The human subject was no longer in control of his own world, and these de-
humanising sentiments are effectively signified in the visualisation of the machines in 
Metropolis. 
 
Johnny Mnemonic (1995) 
 
The film centres on Johnny, a data courier in the twenty-first century who is being chased 
by the Yakuza and a large pharmaceutical company, in order to extract the data from his 
head. Nerve Attenuation Syndrome (NAS) affects the majority of the population; NAS is 
caused by an over reliance on technology, and the data in Johnny’s head is later revealed 
to be the cure for NAS. The film, although clearly situated within the cyberpunk sub-genre 
of SF film, is merely a re-assertion and re-formulation of the human’s fight against 
technological domination in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Johnny’s quest to 
regain his childhood memories (erased by the neural implant that allows him to carry data 
in his brain) and his fight to stay alive, despite the damage inflicted on him by technology, 
reasserts humanist ideologies that trade on the age-old story of the male protagonist’s 
pursuit of life and liberty. The film condemns the trappings of twenty-first century life that 
are available through technology, and instead aims to re-assert heterosexist ideologies 
that structure the notion of ‘human’ and lived social relations of the twentieth century.  
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3.6 Body Invasion, the Double, and Questioning What it means to be Human 
 
Just as the unknown forces of nature were anthropomorphised in folklore, creating a 
counter intellect that was human but not quite human, the modern vision of 
anthropomorphised power and the unknown, is the cyborg – similarly human, but not quite 
human. In SF film that employ the notion of the Double, a reassertion of heterosexist 
ideology is enabled by the spectacle of the film, as well as the visual signification of the 
Other as double. 
 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) 
 
In Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) directed by Don Siegal, small town America is 
under threat from an alien force, intent on replacing the community with alien doubles. A 
town doctor, Miles Bennel, receives complaints from many of the townsfolk that their family 
members are acting strangely – cold, and un-emotional. What is dismissed as delusion is 
eventually justified upon discovering that alien seed pods have begun birthing replicas of 
the townsfolk, and replacing the human beings of the town while they sleep. Bennel, while 
on the run with his love interest Becky Driscoll, takes refuge in a cave. Bennel leaves for a 
short while to look for help, and upon returning, kisses Becky who has been unable to stay 
awake. Bennel suddenly realises that Becky too has been replaced by the alien Other, and 
exclaims “I never knew the real meaning of fear until…until I kissed Becky” (Telotte 
2001:21). A peculiar statement to make in the midst of an alien invasion – but as Telotte 
(2001:21) states, “in this context, however, it signals an abiding concern of many of our 
science fiction films: their tendency to lodge a sense of our humanity in feelings, passion, 
desire – and not in the atmosphere of reason and science that would seem to dominate 
the world of science fiction”. 
 Bennel and other characters in the film are told that they are ‘hallucinating’ and that 
their fears are irrational. Even as Bennel runs along the road at the end of the film trying to 
warn the drivers of impending doom, nobody responds to his warnings or cries for help. 
Rationality is critiqued in this film, and emotion, here coded as an essential quality and 
cornerstone of ‘humanness’, is lauded. The breakdown of the boundary between human 
and Other; the visual trickery of the alien double; and the weakening of traditional 
American family values of gender, identity, and self, results in the firm reassertion of the 
boundary between the human and non-human characters onscreen. By the end of the film, 
when Bennel’s account of the events is finally believed, appropriate action is taken by the 
authorities. By invoking traditionalist ideologies and binary codifications of the world, the 
film requires the audience to actively participate in re-drawing the boundary between self 
and Other, and in so doing symbolically expel the threat of the human-double-Other. 
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 In the 1978 remake of the film, the monstrous and grotesque imagery of the pod 
people is given specific prominence in the film. The notion of the abject is invoked when 
viewing the pod people, who are imaged as gelatinous creatures that summon a 
comparison to mucous. This visual treatment of the alien Other foregrounds difference and 
deviance and is in stark contrast to the visual treatment of the human characters. Both 
versions of this film, although not explicitly about the negative effects of technology, imply 
anti-technological sentiments in the visual treatment of the alien Other. Similar to the Borg 
Queen in Star Trek: First Contact (1996), the alien Other signifies the breakdown between 
self and Other; the destabilisation of patriarchal ideologies of gender; and the weakening 
of accepted notions of ‘self’ and human identity.42 These constitutive elements of lived 
social reality and cultural practice are threatened by technological and scientific invention 
and progress, and so inadvertently, Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) critiques the 
encroachment of technology and science into our everyday lives and the threat of being 
consumed, literally, by this.  
 
3.7 The Cyborg and Woman as Robot 
 
  Starting in the 1920s, if you had viewed too many science fiction films, you might be 
forgiven for nightmares in which you were surrounded by mechanical creatures that could 
do anything a human could – walk, talk, think, fight– only better, and often with evil intent 
(Perkowitz 2007:142). 
 
Technological advancement and progress have been one of the central leitmotifs of the 
human race and a driving force throughout history. One of the manifestations of this 
progress has been the invention of the automan, and the various manifestations thereof 
that developed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
 The Golem of Prague and Telos are some of the earliest examples of this 
manifestation, and throughout history various other automata have been invented, partly 
as a response to and an indication of specific technological or cultural epoch. The human 
double has been portrayed in equal measure either positively or negatively, and it remains 
in the popular imagination up until today as a figure that showcases the advancement of 
science and technology, and the changing relationships between human beings and 
technology. 
 
                                                            
42 This film will be discussed in more detail further on. 
 94 
 
 Metropolis (1927) 
 
While being a key filmic text on the dangers of technological advancement, this film also 
testifies to the dangers ‘inherent’ in female deviance, especially in a robotic form. A 
scientist by the name of Rotwang invents a robot that could potentially replace the human 
workers in the city, under the commission of Johann Frederson, the Master of Metropolis. 
The robot that he develops is a duplicate of Maria, one of the workers, and the love 
interest of the master’s son, Freder. Sidney Perkowitz (2007:143) states that “Rotwang’s 
prototype robot is both aggressively machinelike and recognisably woman…[it] has breasts 
and hips and a provocative female face… The replica of Maria has an evil streak and, 
unlike the saintly real Maria, radiates sexuality”. 
 This dual vision of the female form, one saintly, one evil, is representative of 
entrenched ideologies still present in society to this day, and which frame women around 
the duality of good versus evil; the Madonna versus the seductress, and so forth. 
Underpinning these dualities is the repressed or overt sexuality inherent in feminine 
nature. The robot Maria is burned, much like a witch at the stake, by the end of the film, 
while the saintly human Maria, is united with Freder and legitimised through his 
heterosexual love for her. 
 Metropolis as an early filmic representation of these fantasies of what the future can 
hold and also foregrounds the anxiety felt by many regarding this boundless technological 
future. The film re-inscribes traditional heterosexist norms by visually signifying the robot 
Maria as deviant and pathological because of her overt sexual nature. The robot Maria, in 
her ultimate form, would function as a private eroticised automan, created for the 
enjoyment of her maker/master. However, the uncontrolled sexual deviance of Maria is 
punished in the film as she has transgressed the boundaries of appropriate female 
behaviour.43 Similarly, the heterosexual love between the real Maria and Freder serves to 
highlight the difference and sexual deviance of single robot Maria. Metropolis represents 
automata, and women, in a way that SF cinema goers would come to know well over the 
following century –the robot Maria as the sexual, deviant, and monstrous, and the human 
Maria as the saintly, heterosexual mother. The future world of Metropolis is inscribed with 
traditional ideologies and acts to reify the power of human beings over impertinent and 
uncontrolled technology. As Shaw-Garlock (2006:85) states: 
 
In the figure of False Maria, we are presented with a machine-woman who is both a 
fetishistic of male desire as well as a monstrous representation of unrepressed female 
sexuality in the tradition of the witch and the seductress. The transgressive woman 
evades the rules of society and returns to nature and the demon, she loses uncontrollable 
and evil forces in the collective midst. Thus False Maria, and the female-machine 
generally, represent the potential for both oppression and emancipation through 
technology. 
 
                                                            
43 The robot Maria dies at the end of the film in a fire – aligning this character with another deviant female, the 
witch. Similarly, the visual signification of the robot Maria as sultry, with her dark make-up and flirtatious 
behaviour further reify why she needs to be punished.  
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 These sentiments are echoed in later SF film of the twentieth century that similarly 
depict this ambiguity that resides within the figure of the cyborg. The feminised machine of 
Ash in Alien (1979), for example, to be discussed in detail in the following chapter, 
represents this dual threat and emancipation evident in the cyborg. 
 
Weird Science (1985) 
 
In Weird Science, the fantasy girl of every 1980s teen boy materializes in the form of Lisa. 
Two friends, sick of being ridiculed and keenly aware of their lack of ability to attract the 
opposite sex, decide to create the perfect girl who will follow their every instruction and 
belong to them. Designing her on their crudely pixelated computer screen, which only 
serves to highlight her constructedness, by connecting two Barbie dolls to wires, and with 
the help of a supernatural lighting strike, Lisa appears through the doorway – the perfect 
figure of 1980s feminine sexuality. Although Weird Science is aimed at a younger teen 
audience, an alternative take on the traditional high-school movie sub-genre, the film still 
highlights, in unapologetic clarity, the eroticised female cyborg. 
 Throughout the film, the sexuality and deviant nature of Lisa is portrayed in a light-
hearted way, with just enough deviance and sexuality to get the two boys out of their high 
school ‘slump’. By the end of the film, the two boys, who now have friends, have hosted a 
party at their own house, have a Ferrari and other trappings indicative of masculine 
identity, and find themselves two girlfriends. The next day, Lisa, positioned as their shared 
girlfriend throughout the film, is told very politely that her services are no longer required. 
Lisa’s response to this conversation, with a tear in her eye is, “yeah, sure I’m hurt, but I 
wouldn’t change it, I’m really just getting off seeing you two guys straightened out”. This 
statement reaffirms Lisa’s status as object, caring mother figure, and simultaneously, the 
object of the boys’ erotic desires.  
 Lisa’s function in the film mirrors the function of women as the eroticised object 
constructed for the consumption of men in a private space. Her sexualised advances 
towards other male characters in the film is presented as deviant; thus Lisa’s ‘dismissal’ by 
the boys at the end of the film is somehow warranted because of her behaviour towards 
other male characters.  
 
Cherry 2000 (1987) 
 
In Cherry 2000, the idyllic, saintly female is this time represented as a robot woman. In the 
film, ‘Cherry’ is presented as the ultimate female form – she has a perfect body and is 
aesthetically pleasing, caring in nature, and the ideal American housewife; constructed for 
the personal pleasure and erotic fulfilment of her male counterpart. When Cherry short-
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circuits due to water damage, the system crash is shown to the viewer using a close-up 
shot of her eyes rolling back in her head; after which her boyfriend goes in search of a 
replacement model. 
 Although this film takes an alternative stance on the traditionally deviant female robot, 
the film still reasserts anti-technological sentiments by chastising Cherry’s boyfriend for 
seeking love in the arms of a robot. The majority of the film depicts Cherry’s boyfriend’s 
quest to find a replacement model. On his dangerous journey, where he is nearly killed 
several times, he falls in love with a human woman, a ‘tracker’ tasked with finding a 
replacement for Cherry. By the end of the film, he has realised his folly, and the film ends 
with him and the female tracker flying off into the proverbial sunset.  
 Cherry 2000 is a key filmic text that highlights two of the main themes present in many 
SF films. Firstly, the construction and representation of the female form for personal male 
erotic fulfilment, and secondly, the reassertion of traditional ideologies, in the form of 
heterosexual human love, which in turn reifies the humanist standpoint that the majority of 
these films take.  
 
3.8 The Uncanny, the Abject, and the Monstrous Feminine 
 
Freud (1919:1-2) states that “the ‘uncanny’ is that class of the terrifying which leads back 
to something long known to us, once very familiar”. Freud’s discussion of the ‘uncanny’ is 
useful when unpacking the reactions and feelings of human characters towards non-
human characters onscreen. The notion of the ‘uncanny’ in its very description by Freud, 
mirrors the dualistic nature of the various cyborg and robot characters in these films and 
explains the nature of the interaction between the human and non-human characters.  
 Freud begins by discussing the opposite of the word ‘uncanny’ or unheimlich, which is 
the German word heimlich. Heimlich, “meaning ‘familiar’, ‘native’, ‘belonging to the home’, 
and we are tempted to conclude that what is ‘uncanny’ is frightening precisely because it is 
not known and familiar” (Freud 1919:2). He adds however that “not everything which is 
new and unfamiliar is frightening… something has to be added to what is novel and 
unfamiliar to make it uncanny” (Freud 1919:2). 
 So the German Heimlich is a translation of ‘homely’ or ‘at home’, ‘feelings and ideas 
relating to the home’. Feelings and ideologies associated with notions of ‘home’ are 
challenged when the uncanny is invoked. Heimlich however, can also be translated as 
‘secret’. As Freud (1919:3) states “concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to 
know about it, withheld from others…Geheim [secret]”. 
 
  Among its different shades of meaning the word heimlich exhibits one which is identical 
with its opposite, unheimlich. What is heimlich thus comes to be unheimlich. In general we 
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are reminded that the word heimlich is not unambiguous, but belongs to two sets of ideas, 
which without being contradictory are yet very different: on the one hand, it means that 
which is familiar and congenial, and on the other, that which is concealed and kept out of 
sight (Freud 1919:4). 
 
 Thus ‘uncanny’ comes to mean that which is familiar, but also that which was once 
concealed, a secret, but now has come to light. He continues by saying “heimlich is a word 
the meaning of which develops towards an ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its 
opposite, unheimlich. Unheimlich is in some way or other a sub-species of Heimlich” 
(Freud 1919:4).  
 When applying Freud’s notion of the uncanny to occurrences between characters in 
SF film, we see that the uncanny, that which is at once familiar, but yet also secret, is 
present in the majority of interactions between human and so-called ‘non-human’ 
characters. It is the very ‘humanness’ of the cyborg characters in these films that results in 
the uncanny. Freud goes on to cite E. Jentsch’s paper Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen 
in order to further clarify. 
 
  Jentsch has taken as a very good instance ‘doubts whether an apparently animate being 
is really alive; or conversely, whether a lifeless object might not be in fact animate’; and he 
refers in this connection to the impression made by wax-work figures, artificial dolls and 
automatons. He adds to this class the uncanny effect of epileptic seizures and the 
manifestations of insanity, because these excite in the spectator the feeling that 
automatic, mechanical processes are at work, concealed beneath the ordinary 
appearance of animation (Freud 1919:5). 
 
 The spectator here is struck by either the visible manifestation of ‘humanness’ in a 
cyborg character, or the human-like character of one, and this ‘humanness’, familiar to the 
spectator is immediately intertwined with the unfamiliarity of the essential non-humanity of 
the cyborg. Freud goes on to quote Jentsch who explains that the uncanny is produced by 
feelings of “intellectual uncertainty”, and this is invoked when questions arise about 
whether an apparently animate being is truly alive or dead (Freud 1919:2). 
 When the spectator is unable to ascertain the “mechanical processes at work”, the 
uncanny is invoked in the spectator’s interaction with the apparently non-human character. 
Freud further explains that the uncanny has ties to notions surrounding the primacy of 
vision in ascertaining truth, as well as castration anxiety. The primacy of the eye is called 
into question when the uncanny is invoked as the ‘nature’ of the automan or cyborg; 
whether it is truly human or not, cannot be deduced purely by looking at it. 
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 As Freud (1919:6) states:  
 
  We know from psychoanalytic experience, however, that this fear of damaging or losing 
one’s eyes is a terrible fear of childhood. Many adults still retain their apprehensiveness in 
this respect…A study of dreams, phantasies and myths has taught us that a morbid 
anxiety connected with the eyes and with going blind is often enough a substitute for the 
dread of castration. In blinding himself, Oedipus, that mythical law-breaker, was simply 
carrying out a mitigated form of the punishment of castration—the only punishment 
that…was fitted for him. 
 
 This double fear, produced in the challenge to the primacy of vision in ascertaining 
truth, and concealed within the fear of castration, is at the base of feelings of uncanniness 
towards ‘non-human’ characters onscreen.  
 When the spectator is faced with one that is the same, but at once, not the same, 
Freud’s notion of ‘the double’ is similarly useful in unpacking the relationship between the 
human and non-human characters. The ‘double’ is invoked through similar experiences, 
ideas, or purely by looking alike. 
 
  For the “double” was originally…an ‘energetic denial of the power of death’… [the] 
invention of doubling as a preservation against extinction... Such ideas, however, have 
sprung from the soil of unbounded self-love, from the primary narcissism which holds 
sway in the mind of the child as in that of primitive man; and when this stage has been left 
behind the double takes on a different aspect. From having been an assurance of 
immortality, he becomes the ghastly harbinger of death (Freud 1919:9). 
 
 The double then, especially when coded as it has been within SF film, stands as both 
that which is uncanny and that which represents death. As the uncanny double in question 
is a product of technological and scientific progress, questions about how science and 
technology threaten the human race are imbued in the interactions with the non-human 
characters onscreen. Symbolically, these characters also question the authority of 
patriarchy by challenging accepted ideas about the primacy of the eye (and incites fear of 
castration simultaneously, according to Freud), in ascertaining truth. These non-human 
characters function then as the product of science and technology gone awry, and the 
challenge to human dominance, but more specifically, male dominance.  
 Freud (1919:15) continues by saying that “…an uncanny effect is often and easily 
produced by effacing the distinction between imagination and reality, such as when 
something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality”. 
When these figures of the imagination appear before the spectator, they appear as not 
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only a challenge to accepted notions of being and self, but also as “harbingers of death” to 
the human race and patriarchal order. 
 The uncanny and the double are further complicated in SF film by the addition of the 
‘abject’ in the construction and depiction of these cyborg characters. As Freud (1919:2) 
states, “in Arabic and Hebrew ‘uncanny’ means the same as ‘daemonic’, ‘gruesome’”, and 
when applying Barbara Creed’s notion of the monstrous feminine, and her reading of 
Julia Kristeva’s ‘abject’, we see how these non-human characters come to be visually 
coded as gruesome, unholy, and threatening. 
 The notion of the monstrous feminine, although predominantly associated with horror 
films within popular culture, permeates the imagery of SF film symbolically and through the 
body of the cyborg. The notion of the abject and gender are central in the definition of the 
monstrous feminine, and the result is the embodiment onscreen of all that is terrifying, 
repulsive, horrific, and disgusting about the female body and its nature.  
 The image of the violent female monster has occupied classical mythology for 
thousands of years and Barbara Creed in The Monstrous-Feminine: Film, Feminism, 
Psychoanalysis, outlines how various authors have explained the monstrous feminine and 
how she appears within the horror film. Creed sites David J. Hogan who explains that 
“horror films with female monsters as central characters are a ‘relatively new phenomenon, 
and seem to have developed parallel with the growth of the women’s movement in the 
United States and Europe’” (Creed 2001:4). 
 As with most key figures in horror and SF film, the figure of the monstrous feminine 
appeared in popular culture at a time when Western Culture was experiencing social 
change and traditional categories of gender and gender roles were being questioned. As a 
science fictional character, the monstrous-feminine stands, as the cyborg body does later 
on in the twentieth century, as a figure with which to debate and interrogate changing 
relationships within society, the workplace, and politically. However, as we come to see in 
Creed’s discussion of this figure, the notion of the abject and its construction of the 
monstrous-feminine relegate this discussion of changing gender roles to a one-sided 
evocation of the anxieties produced by a destabilised patriarchal identity.  
 Stephen Neale in Genre explains that  
 
  It could well be maintained that it is woman’s sexuality, that which renders them desirable 
– but also threatening – to men, which constitutes the real problem that the horror cinema 
exists to explore, and which constitutes also and ultimately that which is really monstrous 
(cited in Creed 2002:5). 
 
 By constructing the monstrous in the feminine based on women’s sexuality and, 
therefore also her gender, the image of the monstrous-feminine comes to represent the 
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embodiment of male anxiety towards female power, sexuality, and changing gender 
dynamics. The dual incitement of both desire and threat, which also figures in the image of 
the cyborg in the late twentieth century, combine in a volatile mix of reactions from the 
viewer.  
 Neale proposes that there are two ways to understand the monstrous-feminine: firstly, 
the monster stands as the boundary between the non-human and human; and secondly, 
the monstrous-feminine is explained and produced by male castration anxiety (cited in 
Creed 2002:5). The resultant is a constant reworking of practices of signification within the 
horror film which offers the viewer “an abundant display of fetishistic effects whose function 
is to attest to the perversity of the patriarchal order” (Neale cited in Creed 2001:5).  
 Creed offers a different view of the monstrous-feminine through a reading of the work 
of Linda Williams. Williams does not define the monstrous-feminine as victim, as do the 
authors that Creed mentions, but instead as a figure in which the female spectator can 
recognise a threat posed to established male power (Creed 2001:6). As Williams states, 
“both [female spectator and monster] are constructed as ‘biological freaks’ whose bodies 
represent a fearful and threatening form of sexuality” (cited in Creed 2001:6).  
 However, this recognition by the female spectator of the boundary crossing abilities 
that the monstrous-feminine might have is neutralised by the notion of the abject that 
structures and informs the reading of the monstrous-feminine. The abject, as posited by 
Julia Kristeva, is at once alluring, but yet always something that must be expelled from the 
body in order to constitute the ‘self’ of Western patriarchal ideology. Furthermore, as Creed 
states, “when woman is represented as monstrous it is almost always in relation to her 
mothering and reproductive functions. These faces are: the archaic mother; the monstrous 
womb; the witch; the vampire; and the possessed woman” (Creed 2001:7).  
 By intimately linking the ‘female’ and the monstrous, this figure’s transgressive abilities 
are collapsed, as the image of the monstrous-feminine emerges as a re-presentation of 
traditional patriarchal notions of gender binaries and male power. With the addition of the 
abject to this figure, the monstrous-feminine is treated as something that must be expelled 
and cleansed. 
 Kristeva explains the abject as “that which does not ‘respect borders, positions, rules’ 
that which ‘disturbs identity, system, order” (cited in Creed 2001:8). The monstrous-
feminine, through invoking the abject, poses a threat to established masculine identity and 
power, and, like the figure of the cyborg, is presented to the spectator as abject through 
the action of boundary crossing in their very nature. The body of the cyborg and the 
monstrous-feminine, which are constructed through hybridity and difference, are presented 
as figures that need to be policed and neutralised.  
 Kristeva goes on to explain that “ritual becomes a means by which societies both 
renew their initial contact with the abject element and then exclude that element. Through 
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ritual, the demarcation lines between the human and non-human are drawn up anew and 
presumably made all the stronger for that process” (cited in Creed 2001:8). This boundary, 
that Kristeva (cited in Creed 2001:14) calls “the boundary between the maternal semiotic 
authority and the paternal symbolic law” is re-drawn and policed through ritual cleansing.  
 
 As Creed (2001:8) states: 
 
  The central ideological project of the popular horror film- purification of the abject through 
a ‘descent into the foundations of the symbolic construct’. The horror film attempts to bring 
about a confrontation with the abject (the corpse, bodily wastes, the monstrous feminine) 
in order finally to eject the abject and redraw the boundaries between the human and non-
human. 
 
 The threat of the uncanny, abject, monstrous, symbolic female is visually coded onto 
the body of the cyborg, however that cyborg body may be gendered.  
 
3.9 Cyborg Cinema 
 
Cyborg cinema emerged as a sub-cycle of SF film in the early 1980s with films such as 
Alien (1979), Blade Runner (1982), and RoboCop (1987), although early precursors such 
as Metropolis (1927) and Westworld (1973) make it difficult to assign an exact date to the 
emergence of this branch of SF film. Combining elements from various other genres, such 
as Film Noir (Blade Runner); Horror (Alien); Thriller (The Lawnmower Man), and Action 
(RoboCop), the rise of cyborg cinema mirrored the emergence of the mega-corporation, 
technological development, and immense workplace uncertainty in America and elsewhere 
(Short 2011:22).  
 Films from this period emphasise the negative aspects of Capitalism, and it is 
presented as “ruthless, exploitative and hostile to humanity… [simultaneously it is] held 
accountable for the poor conditions in which humans live” (Short 2011:22). The cyborgs of 
these films are developed by mega-corporations, and they are produced to execute the 
immoral and often violent undertakings of these corporations. Most importantly, films of 
this period “may question existing tendencies, [but] they also question the viability of revolt, 
along with any belief in social progress” (Short 2011:22). 
 These early examples of cyborgs onscreen are characterised by innovation and 
experimentation, however, the majority of these films resort to what Short (2011:22) calls 
“conservative resolutions”. Anxiety over the decentring of man as the focal point of the 
universe, and as the master of his own destiny are circumvented and resolved by a return 
to, and re-inscription of, traditionalist ideologies. Short (2011:22) continues by saying that 
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“anxieties surrounding dehumanisation were met with reassurances that humanity itself, 
based as it is on a specific set of emotions and values, will somehow prevail”. 
 Two trends emerge during this period, with which current depictions of cyborgs 
onscreen are still structured: the good cyborg, with which the audience member can 
sympathise due to its human-like nature, or its attempt to uphold traditional human 
characteristics and society; or the evil cyborg, intent on destroying human life, and 
restructuring society as we know it. Placing these archetypes in opposition to each other in 
films such as The Terminator (1982) and i, Robot (2004), further highlights the good 
versus evil cyborg as the embodiment of man versus machine onscreen. Similarly, this 
battle between good and evil is informed by the representation of the evil 
cyborg/technology as the reason for moral decay and the end of the human race. As Short 
(2011:23) states, these films opt “to blame machines rather than any particular social 
system”. Although the mismanagement, or use of technology for nefarious means might be 
“obliquely criticised” for their role in the destruction of life as we know it, the machines are 
represented as the overarching enemy on which we can transpose our fears (Short 
2011:23).  
 Thomas Schatz in Hollywood Genres (cited in Short 2011:21) states that “what is so 
fascinating and confounding about Hollywood genre films is their capacity to ‘play it both 
ways’, to both criticise and reinforce the values, beliefs and ideals of our culture within the 
same narrative context”. While technology is lauded in many of these films as the key to a 
utopian future free from class, race, or gender distinction, poverty, or crime, the overriding 
message is that humanity, and traditional ideas relating to this concept, should remain 
intact if we wish to survive. 
 Judith Wright (cited in Short 2011:21) states that “genre films produce satisfaction 
rather than action, pity and fear rather than revolt. They serve the interests of the ruling 
class by assisting in the maintenance of the status quo”. Although Wright’s approach limits 
audience participation in creating meaning, the gist of her argument is that genre films and 
the Hollywood Blockbuster are indicative of current lived social relations, and that they 
espouse traditionalist ideologies that act to concretize and validate man’s victory over the 
machine. This is pertinent commentary, particularly relevant in discussing the majority of 
films in this sub-cycle, over the last thirty years. 
 Later ‘Cyber Thrillers’ of the early 1990s such as The Lawnmower Man (1992), Ghost 
in the Machine (1993), Johnny Mnemonic (1995), and Virtuosity (1995), represent that 
decades’ anxiety about new information technologies such as the World Wide Web, and 
Virtual Reality. These films undermined the faith in technology, however minimal, that early 
films in this sub-cycle had established. As Short (2011:21) says, “its ability to challenge 
existing mores appears to have been noticeably reduced as the cycle has progressed”. 
 The Lawnmower Man (1992) is a prime example of the reassertion of heterosexist 
ideologies and American family values. Although the possibilities of Virtual Reality are 
explored, the character of Lawrence Angelo (Pierce Brosnan) is dismissive of the fate of 
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Jobe Smith (Jeff Fahey) at the start of the film, when he enlists Jobe as the human test 
subject for his Virtual Reality program. We also see Angelo’s girlfriend end their 
relationship at the start of the film because he is obsessed with his work (on a military 
program involving Virtual Reality) and with spending his leisure time inside a virtual reality 
that he has created. By the end of the film, Jobe has become a violent killer whose brain 
has been transplanted into the mainframe of VSI (the company that Angelo works for) 
where he hopes to live forever. The films’ substantial disdain for Virtual Reality 
technologies is evident, while similarly producing anxiety in viewers about the negative 
implications inherent in this new technology. Angelo’s touching scene with Peter and 
Peter’s mother Carla, at the end of the film, reassures the viewer that Angelo has learnt his 
lesson. His return to family values and the appearance of a heterosexual love interest re-
establishes the ‘pro-human’ values that inform the narrative and visual structure of many of 
the films from this decade.  
 Jobe’s descent into madness is communicated to the viewer through particular 
markers throughout the film. As his mind is transformed by the intelligence-boosting 
treatments administered by Angelo, Jobe also spends more time in Virtual Reality. Jobe 
develops telepathic abilities and starts experiencing hallucinations, but by the end of the 
film, Jobe descends into full-blown megalomania. Visually, Jobe’s decline into violent 
madness is communicated through extended sequences that show Jobe’s attempts to 
conquer and control Dr Angelo’s mind through telepathy. Close-up shots of Jobe’s face, as 
seen in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, that focus particularly on his eyes, dishevelled appearance, 
and facial expression, further concretize Jobe’s mental instability.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Still from The Lawnmower Man (1992). Dir. Brett Leonard. Depicting Jobe (Jeff 
Fahey) injecting himself. [59 minutes]. 
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Figure 3.2: Still from The Lawnmower Man (1992). Dir. Brett Leonard. Depicting Jobe (Jeff 
Fahey) reacting to the injection. [59 minutes]. 
 
 In the 2000s, we see a shift in the treatment of cyborgs in some SF film, with films like 
Bicentennial Man (1999), Artificial Intelligence (2001); WALL-E (2008), Avatar (2009); and 
RoboCop (2014), inviting the viewer to sympathise with the cyborgs onscreen. The 
viewers’ ability to connect with the ‘good’ cyborg character onscreen is proportional to the 
level of traditionalist human-like characteristics the cyborg displays or endeavours to 
uphold. As Short (2011:29-30) states, “a similar contention is to be found in virtually all 
cyborg films, with romance, family kinship networks and a respect for life serving as the 
conventions by which human identity is understood, and wider concerns surrounding 
exploitation or planetary destruction conveniently ignored”.  
 Films such as Bicentennial Man and RoboCop, highlight the quest of the protagonist 
to either gain, or re-gain, a sense of humanity as theorised in a traditional Modernist 
sense. Officer Alex Murphy in RoboCop is able to overcome his un-emotional robot Other 
through the love of his wife and son. Family values and heterosexual love enable Murphy 
to fight his programming and assert his dominance over this machine Other. The film, a 
key text in implausible and improbable cyborg SF will be discussed in chapter four.  
 The cyborg emerged as a figure in Feminist discourse with Donna Haraway’s seminal 
text, The Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
Twentieth Century, published in 1985. However, Haraway’s conceptualisation of the 
cyborg has been critiqued by many. As Short (2011:3) states “critics have referred to these 
films to make a number of claims, from arguing that there are feminist gains to be found in 
considering women to be cyborg, to the suggestion that we are all, to some degree or 
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another, post-human”. In Short’s definition of what constitutes a ‘cyborg’, she draws from a 
variety of sources that establish a wide and varied definition of this much contested term.  
 She expands on six broad categories: “i. Those whose bodies are fitted with a medical 
prosthetic…; ii. Those who have had cosmetic surgery…; iii. Those whose occupation 
entails prolonged technological meditation…; iv. Those who spend their leisure time 
similarly interfacing with technology” (Short 2011: 44-45). 
 Short (2011:45) expands these definitions once more to include non-biological or non-
behavioural interactions by saying:  
 
  Those whose thought patterns and belief systems have been shaped by their 
environment, particularly the various media that supplement daily existence in advanced 
industrial nations, affecting the way in which subjects perceive reality and themselves. 
Both consciousness and cognitive process are thus shaped by external stimuli. vi. Those 
whose behavioural patterns have been shaped or conditioned by social laws, familial 
experiences and cultural conditions. Behaviour is learned through social institutions and 
reinforced by both legal sanction and the approval or disapproval of fellow citizens. 
Freedom of movement and expression are curtailed by convention or expectation, the 
rules of which work on par with programming.  
 
 By widening Haraway’s reading of the cyborg to include a variety of Post-modern life 
forms onscreen, Short and other authors such as Michelle Chilcoat, extend the category of 
cyborg and consequently the reading of this figure. In the following chapter, my own 
discussion of the cyborg is broadened and extended by this expanded categorisation. A 
discussion of seminal cyborg films will be read against the body of the hysteric to further 
my argument that the twentieth-century cyborg partakes of old visual signifiers typically 
associated with the deviant female. By drawing on feminist authors such as Anne Balsamo 
and Claudia Springer that speak to the use of cyborg imagery, I further expand my 
argument that Haraway’s notion of the cyborg has yet to come to fruition in SF films of the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Cyborg Body: Problematic Signification; the Punishment of Deviance; 
and the re-inscription of Heterosexist Ideology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The cyborg functions in various ways within popular culture of the late twentieth century 
and early twenty-first cezntury. Presented onscreen as an eroticised figure purposed to 
allay fears of dehumanisation wrought by technological and scientific development and the 
loss of the gendered body, it is often represented as either frightening or castrating or both. 
The cyborg body also acts as a site on which to question what it means to be human. The 
body of the cyborg as a site of current cultural anxieties and ideologies, as well as a figure 
that is representative of current lived social relations, as identified by authors such as 
Donna Haraway, Anne Balsamo, and Glenda Shaw-Garlock, the cyborg body acts as a 
repository for these changing anxieties and ideologies, as well as a site on which to 
unpack and resolve these. 
I have argued that female deviance, in the form of the female revolutionary (the female 
in the political realm), and the female hysteric (the female outside of the home and 
appropriate feminine behaviour), were constructed as deviant to allay fears of changing 
socio-cultural relations (the rise of the New Woman) related to the mechanisation of 
society and the changing modes of being brought on by the Industrial Revolution. In this 
chapter I will discuss how the historical and socio-cultural contexts of the deviant female of 
the nineteenth century, as well as the ambiguous relationship that patriarchal ideology and 
society had with techno-scientism, are re-constructed with the twentieth-century cyborg.  
I argue that Enlightenment principles evident in nineteenth-century medico-scientific 
treatment of mental illness and deviance, specifically regarding the deviant female hysteric 
and the valorisation of scientific and technological inquiry and progress, still function in 
contemporary depictions of deviance – in popular representations of the cyborg. The figure 
of the cyborg, although manifested differently in different cultural epochs, cannot be 
severed from its historical and cultural context (particularly that of the female-automan-
machine), when reading contemporary manifestations. These historical and cultural 
contexts, for example medico-scientific discourse of the nineteenth century as well as 
prevailing ideologies about women, continue to inform the treatment of character, 
narrative, and spectacle in the Cyborg Cinema sub-cycle. 
In this chapter I also suggest that the circulation of visual signifiers of female mental 
illness (deviance) operate in the same way, and for the same purposes, in representations 
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of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century cyborg – to eroticise, neutralise, control, and 
expel presumed female pathology and anxiety related to Industrialisation and the shift in 
gender relations that this technological epoch has wrought. I will examine how fear and 
anxiety are resolved through the pathologised/neutralised image of the cyborg, and 
through this action, the transgressive capabilities of the cyborg are undermined. In this 
process, Enlightenment principles relating to the innate rationality of ‘man’ and his 
centrality in the world, and dominance over nature/woman/technology are re-established 
and reinforced through the gendered cyborg. 
The figure of the cyborg has emerged in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as a 
figure whose descriptions vary as much as its constructions and representations. A variety 
of authors have examined its potential meaning in various disciplines, resulting in a widely 
divergent range of understanding and conceptualisation regarding the cyborg. The 
different readings of this figure will be delineated in this chapter in order to gain insight into 
the various ways in which the cyborg body manifests itself within the popular imagination, 
onscreen, and theoretically. Interrogating the impact of the cyborg in postmodern culture 
and how it has come to stand as an icon of postmodern gender relations and modes of 
being, in many divergent discourses, aides in conceptualising a ‘snap-shot’ of culture, 
ideology and lived social relations in the late twentieth century, the twenty-first century, and 
the future. Simultaneously, the transgressive abilities of the cyborg, as proposed by 
Donna Haraway, are scrutinised.  
 
4.2 Visions of the ‘Cyborg’ 
 
  Cyborgs are the postmodern icon. From children’s plastic action figures to RoboCop’s 
titanium exoskeleton, cyborgian artifacts will endure as relics of an age obsessed with 
replication. But what will they tell us about the place and identity of woman? (Balsamo 
2000:148). 
 
Anne Balsamo in Reading Cyborgs Writing Feminism asks what the possibilities would be 
if “we read contemporary science fiction stories as ethnographies of the future?” (Balsamo 
2000:148). By asking this question, we are also simultaneously asking what these future 
utopias and dystopias are saying about current and past ethnographies. The cyborg is a 
central figure in SF literature and film, and stands as a figure that communicates the lived 
social relations and ideologies of its time, as well as reflects past and possible future 
ideologies and cultural anxieties. As I argued in chapter two Bazin (cited in Bowen 1999:3) 
states, “photography…embalms time” and in the same way, SF films of the Cyborg 
Cinema sub-cycle embalm time in the same way. It embalms socio-cultural relations of the 
period of its production, and in this way, the SF films discussed in this chapter speak to 
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anxieties relating to the destabilisation of patriarchal ideology by the cyborg and the 
advancing technological change. 
The idea of the human-like machine; the automaton; the cyborg, have fascinated 
human beings for hundreds of years, and as discussed in chapter one, the figure of the 
automaton has been conceptualised and (re)presented in a variety of ways as society has 
moved from one technological period to the next. From the Golem of Prague to RobCop, 
the figure of the cyborg has changed as a result of changing cultural mores; technological 
development; gender relations; and socio-economic phases. 
Buchanan (2005:53) states that philosophers have engaged with the idea of the non-
human for centuries, and through this they have unpacked and re-formulated again and 
again what it means to be human, and that “Science Fiction writers have used the 
possibility of intelligent machines to advance the fantasy of intelligent nonhumans, as well 
as to make us think about our own human characteristics” (Buchanan 2005:53).  
In the various manifestations of the figure of the cyborg throughout the centuries, the 
differences in ideas about human identity and notions of the self, have emerged through 
the body of the cyborg. Through this figure, changes in not only ideas about ‘the human’, 
but also changes in social relations and constructions of gender can be observed and 
tracked. The figure of the cyborg thus emerges in the late twentieth century and early 
twenty-first century as a symbol of these challenges, and the events that spurred them into 
existence.  
 Through the hybrid nature of the cyborg, its body built on dualities and ambivalence, 
its very being is a challenge to the binaries that have structured gender identity until now. 
Through the cyborg’s hybrid nature, it could aid in destabilising these constructed notions 
of gender. As Balsamo (2000:149) suggests:  
 
  Variously used as a symbol of anti-technological sentiments or of the possibilities of ‘better 
living through chemistry’ cyborgs are a product of cultural fears and desires that run deep 
within our psychic unconscious. Through the use of technology as the means or context 
for human hybridization, cyborgs come to represent unfamiliar ‘Otherness’, one which 
challenges the connotative stability of human identity. 
 
The notion of ‘the Other’, with which the figure of the cyborg is so intimately linked, is 
fundamental to its revolutionary power and the very nature of the cyborg body, hybridity, 
presents a challenge to established notions of gender and identity, as purported by 
Donna Haraway. However, the ‘Otherness’ of the cyborg also relegates this figure to the 
margins of agency and influence when analysed through the conventions of patriarchal 
ideology and the past treatment of presumed Otherness, for example, the female hysteric. 
The challenge presented by the cyborg through its hybridity and Otherness emerges, in its 
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various manifestations, as pathological and terrifying in Postmodernity, due to the 
challenge to established ideas about identity and gender it offers through its very being, 
and as Buchanan (2005:53) states “[they] have always captured the public’s imagination, 
in part, by playing on our fears”. 
Centuries-old anxieties about change relating to identity; gender; technology; and 
humanity are all imbued in the representations of the cyborg in the late twentieth century 
and early twenty-first century. Although the cyborg body presents a direct challenge to 
even the notion of ‘Otherness’ through its hybrid nature, the way in which the body of the 
cyborg has been represented to us within popular culture is pathological, and neutralised 
through this act of pathologising and marginalising the cyborg body. Although theoretically 
posited as an agent of positive change by authors such as Donna Haraway, the focus of 
this chapter is to explore how the figure of the cyborg presented onscreen is stripped of 
these capabilities. 
As discussed in chapter one, Haraway’s reading of the cyborg foregrounds this figure 
as a Post-Modern body on which to model Socialist Feminist discourse of the information 
age. The nature of the cyborg, which is grounded in the hybridity that classifies early 
twenty-first century life, arises as a figure on which current lived social relations can be 
mapped. Furthermore, the binaries and patriarchal ideologies that construct ‘women’s 
experience’ and bodily relations are undone in the figure of the cyborg.  
As discussed in chapter one, despite the claims made for the cyborg’s function in 
Science Fiction literature in Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto, the dominant space for 
formation of ideas and opinions regarding the cyborg, for the majority of people, is not 
found in feminist theory, SF literature, or in scientific journals, but at the cinema. If 
Adam Bostic is correct in stating that “if we consider that one of the primary functions we 
ascribe to visual form – whether film, television, ad media, or fine art – is to represent that 
culture that gave meaning to it” (1998:358), then the cyborg has been appropriated to 
concretize gender narratives that serve traditionalist ideology. The power of the visual and 
of spectacle as advanced communication systems in modern societies far outstrip the 
communicative and transgressive abilities of the cyborg in the SF literature cited by 
Haraway.  
As Bostic (1998:360) states “with computer-generated imagery, today’s creatures 
(cyborgs included) have obtained visual credibility and thus weigh more heavily on both 
the conscious and unconscious mind”. The superior visual technologies of the Postmodern 
age, like the camera of the nineteenth century, enable us to ‘see’ the cyborg. The cyborg, 
as presented visually, is beset by modes of communication and coding that stretch far into 
antiquity, and which prioritise vision as wholly singular in its ability to communicate truth 
and depict reality. The ‘hidden truth’ of the cyborg, and by inference, technology “which lies 
outside the boundaries of understanding and language, [is brought] into the light – the 
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symbolic order’ (du Preez 2004:49). Du Preez is speaking in reference to the hysteric here, 
but the hidden essence, or hidden characteristics of the cyborg, is similarly only 
decipherable through the visual, and through the mediation of the eye of the camera.  
The paradoxical impressions of technology here are astounding. On one hand, the 
technological (the cyborg), just as the New Woman (epitomised by her predecessors, the 
revolutionary and the hysteric) of the nineteenth century was able to resist patriarchal 
conceptions of ‘woman’ and her relegation to the home as docile mother, through the 
mechanisation of society and the scientific discoveries and invention of this time that 
altered the way that society viewed the world. The Industrial Revolution effected numerous 
socio-cultural shifts, one of the many being the social mobility of women which in turn, 
expanded the role of women in society.  
As women were able to challenge the roles that had been assigned to them by the 
dominant order through the massive socio-cultural changes brought on by industrialisation, 
so the negative effects of this process were emphasised; anxiety about the changing 
landscape of everyday life, enabled by the mechanisation of society, demonised not only 
the women that sought to break from these roles, but also the technology that enabled it. 
The challenge posed to patriarchal ideology and ways of life elicited fears about the 
destabilisation of a patriarchal future.  
On the other hand, technology was also used to control these deviations from the 
norm. As discussed earlier, the camera was subsumed in a discourse of 
phallocularcentrism that had structured science, philosophy, and medicine for centuries. 
The camera, as the technological extension of the human eye, was used as an instrument 
in the practice of gendered looking. In this way, the camera was re-purposed as a tool that 
was used in the re-inscription of patriarchal ideology that was being challenged at the time, 
instead of a device that enabled the deviance of women.  
The film camera functions in much the same way. Film, however, takes the technology 
of the camera and its purpose of re-inscription to a new level of spectacle, with techni-
colour and CGI further crystallising the ‘truth’ of the image of the cyborg through the 
phallocularcentrism of Western and the mediation of modern life through spectacle. The 
cyborg is uncovered and its true intentions revealed – the destabilisation of patriarchal 
norms and values by the deviant feminine and the technological. The loss of the body, the 
site on which difference is created and the domination of the female body is justified, 
further implicates technology in the destabilisation of patriarchy.  
Michelle Chilcoat (2004:156) explains that, with the onset of new technologies such as 
Virtual Reality, prosthetics, and genetic manipulation, we see the beckoning of a new era 
in which the promise of “a life to come for superior minds released from the chains of 
bodies rendered obsolete by the advances in computer technology”. However, as these 
new technologies are explored in films of the last three decades, we also see the panic 
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rooted in the loss of a gendered body, a body that is the axiom of patriarchy, as well as the 
body that is crucial to informing subjective human experience. Chilcoat (2004:3-4) goes on 
to say that 
 
  The dislocation of the body created anxiety, and this anxiety surfaced in the form of a 
scientific imperative to reduce the complexity of the mind to the brain, and to sex this brain 
as male or female... Meanwhile, the new discipline of brain sex studies was touting its 
ability to sex the brain as male or female according to physiological structures said to 
dictate gendered behaviours.  
 
Furthermore, Chilcoat (2004:165) states that this notion of 
 
  A world without borders or boundaries... where anything is possible comes off as little 
more than the often-repeated cliché of science fiction promising radically altered states 
and then repeating the same old story. While disembodied minds might appear to run the 
show in cyberpunk film, they are still as constrained by the gender codes of a two-sex 
system as their former meat bodies were.  
 
Chilcoat’s critique of SF film similarly critiques the role that the cyborg plays in reifying 
traditionalist ideologies present in the narrative, as Chilcoat states (2004:170), it is “a body 
otherwise imagined”. However, this body (or mind) is (re)presented in the same dualistic 
mode that has structured gender and the body of the past, as well as the present. As 
Claude Draude (2009:26) states in Who’s Afraid of Virtual Humans? “the Virtual Human is 
already defined as a hybrid, and thus it cannot take additional risks by transgressing 
norm[s] so central to our culture”. The power of the hybrid cyborg figure, and how this 
hybridity can challenge established identities and ideologies, is also the characteristic that 
defines the cyborg as ‘Other’ in society. Although the cyborg body is lauded as the 
pinnacle of human ingenuity and scientific/technological progress, in order to neutralise the 
presumed threat that technology will consume humanity (and over power man), the cyborg 
stays locked in the dualisms that reinforce patriarchal ideology.  
 
4.3 Anxiety: Technological, Social, Philosophical Change 
 
Mass media images of the female-machine (in its many manifestations) are evolving 
ideological repositories of our culture’s views toward scientific and technological progress. 
The image of the female-machine is a potent representation that works to restructure 
conceptual differences between humans and machines (Shaw-Garlock 2006:76). 
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Different conceptions of the cyborg body that fall within the realm of techno-erotic 
imagery, might explore the myriad of ways in which the Postmodern subject and body 
have been, and can be reformulated, but do so in a way that is in service of traditionalist 
ideologies, and have done so well into antiquity. Claudia Springer whose work focuses on 
technology and techno-eroticism (1996:19) states that there are a variety of cyborgs that 
are presented to us in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, but two of the most 
common are explained by Springer. “The first type combines the organic human body, 
which either pre-existed as a person or was genetically engineered, with nonorganic 
mechanical or electronic implants or prostheses. The second type has no organic form but 
consists of the human mind preserved on computer software. When fictional characters 
load software directly into their electronically wired brains, they also qualify as cyborgs” 
(Springer 1996:19-20).  
Although Springer defines two of the most common types of the cyborg, there are 
several varieties to this, both in reality and in fiction, I would argue that this delineation of 
the cyborg body is essentialist in terms of the main tenets of Post Modernity in which the 
cyborg finds itself espoused and defined. If we examine the ‘nature’ of the cyborg, as 
explained to us by many theorists, most notably Donna Haraway, the cyborg stands as 
one that promotes boundary crossing and the multiplicity of subjectivity. Although by 
definition it is the merging of organic and inorganic materials, the cyborg stands mainly as 
a marker of all that is Postmodern, multiple, merged, different, Other, progressive, and 
technological. 
The rigidity of the definition relating to the cyborg body, a merging of organic and 
inorganic- is thus a very restrictive one when relating it to all that it represents, namely, 
multiplicity, Postmodernism, merged, different, Other and so forth. Many would argue this 
point; however it seems unlikely that this restrictive definition would aide in achieving any 
of the change that the image of the cyborg would advocate. I propose a loosening of this 
restrictive definition to include other depictions and variations of the merging of the 
machine and the human. 
The inclusion of androids, computers, A.I’s, robots and any other advanced 
technology that adopts human qualities in whatever form, in the term ‘cyborg’, would 
greatly assist in not only expanding the definition of this prototype, but also in broadening 
the scope of understanding and study of how technology has altered and influenced our 
current existence and culture. By widening this pool of inquiry, we are firstly moving away 
from the Modernist impulse for dualities, and secondly creating a broad spectrum of 
investigation within which we can question the impact and role of technology on gender 
and conceptions of the body. The inclusion of non-traditional cyborgs in this definition 
opens and extends the scope of inquiry and leads to the investigation of more nuanced 
areas of human machine interaction. In this chapter I make use of this broad definition to 
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aid in my unpacking of the impact of technology on humanity and society as a whole. 
 Discussions of the body, gender, what it means to be human, and how this links to the 
Western obsession with vision and technological progress are also aided by broadening 
the scope of inquiry. Furthermore, a move toward understanding just how inclusive the 
image of the cyborg is, is paramount to understanding human machine interaction in the 
twenty-first century. Moving away from Modernist ideals of the machine, technology, and 
humanity, and toward a truly Postmodern understanding of these is the most direct route in 
understanding and using the image of the cyborg to its full potential. 
 
  Enlightenment thinkers believed that reason gives humans the ability to create a better 
world rather than submit to a fixed social order and a preordained destiny. This belief in 
the power of human reason to control the environment culminated in the nineteenth-
century Industrial Revolution. By harnessing machine force industrialists displayed the 
power of human intelligence over the brute strength of machines… however, in the late 
nineteenth century, perceptions of the relationship between humans and machines 
changed. Machines were increasingly described as superior to the human body (Springer 
1996:17). 
 
As we progressed into the twentieth century, we see the paradox of technological 
advancement that we are faced with today, namely, the furthering of the human race 
through technological progress which would culminate in erasing the body, and inevitably 
the human race. Notions surrounding death are intimately linked with the obsolescence of 
the human body, and yet, the increased erotic fulfilment of the electronic age, are also 
linked to the body. The body in the electronic age – as it has been for centuries prior, is 
linked to notions of death, eroticism, gender and humanity.  
As Springer (1996:18) states, “in the late twentieth century the distinction between 
human beings and machines has become even more blurred. Human dependence on 
technology has started to efface the line between the two”; the image of the cyborg that the 
late twentieth century and early twenty-first century has come to know rests on this 
dichotomy between mind and body (Springer 1996:19). 
Technological and cultural transformation in the twentieth century greatly impacted 
gender identity as well as the relationship between humans and technology. Masculine 
identity, traditionally aligned with technology and science in a beneficial relationship that 
saw the continuation and construction of patriarchal power, encountered a wave of flux 
that altered masculine identity and its relationship with science and technology.  
This change in gender and identity has been well documented in SF films, however 
not toward a positive re-imagining of gender, the body, and its relationship to technology. 
The challenge that new technologies posed to masculine identity and its relationship with 
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technology in the electronic age, and how vastly it differed from masculine identity in the 
industrial age, can be seen in SF films toward the end of the twentieth century.44  
This flux in identity was visually documented in science fiction films of the 1980s 
(Kibby 1996:139). Sobchack saw the conflation of the horror and science fiction genres in 
films of the 1980s as resulting from the cultural and social changes of the prior decades 
(Kibby 1996:139). As Kibby (1996:139) states, “the conjunction of the horror and 
sci-fi genres is evident in the ‘cyborg’ films of the period, which enact the crisis inherent in 
the absence of a masculine identity and the loss of a patriarchal future”.  
Technology was traditionally the territory of man, as well as medico-scientific 
discourses. These discourses, previously solely contained within masculine discourse, 
were being penetrated by an ever increasing boundary crossing techno-presence intent on 
multiplicity. Connell (cited in Kibby 1996:142) explains a “historical division between forms 
of masculinity organised around direct domination, and forms organised around 
technological knowledge, suggesting that the latter have challenged the former for 
hegemony in advanced capitalist societies”.  
Along with this shift in the nature of the relationship between men and technology 
evolved the fear that men would eventually be replaced by these new forms of technology. 
The end of the 1970s was indicative of the culmination of social and technological changes 
of the previous decades; the swift changes to the nature of work; social changes resulting 
in previously under-represented groups, such as women, being added to the workforce; 
new industries; technological change that no longer valued some traditional skills (Kibby 
1996:141). 
Kibby (1996:140) cites the example of compositors in the 1970s being replaced by 
new computer technologies that dealt with photocomposition, effectively making this once 
essential and stable job description redundant (Kibby 1996:142). The growing numbers of 
women in the workplace in the 1970s, as well as new computer technologies destabilised 
many men in the workplace (Kibby 1996:142). The machine becomes the physical figure of 
this misplaced societal frustration. And although changing social roles, mechanisation, and 
technological change are not new issues, their representation in SF films has changed 
considerably over the last hundred years. 
Since films like Metropolis, technology and industrialisation have been pitted against 
the values of humanity (Kibby 1996:139). However in the cyborg cinema of the 1980s, a 
new threat is introduced in conjunction with the already negative representations of 
technological change and development- that man will be incorporated by the 
                                                            
44 Whereas in the Industrial Age, man was firmly in control of the machine, the Electronic Age signals the 
impending reversal of this relationship. As Marj Kibby expands, “… new technology has altered the familiar 
connection between masculinity and machinery. While the machinery of the industrial age required mastery by 
physical strength, the technology of the information age involves a more physically inert, passive approach” 
(Kibby 1996: 142). 
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machine (Kibby 1996:139). This fear of the loss of individuality strikes at the heart of 
Western post-Enlightenment related to the valorisation of the individual and the power that 
such an individualism would wield.  
The figure of the cyborg in 1980s film, as well as later depictions, “perpetuate, in 
exaggerated form, an industrial age metaphor of physical masculinity, in a nostalgic echo 
of a time when masculine superiority was taken for granted, guaranteed by an alliance with 
empowering technology” (Kibby 1996:144-145). The inherent change in gender identity 
that we observe in the Post-Modern era due to its focus on different subjectivities and 
multiplicity, resulted in a revolt against the destabilisation of a previously stable masculine 
identity. Whereas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a stable masculine identity 
was formed on binary opposition and man’s central role within the discourses of science, 
medicine and technology (of the industrial and machine age), the multiplicitous nature of 
the Post-Modern era heralded not only the destabilisation of such binary oppositions, but 
also the splicing together of different subjectivities that had previously stood in opposition 
to one another, and consequently, in opposition to patriarchal ideology. The looming figure 
of the cyborg in twentieth century fiction and medico-scientific discourse was the 
embodiment of the splicing together of man and machine within technological discourse. 
Whereas man had previously reigned supreme within the realm of technology during the 
machine age, the cyborg body, just as the New Woman and hysteric before, represented 
the shift in this power. 
 
4.4 The Cyborg: The Merging of the Monstrous Feminine and Mental Illness 
 
 Techno-Eroticism  
 
Claudia Springer states that the artistic depictions of technology in twentieth century 
Western culture have often conveyed techno-erotic impulses. She sites Italian futurism, 
which eroticized and fetishized the speed and force of machines as an early example. With 
the exception of the First World War, when the destructive force of technology was 
revealed, this fetishization of the technological continued into the twenty-first century 
(Springer 1996:3). As K.C. D’Alessandro (cited in Springer 1996:4) states: 
 
  Sexual metaphor in the description of locomotives, automobiles, pistons, and turbines; 
machine cults and the Futurist movement, Man with a Movie Camera, and Scorpio Rising 
– these are some of the ways technophiliacs have expressed their passion for technology. 
For technophiliacs, technology provides an erotic thrill – control over massive power, 
which can itself be used to control others… The physical manifestations of these 
machines – size, heft, shape, motions that thrust, pause and press again – represent 
human sexual responses on a grand scale. There is much to venerate in the technology of 
the industrial age. 
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Although D’Alessandro refers to the industrial age, we can see this trend in the 
electronic age too. The veneration of the cyborg body, A.I, computer technology, 
prosthetics, medical technology and so forth in television, media, advertising, literature, the 
cinema, and the popular imagination of the twenty-first century all exhibit the same trends 
as the focus of the industrial age on the automobile. Power, eroticism, control, gender and 
fetishization are still associated with technology today. 
It has been argued by theorists such as Springer that newer technologies, such as 
those found in the electronic age have stimulated changes in some techno-erotic imagery 
(Springer 1996:8). These changes in techno-erotic imagery lend themselves to the 
multiplicity of subjectivity advocated by the Post-Modern age. However, many other texts 
in popular culture simply re-use techno-erotic conventions that originated in the industrial 
age of the West. This recycled imagery does not fashion itself on the multiplicities present 
in modern day subjectivity, but instead clings to traditionalist models of the self, sexuality, 
gender and the body. 
According to Springer (1996:8) there is a “tendency in popular culture to associate 
computer technology with sexuality, creating a contradictory discourse that simultaneously 
predicts the obsolescence of human beings and a future of heightened erotic fulfilment”. 
She also points out that historians have ascertained that new inventions and new 
technologies have long been partnered with sexual imagery or impulse, citing the 
examples of ceramic technology being used for erotic artwork long before this technology 
was used for utilitarian purposes, and the use of communications media as a vehicle to 
express sexual impulses or imagery (Springer 1996:8-9).  
The question posed then is, if technology has no gender why then are representations 
or depictions of technology gendered and sexualised? We also find ourselves with a 
paradox in imagery of the electronic age, the obsolescence of the body, yet also the 
‘heightened’ erotic fulfilment that Springer speaks of. Where, but from the body, would this 
erotic fulfilment emerge from? Many theorists of the electronic age question what role the 
body plays in this new era of technology. On the one hand, we have an eroticised body, in 
whichever form, and on the other, the human mind set free from the limitations of its ‘meat-
suit’.  
As Vivian Sobchack, a film theorist, states, “if we don’t keep this subjective kind of 
bodily sense in mind as we negotiate out technoculture, then we, like… Baudrillard, will 
objectify ourselves to death” (cited in Springer 1996:7). Springer (1996:7) continues by 
saying that “those who adulate technology’s penetration of the human body and mind can 
lose sight of how the attempt to become a technological object leads inevitably to 
extinction”.  
If we contrast these sentiments with Donna Haraway’s notion of the cyborg, a human 
body that is spliced together to any extent with technology and lauded for this, we see the 
 117 
 
myriad theories and subjectivities that emerge from this electronic age, regarding the body. 
A commonality between all of these theories, however, is how the notion of the body is 
intimately linked with notions of humanity, gender, subjectivity and the heteronormative 
patriarchal conceptions that have traditionally been associated with notions of the body. As 
Springer (1996:10) states “debates about what it means to be male or female and how 
sexuality should be expressed often find their way into popular culture’s techno-erotic 
imagery. The imagery sometimes explores alternative types of sexuality and gender roles 
and at other times retreats to conventional stereotypes from the past”. 
 
4.5 Film Analysis 
 
SF film, as indicative of a cultural moment in time, has the powerful ability to reshape 
conceptions of technology, the body, and gender. Kaye Mitchel (2006:110) states that “SF 
is one of the discourses… that can serve to reformulate the social and cultural meanings of 
the gendered body in the technological age, as well as imaginatively refashioning its very 
forms… in some hypothesized future world”. The discussion of key SF films of the late 
twentieth century will enable a critique of the Postmodern cyborg, and its transgressive 
abilities as posited by Donna Haraway. As Kibby suggests “Masculinity was under 
challenge in the eighties, in face of an apparently feminising technology and a perceived 
decline in patriarchal power. The image of the technobody was one expression of this 
crisis” (Kibby 1996:143) Kibby also states that in order to quell this anxiety “many of the 
‘cyborg films’ of the eighties insistently maternalise the technological, either displacing the 
feminine in a masculine reproductive cycle; depicting the maternal as ‘monstrous’ (Creed 
1990); or enunciating a misogynist logic” (Kibby 1996:143). By aligning the figure of the 
cyborg with the feminine, this anxiety is placed onto the figure of the female (Doane 
2000:163). 
This anxiety surfaces in the form of the hysterical outburst. The hysterical outburst 
perpetrated by the cyborg is constructed by various medico-scientific and technological 
discourses that inform the imaging of this act of defiance. By incorporating visual signifiers 
of mental illness, most notably mania and hysteria, the cyborg is pathologised and their 
actions intimately linked to not only the monstrous feminine imbued with the threat of 
castration, but also with the castrating threat associated with a technology that has 
destabilised masculine identity; added to this, the discourse of mania and hysteria, which 
firmly establish it as a female malady further strengthens the linkage between the 
monstrous feminine, mental illness, and technology. The hysterical outburst not only 
pathologises the behaviour of the cyborg, but also effectively neutralises any radical 
potential afforded to this figure in the work of authors such as Donna Haraway.  
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Alien (1979) 
 
In the film Alien directed by Ridley Scott, two key characters emerge as central figures in 
the re-inscription of the construction of the symbolic female in SF film. ‘Mother’ (Helen 
Horton), the ship’s on-board computer, and ‘Ash’ (Ian Holm) the ship’s robot doctor stand 
as figures of estrangement and the symbolic female in this SF narrative that serves to re-
inscribe traditional ideologies relating to notions of the ‘human’, as well as female 
deviance. The character Mother, defies traditional gender binaries as well as hierarchies 
between humans and technology. The computer is gendered in two off-screen acts: by 
naming a computer, it is immediately anthropomorphised; and by naming it ‘Mother’, it is 
assigned traits traditionally associated with ‘inherently’ female mothering traits, as well as 
signalling the ‘proper’ place of woman, the private sphere of the home. This also acts to 
produce a set of expectations in the audience as to how she should act. Her voice, 
although limited in tonal quality, is feminine, adding to the computer’s inscription as female 
and subsequently cements her role as ‘mother'. 
Mother, who is assigned to help the crew in any way possible, keep them safe, plan 
and execute their mission, and run the ship, eventually attempts to kill the crew. By being 
willing to sacrifice the lives of the crew, the figure of Mother presents to the viewer an 
unforgiveable treachery in patriarchal society – infanticide, as well as inferring the damage 
that technology will do to the idea of ‘woman-as-mother’. In addition to this, Mother also 
invokes castration anxiety in the viewer, as will be described later on.  
Mother’s programming objective is to attain, at all costs, a sample from the planetoid 
that the ship receives a transmission from, despite the crew not knowing this, and get the 
sample back to Earth for analysis. Mother and the crew's mission is planned and funded 
by a mega-corporation named, Weyland. The apparent disregard for human life by Mother, 
as well as Weyland, speaks to societal anxiety about the role of capitalism and technology 
in destabilising traditional divisions of power. As Marj Kibby (1996:141) states, “in a society 
that uses machines to replace, exploit or control men, anger is displaced from the societal 
source of the frustration, onto the machine”. Mother stands as a placeholder for this source 
of frustration, and by combining male fears about the interplay between capitalism and 
technology in the destabilisation of a patriarchal future, with a computer not only gendered 
female but also one that is expected to behave as its name would suggest, the figure of 
Mother portrays two threats to male dominance ‒ women and technology.  
Upon the death of all of the crew, except for Ripley, Mother eventually explains her 
mission. We also discover that ‘Ash’, the crew’s doctor, is in fact a robot, and in on 
Mother’s ruthless mission. Mother’s blatant disregard for human life as well as traditional 
patriarchal notions of women and ‘mother’s’ is labelled as insanity. By invoking the 
discourse of the ‘wayward female’ to explain Mother’s actions, her ‘illogical’ actions are 
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justifiably quarantined, just as mentally ill women of the nineteenth century were interned 
in asylums. The transgressive and revolutionary element within the discourse of the 
hysteric was neutralised through visual signification of madness onto the body of the 
hysteric. Mother is represented as insane through her claiming of the objective masculine 
role; posing a threat to traditional hierarchies; symbolising the fear of castration; as well as 
acting in opposition to her appropriate role as ‘mother’. Relegating Mother to the realm of 
insanity neutralises her within the film (which also ensures her death), as well as further 
neutralising any transgressive or boundary crossing ability that this figure might have had. 
While the ship’s self-destruct counter continues, Ripley while trying to save herself, 
appeals to Mother’s illogically assigned ‘motherly’ and assumed ‘nurturing’ character by 
begging her for help. When Ripley is denied this she screams ‘You bitch!’ picks up a pipe, 
and hits the wall of the ship. Mother’s calm and almost robotic tone during this interaction 
with Ripley also establishes Mother as a figure of estrangement within the film; although 
she has been assigned motherly qualities through her name, as well as the higher pitch of 
her voice, the familiar signifiers, visual and otherwise, normally associated with a mother 
have been disregarded by the character. The removed manner in which she engages with 
Ripley as the ship self-destructs, constructs Mother as a figure outside of the normal 
context within which a ‘mother’ would fall. Mother’s non-diegetic tone also contrasts 
sharply with the ensuing drama on the ship, which further alienates ‘Mother’ from any 
traditional maternal or nurturing qualities by alerting the audience to the strangeness 
inherent in this scene, as well as Mother’s un-motherly behaviour. 
Mother acts as a figure of estrangement in this film, as technology has estranged 
women from their proper role in the home, and her death is justified through the spectacle 
used to communicate the havoc and danger that Mother’s behaviour creates. She stands 
as a symbol of societal change and questions the role of men within society and their 
relationship with technology within that system. Through her disregard for her role within 
the hierarchy of human-technological interaction, she destabilizes traditional technological 
hierarchies, which previously posited men as dominant, as most of the crew lose their lives 
because of Mother’s inhumane decisions to sacrifice them for the mission. 
As Marj Kibby (1996:139) states “qualms about the changing relationship between 
masculinity and technology are written on the figure of the cyborg… [and] the eighties 
proliferated an established theme ‘that pitted human values against the presumed non-
values of technology and mechanisation’”. Mother’s disregard for human life as well as her 
very ‘un-Motherly’ behaviour reifies this notion of the “non-values of technology”. The 
figure of Mother then acts as not only a comment on technological advancement, but also 
reflects the fear of societal change and the role that this change plays in destabilising 
patriarchy.  
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Mother is coded as female and her immoral and evil behaviour assure her death from 
the outset of the film. By aligning her disregard for human life with insanity, Mother pays 
the price of not only the aberrant technology that malfunctioned, but also of the woman 
that did not know her place.  
Although the figure of Mother has potential to imagine human-technological interaction 
differently, she is instead killed due to the threat she poses to patriarchy and because she 
stands as a symbol of cultural and societal change within the realm of technology and 
patriarchy. Mother is also illustrative of the demise of the gendered human body within 
society. As the film progresses, we see the fear and anxiety over the loss of the sexed 
body that Chilcoat speaks of. Ripley is sexualised, gazed upon, and heavily eroticized at 
the end of the film, almost as a consolation prize. In sexualising the character of Ripley 
and offering her body to be consumed as eroticised figure, it reaffirms traditional gender 
roles that Mother has so blatantly disregarded. 
Another possibly transgressive character in the film that succumbs to a hysterical 
demise is the ship’s on-board physician, ‘Ash’. The realisation that ‘Ash’ is a robot, and not 
a human being as previously assumed, codes Ash as a figure of estrangement for the 
audience. This pre-empts Ash’s proceeding actions in the film as deviant. 
As readily as Ash was accepted in the beginning of the film, the discovery that he is a 
robot catapults him into ‘uncanny valley’ and leaves the audience cold and fearful at the 
knowledge that they were so easily mislead by this figure of ‘the double’. The fear of the 
human double, that which is not quite human, but scarily similar, results in an atavistic 
grasping at traditional ideologies informing our conceptions of ‘human’, ‘gender’, and 
‘technology’. The crew in general respond to Ash as if he were human, also signalling the 
trust of future humans, of the technological double. By trusting Ash, the crew endanger 
their lives, and this act of trust, and the resulting violent consequences, serve as a lesson 
not to ‘trust the technology’. This act is mirrored in the mimetic character of the hysteric, 
who as stated by Jean-Martin Charcot, copied the physical and visual markers of epilepsy 
during their own hysterical attacks. Ash is marked by deviance by ‘pretending’ to be 
human, and is further marked as deviant in his death scene, through the invocation of the 
abject. 
Violence is exacted upon him swiftly due to the fact that he aided ‘Mother’ in her 
mission and because he concealed that he was a robot. In the scene where Ash is killed 
by one of the crew members, we see him spinning around; arching his back; and having 
visual disturbances – three dominant visual markers of the hysterical attack as theorised 
by Jean-Martin Charcot. This death ‘fit’ as seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, which Ash 
succumbs to as he is killed, justifies his killing. Ash spews white liquid from a variety of 
orifices while he is dying. He spins around violently, and when he finally crashes to the 
floor, his body maimed, he once more comes to life and tries to kill another one of the crew 
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members. This scene justifies what the film has been implying from the start; Ash as a 
deviant-hysterical-female-automan that is not to be trusted. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Still from Alien (1979). Dir. Ridley Scott. Depicting Ash’s (Ian Holm) death fit. 
[120 minutes]. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Still from Alien (1979). Dir. Ridley Scott. Depicting Ash’s (Ian Holm) death fit. 
[120 minutes]. 
 
The filmic conventions used throughout the film are cold, almost robotic, and the 
narrative sequences proceed at a medium pace. Scenes of violence, danger, or those 
which highlight the abject, are differentiated with changes in lighting, the chaotic and haptic 
movement of the camera that mimic a first person perspective (the audience member feels 
like they are in the violence or drama), the scene mirrors an earlier scene in the film where 
one of the crew members, Kane, played by John Hurt, births the offspring of the alien from 
his chest from an egg that has been previously implanted in him. Ash’s death scene 
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echoes this earlier scene in that the abject, monstrous, and feminine are invoked in both, 
as seen in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Still from Alien (1979). Dir. Ridley Scott. depicting ‘the birth’. 
 [53 minutes]. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Still from Alien (1979). Dir. Ridley Scott. Depicting ‘the birth’. 
 [53 minutes]. 
 
Julia Kristeva’s notion of the abject, as discussed in chapter three, aligns Ash with the 
symbolic feminine. This is combined with previous feelings of uncanniness towards Ash, 
when the audience member questions who or what he is, and, lastly, the monstrous is 
invoked when Ash excretes the white liquid, has a hysterical attack, and then rises from 
the dead to kill again. 
These visual markers as well as the visual treatment of this scene, solidify the link 
between Ash and the symbolic female traits that he has been assigned; hysterical and 
boundary crossing traits that somehow legitimize his death. Ash simultaneously represents 
the threat to masculine (and human) identity posed by advancing technology, as well as 
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the threat posed by women to this identity and patriarchy. By aligning Ash with the 
symbolic feminine through visually marking him as hysterical or insane, his death is not 
only warranted, but this also neutralises the threat that Ash poses to patriarchy (and 
traditional notions of gender and what it means to be human) symbolically, as well as in 
the film. 
However, when logically approached, Ash was carrying out instructions, instructions 
given to him by human beings that programmed him. The critique initially posed by Alien 
falls flat through the violent re-assertion of traditional ideologies regarding women, 
technology, society, and patriarchy, with the killing of both Mother and Ash. 
The characters of Ash and Mother are also visually coded as ‘normal’. Ash looks like a 
human man and Mother looks like a subservient computer and in light of her name should 
possess the qualities of a mother. When they discover that the robots do not behave in the 
way that they were visually coded, the outrage of the humans is justified. Their death is 
further justified by casting them both as figures of estrangement, thus invoking a clear 
distinction between what is ‘normal’ and the characters of Mother and Ash who are coded 
as ‘abnormal’. The hysterical fit that Ash has during his death as well as Mother’s ‘un-
motherly’ and homicidal behaviour further align these characters with the hysterical woman 
of the nineteenth century.  
The visual diagnosis of Mother and Ash as insane further aligns these characters with 
the hysteric. The primacy of vision in Western Culture, that posits visual observation, 
especially within medico-scientific discourse, as akin to pure truth, acted as a weapon of 
control for both the hysteric and these two characters in Alien. The mimetic nature of 
hysteria, as well as Mother and Ash, elicit fear in that this behaviour is uncanny and 
challenges the hegemony of vision in ascertaining the true nature of an object/subject. This 
fear is allayed by the death of both characters. The challenge posed to the visual 
supremacy of medico-scientific discourse (in the case of the hysteric) and the challenge 
posed to the human crew on-board the ship in Alien both contest the role that vision and 
the visual ‘diagnosis’ of deviance has played in establishing and reifying the dominance of 
patriarchy. 
The outrage at this visual trickery of the human crew conjures up images of the 
hysteric, her ‘visual judgement’ and the outrage of the doctors upon discovery of a mimetic 
representation of another disease by the hysteric. If we look at images of inmates in 
asylums such as Bicêtre and La Salpêtrière, we see that as Ash dies in the film his 
gestures and physical movement are visually coded as ‘hysterical’. The well documented 
hysterics, especially at La Salpêtrière, were photographed by their male physicians so as 
to bring the mysterious disease into the realm of visual observation, and thus into the light 
of scientific reason. The scientific documentation of these women brought the disease into 
the Symbolic Order and therefore, into the realm of language. Once the doctors had 
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discovered the disease through visual observation, they were then able to classify it and 
bring it under the control of Western scientific rational thought.  
The medico-scientific community during the nineteenth century relied heavily on visual 
observation as a diagnostic tool and this statement of ‘objective truth’ revealed to the 
doctor, was further strengthened by the incorporation of new technologies at the time 
relating to the visual, namely the camera and photographic plate. Ash is similarly visually 
diagnosed as insane and hysterical, and is subsequently deemed too emotional because 
of it. The transgressive qualities of this character are neutralised through this diagnosis 
and his eventual death for transgressing boundaries so central to dominant ideologies. 
 
Star Trek: First Contact (1996) 
 
In Star Trek: First Contact, the interaction between the Borg Queen (Alice Krige) and Data 
(Brent Spiner) is exceptional in that it quickly becomes apparent that the scenes between 
them hold no other purpose than to stage a play of traditional gender role transgression, 
and the subsequent punishment of that transgression. The film is at the outset posited as a 
narrative about the conquering of the unknown by human beings. The series and the films 
in the Star Trek franchise are all coded as the domination of the natural world by man, 
albeit the foreign and Other natural world of outer space. The Borg queen captures Data 
and the scene opens with her head being lowered from the ceiling into a biomechanical 
suit.45 Immediately she is aestheticized as grotesque and Other due to the fact that she is 
not visually represented as traditionally female. Her bald head, phallic spine, awkward 
body, and discoloured skin establish this image of Other and invoke Creed’s notion of the 
abject, as seen in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
                                                            
45 The Borg are a communist style entity that re-occur throughout the Star Trek franchise as a threat to 
Western style democracy, notions of the self, human, and gender. 
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Figure 4.5: Still from Star Trek: First Contact (1996). Dir. Jonathan Frakes. Depicting ‘The 
Borg Queen’ (Alice Krige). [44 minutes]. 
 
Figure 4.6: Still from Star Trek: First Contact (1996). Dir. Jonathan Frakes. Depicting ‘The 
Borg Queen’ (Alice Krige). [44 minutes]. 
 
The Borg also elicits images of Communism, and this coupled with the Borg queen’s 
appearance, simultaneously grotesque and eroticised, further establishes her as Other. 
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She is also referred to as ‘the Borg queen’, which genders and individualises her. This is 
ironic due to the fact that historically in the Star Trek franchise, the Borg is a leaderless 
and genderless Communist style entity that stands opposed to individuality and the 
Enlightenment humanist discourse within which this SF film is situated. This link to the 
‘wayward female’ is made firstly, by the way in which she is judged and found guilty of 
being Other by means of a visual analysis of her appearance and behaviour, and 
secondly, by her improper way of assuming the subjective and traditionally masculine role, 
and not the role of ‘object’ in her interaction with the male Data.  
Data is the subservient robot assistant to Captain Pickard and his behaviour and 
interaction with the crew are marked by logic and rationality. He is visually coded as male 
from the start of the franchise, and yet the purpose of this has yet to be explained in the 
series or the films that followed. Data longs to ‘feel’ human and he is given this opportunity, 
briefly, by the Borg queen (see Figure 4.7). 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Still from Star Trek: First Contact (1996). Dir. Jonathan Frakes. Depicting Data 
(Brent Spiner). [44 minutes]. 
 
As opposed to the positive boundary crossing image of the cyborg being established 
by these two characters, a re-establishing of traditional gender roles, this time in the 
technological domain of the future, is created instead. Data and the Borg queen are 
rendered useless as examples of the Haraway’s notion of the cyborg as positively 
transgressive and gender-defying in that they are both deliberately and rigidly gendered 
from the start. By assigning deviant female visual markers to the Borg queen, she is able 
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to represent all that is Other; female-communist-machine-human-hybrid-insane. Her 
interaction with and treatment of Data visually and symbolically juxtaposes female against 
male and in so doing, further highlights the Borg queen’s Otherness and the challenge that 
she poses to established notions of ‘being’ female. 
The Borg queen’s punishment by death can only be ‘logically’ justified in relation to her 
interactions with Data. Her overt claiming of the subjective role in their interactions, and 
unconcealed boundary crossing, coupled with her ‘insane’ notion to assimilate all humans 
and so maintain the subjective role, is a monumental challenge to traditional gender roles 
as well as to the notion of individuality that is lauded by Western society. The way in which 
this deviance is communicated is through her interactions with Data. As Data has been 
visually coded as male, the visual and symbolic communication of the Borg queen’s 
aberrant behaviour is explicitly presented to the viewer. Her deviance is further highlighted 
when it is read against Data’s subservient male character.  
The Borg queen, in her quest to assimilate Data, attaches a piece of bio-mechanical 
flesh to Data’s arm. She attaches sensors to his brain and so, for the first time, Data can 
feel physical sensation. This experience of corporeality that Data has longed for, finally 
gives him a glimpse of what it means to be human, at least in his opinion. Data is faced 
with an ideological choice at this point in the film, give up his individuality, or join the Borg 
and ‘feel’ human. A juxtaposition of two characteristics of the human experience: 
individuality and corporeality.  
Two important underlying ideological narratives surface through the interaction of Data 
and the Borg queen. On the one hand, we see the choice Data has to make: feel more 
human with the bodily experience the Borg queen offers him, and coincidentally ‘be’ more 
human as a result, whilst giving up the individuality so treasured by Western society; or 
deny her offer and continue to be subservient to the human crew and stay in his 
designated role, one that is befitting of a cyborg. Because as much as Data is ‘respected’ 
by the human crew members, he is only respected inasmuch as he stays within the 
boundaries deemed appropriate by his makers. The second sub-plot reveals itself as the 
interplay between the Borg queen and Data develops. As the Borg queen assumes the 
traditionally male role, Data becomes the object in this interaction – traditional roles are 
reversed, and traditional hierarchies are questioned through this interaction. 
Data is symbolically coded as female in the way in which his body is overcome by the 
power of the sensations that he experiences after the Borg queen attaches the 
biomechanical flesh. Data begins writhing and seems sexually aroused for the first time in 
his life, as he is strapped to a table. The sexual nature of this scene is undeniable. Data’s 
physical experience is represented as deviant, and the overtly sexual nature of his 
experience further solidifies this experience as deviant. Just so, the deviant sexual nature 
of this scene mirrors the deviant sexually associated with hysteria in the nineteenth 
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century. The way in which Data reacts to physical stimulation, by writhing and arching, 
further aligns this scene visually with images of a hysterical attack. The women 
photographed by Jean-Martin Charcot display strikingly similar physical movements and 
gestures during their attacks. This further aligns the visual signification of Data with that of 
the nineteenth-century hysteric as constructed by Charcot. Data is overcome by the 
physical sensation, as was the hysteric, further highlighting the irrational nature associated 
with being ‘overcome’ by one’s bodily desires.  
The hysteric was chastised and eventually institutionalised for not adhering to 
dominant ideologies pertaining to the proper behaviour of women, especially with regards 
to sexuality. Any attempt at transgressing these boundaries was classed as deviant. In the 
extreme case of the hysterical woman, she was represented as sexually deviant through 
the use of visual signification. These signifiers of mental illness were established through 
the use of illustration, and eventually the camera in the medical fraternity. These visual 
signifiers policed traditional hierarchies through presenting boundary crossers as deviant 
and mentally ill.  
In much the same way, Data is threatened with similar punishment. If he refuses the 
social and ideological codes of his human creators, those which are intrinsic in society, for 
example, ideologies surrounding gender and patriarchy, then he will be punished. 
Strangely though, with the sub-plot of Data being male, he is essentially coded as female, 
almost giving in to his bodily whims, but at the last minute refusing them, this is the action 
that ‘saves’ Data from punishment or deactivation by the human crew. The character to be 
punished by them for her extreme boundary crossing is the Borg queen. In claiming the 
role of power in her interaction with Data, she assures her death by the end of the film. 
The Borg queen resembles the hysteric in two ways in this film: firstly, she is visually 
coded as Other, and secondly by claiming the subjective role in relation to the male Data. 
When a female hysteric addressed a male physician directly, she claimed a place in the 
Symbolic Order. The Borg queen endeavours to do the same through her position of 
power over Data. This act of speaking directly to male physicians challenged the 
superiority of the male physical, and consequently traditional ideologies. The challenge to 
traditional ideologies or the transgressive nature of the Borg queen is neutralised by her 
visual signification as Other, as well as the subjective role she claims in her interactions 
with Data. 
 
 Blade Runner (1982) 
 
Directed by Ridley Scott, this film set in 2019 Los Angeles tracks the demise of three 
‘replicants’. Replicants as explained in the film ‘were designed to copy human beings in 
every form except their emotions…the designers reckoned that after a few years, they 
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might develop their own emotional responses. So they built in a fail-safe device, four year 
life span’. Replicants were used as off-planet labour, and were designed to die after four 
years. The film depicts three replicants who have escaped back to Earth. ‘Pris’ (Daryl 
Hannah) is what the film describes as ‘a basic pleasure model’ and was used as a sex-
slave for off-planet service men.  
 ‘Deckard’ (Harrison Ford) is tasked with finding and killing these escaped replicants, 
and in order to differentiate them from human beings, an interrogation while under retinal 
scan are required. Deckard eventually finds Pris in the home of an employee of the Tyrell 
Corporation, who developed the replicants. Pris, who throughout the film is depicted as a 
child-like girl, playing with toys and giggling, despite her purposed invention to function as 
a ‘pleasure model’, suddenly becomes violent and hysterical when confronted by Deckard. 
In Figure 4.8, we see the beginning of this confrontation, with Pris fighting for her life. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Still from Blade Runner (1982). Dir. Ridley Scott. Depicting Pris (Darryl 
Hannah) in her death scene. [129 minutes]. 
 
 Pris, although a cybernetic organism, is gendered for her role as prostitute/slave for 
her human inventors/masters. She is simultaneously visually signified in a hyper-sexual 
manner and her body is eroticised throughout the film. In the film, Pris is imaged in this 
death scene as uncontrollable, violent, and monstrous, all visual cues that alert the viewer 
to her status as deviant female. As she fights Deckard for her life, saliva shoots from her 
mouth, sweat drips down her face, and in Figure 4.8, she is attempting to suffocate 
Deckard with her legs. These all constitute Pris as monstrous and abject. Through this 
signification, in order for the boundaries between human and machine, ‘good woman’ and 
‘seductress’, to be re-drawn, Pris must die.  
 Pris is further classed as uncanny, because of her resemblance to the human form, 
her obvious visual gendering, and the fact that she has implanted memories, which made 
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her believe that she was human until she discovered otherwise. Deckard eventually shoots 
Pris, and she begins to have a hysterical fit. The violent and wild way in which her body 
responds, her ferocious screams, her terrifying facial expressions, and the staccato 
movement of the camera and stuttered lighting, align Pris with the visual signifiers of 
female deviance as seen in images of Hysteria, as seen in Figures 4.9 and 4.10. 
 Pris’ death is justified by visually aligning her with notions of the abject, the uncanny, 
and the monstrous deviant female. Pris in her very nature is a challenge to established 
modes of being, however, it is the link to the hysteric that is posited as the reason for her 
death. Her mediation by technology and patriarchal discourse structure her as the deviant-
female-automan, and these visual signifiers warrant her death. By having a hysterical fit 
after Deckard has shot her, her ‘true essence’ has finally been arrested by the lens. The 
spectacle of her death then justifies her murder by Deckard. 
 Spectacle, vision, the eye- as communicators of truth, validate not only their inclusion 
in current modes of society by ‘arresting’ Pris’ true essence and uncovering her hidden 
nature, but they also reify their function as producers of knowledge. Pris’ reaction to getting 
shot is the justification for the act itself. Although Pris has been used as a sex-slave for 
almost four years, this never comes to stand as a justification for her supposed deviance. 
Deckard shooting her is also not a viable reason in the film for her violent reaction.  
 
 
Figure 4.9: Still from Blade Runner (1982). Dir. Ridley Scott. Depicting Pris (Darryl 
Hannah) in her death scene. [129 minutes]. 
 
 131 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Still from Blade Runner (1982). Dir. Ridley Scott. Depicting Pris (Darryl 
Hannah) in her death scene. [129 minutes]. 
 
 Characters such as Pris; Data; Ash; Mother; and the Borg Queen, widely circulated 
images of cyborgs in blockbuster films of the late twentieth century, never realise the 
transgressive abilities bestowed on them by Donna Haraway. Haraway’s notion of cyborg 
as the next stage in development of humanity, and a creature that is not definitively male 
or female, is not reflected in these characters, or the characters mentioned in chapter 
three. 
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Conclusion 
 
The figure of the late twentieth-century cyborg as depicted in Science Fiction films is 
constructed by popular myth and imagination; fact; and the scientism that inflects 
Postmodern ways of being. I have argued that the cyborg acts as a repository for the 
anxieties that result from technological and cultural change, and have fulfilled this function 
historically from the myths of Aristotle; the Golem of Prague; the automata of the sixteenth 
century; to the modern day cyborg. Changing socio-cultural landscapes, the presumed 
threat to valorised ocular practices; patriarchy; and established notions of ‘self’, ‘gender’, 
and ‘human’ are reflected in the visualisation of the cyborg. The anxieties of rapid 
technological and scientific discovery and development mould the body of the onscreen 
cyborg in the twentieth century. 
The conceptualisation of the cyborg by Donna Haraway (1991) posits the cyborg as 
a transgressive icon for the twentieth century that represents lived social relations. For 
Haraway the cyborg stands as an icon in socialist feminist discourse that could re-imagine 
the binary systems that structure lived experience. Because this creature of fiction and 
reality functions in a border zone between constructions of male/female, reality/fiction, and 
human/machine, the cyborg is able to transgress these boundaries. Haraway’s cyborg 
however is sourced from Science Fiction literature, and she does not fully situate the 
cyborg historically, nor does she acknowledge the power of vision in construction of 
knowledge and communicating supposed truth. 
 Authors such as Rosie Braidotti, Claudia Springer, Marj Kibby, and Anne Balsamo 
have addressed the notion of the ‘cyborg’ and its representations within film and media, as 
well as philosophically. The figure of the onscreen cyborg as such is worth investigating 
and its efficacy as Haraway has posited it, worth exploring. However, Haraway’s 
conception of the cyborg is brought into question when contrasting it with the visual 
representation of the cyborg in Science Fiction films. The question of whether the figure of 
the cyborg as it is represented in Science Fiction film of the late 1980s; 1990s; and 2000s, 
can stand as an icon of a post-gendered world has been problematized in this thesis by 
locating the cyborg within a longer history of representation, its historical context as the 
automaton, and when read against the body of the hysteric. 
 As I have argued, the relation of the cyborg to the feminised Other and female 
deviance inform the construction of the onscreen cyborg. Similar socio-cultural contexts 
gave rise to the deviant female (as Hysteric and New Woman), and the cyborg (as 
feminised deviant Other). Similarly, the visual practices that construct the Other, gender, 
deviance, and pathology exist in both the hysteric, and the cyborg. Although both the 
hysteric as New Woman/revolutionary, and the cyborg are representative of possible 
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positive technological change and development because of their transgressive capabilities 
that are enabled by socio-cultural change (as a result of technological transformation), 
both are Othered because of these transgressive capabilities. As a boundary transgressor 
and because of the partiality of its very being, the cyborg is naturally Othered in a culture 
informed by patriarchy. However, unlike the powerless position, or rather, no position at all 
that the Other is usually found in, Haraway emphasizes the fact that because of this non-
being, the Other can find a collectivity in its ‘Otherness’. 
 However, the onscreen cyborg does not garner power from this Otherness; instead, it 
is gendered, feminised, and signified as deviant. Through signifying the cyborg with a 
visual language of the past that constructs deviance and pathology, the cyborg’s 
transgressive abilities are neutralised. The hysteric/New Woman/revolutionary, were 
similarly pathologised as mentally ill or sexually deviant. By looking at figures such as 
Augustine and Pris, the deviant eroticised female body is displayed as pathological. This 
pathology is signified through visual markers of mental illness that have circulated 
throughout patriarchal discourse and techni-scientism as long as medical practice has 
made use of visual modes of communication. 
 Upon the elicitation of the hysterical outburst by the camera, the doctor, or the robot 
killer, the pathology is justified once again through visual signification. At the same time, 
the visual signification justifies its own use because it has ‘discovered’ the inner secrets, 
hidden truths, or inherent structure of this hyper sexualised deviant female.  
Although technological progress is lauded in these films, it is only portrayed in a 
positive light as long as its control stays firmly in the hands of human beings. When this 
technology is not controlled by humans, and the product of this technological progress, the 
cyborg, is in control, the demise of the cyborg when it is inevitably overthrown by the 
human characters in the films, is in fact a very human, hysterical death scene. What I 
would argue is that what is being represented here is a struggle between the emotional 
versus the rational, nature versus culture, female versus male. Conversely, on the side of 
the humans, emotion (good, controlled emotion) triumphs over the rational and logical 
cyborg. Essential human ‘nature’ will overcome the technological scourge. And yet 
ironically, the final scene cementing this triumph of the human will is that of the cyborg 
having a very emotional hysterical death/system crash. So emotions are good, as long as 
they are tempered by a measure of rationality – and this is the true ‘essence’ of humanity, 
read ‘male’. The onscreen cyborg is not only produced by the culture that gave rise to it, 
but informs that culture on the production of itself, situated within a patriarchal Western 
discourse informed by ocularcentrism. 
Although these cinematic icons of the Science Fiction genre elicit an almost 
grotesque intrigue through the use of notions of the abject, uncanny, and monstrous, the 
resultant fear of the possibility of the destruction of what it means to be human (class, 
 134 
 
race, gender and so forth) and the human race, brings about an overwhelming urge to 
punish these transgressors of traditional boundaries, not to laud them. The power of the 
image of the cyborg, and what it could do to dismantle these archaic notions of humanity is 
lost in these films when an almost pathological need for their domination and destruction 
by ‘real’ humans and the reassertion of traditional patriarchal ideologies overcomes the 
other characters onscreen, as well as the audience. A reassertion of traditional roles that 
are linked to being human are violently re-inscribed on these transgressors, and if they 
resist, their undoing is imminent. If they do not submit to these re-inscriptions, they are 
killed off and the killing is justified by the way in which they die, a hysterical crashing of 
their system; which assures the audience of their insanity. Ironically, this ‘over-emotional’ 
death would lead us to believe that they were killed because they were ‘too human’. 
Paradoxically, the values of traditional humanity overcoming the cyborg and technology 
that has gotten out of hand by acting ‘too rational’, and on the other we have the death of 
the cyborg for being ‘too human’ – corporeality being an integral part of human experience. 
However, the experience of the hysterical outburst or attack is somehow deemed ‘too 
human’ by being so emotional, and so infringes on the boundary between human and 
machine, male and female, and so forth. 
One could argue that the reason for the death of the cyborg in question is then 
warranted as it is verging, or attempting to verge, on becoming human itself, with 
corporeality itself understood as one of the milestones of the human experience, yet it is 
presented in a negative way and the cyborg’s punishment is justified because it dared to 
encroach on a traditionally human pastime.  
 The gendering of these characters, as discussed in Alien and Star Trek, has little to no 
significance to the narrative of the film, except to act out a re-imagining of traditional 
ideologies. Cyborg characters in these films are labelled as deviant, and as such, could 
effectively challenge traditional ideologies. However, this attempt to level a challenge at 
dominant modes of thinking is never realised, and is instead neutralised through their 
quarantine (by being depicted as deviant in a negative way), and eventually their 
revolutionary potential is permanently silenced through death. 
The image of the cyborg, and the possibilities that this image holds, are lost due to 
the highly gendered nature that these characters are imbued with. The interactions of 
these characters and their visual signification that alerts the audience to their Otherness 
are aligned with that of the nineteenth-century hysteric, pathology, and deviance. The 
primacy of the eye and vision in Western culture that constructs the deviance, visually, of 
these characters, as well as the ‘disease’ Hysteria is totally disregarded. The role of visual 
communication and how this assigns meaning, needs to be thoroughly unpacked and 
problematized with regard to gendered technology in Science Fiction films. 
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For Science Fiction film, a place where new possibilities and versions of the world 
are imagined, a thorough re-visiting of the gendering, visual coding and gendered 
interactions of these characters is needed if any semblance of the cyborg, in the sense 
that Donna Haraway has posited it, can claim any agency in transgressing or subverting 
heteronormative thinking. 
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